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ABSTRACT
This study examines the contemporary discourses of 
journalism and pedagogy from the standpoint of critical 
theory to assess the impact of technocratic rationality and 
instrumental logic on the practices of communication and 
education. It is premised on the observation that, spurred 
by the imperatives of t r a ns-nationa1 capital accumulation, 
privatization inimical to democratic interests has begun to 
colonize public education. The study represents an effort to 
reactivate a concept and rhetoric of "social responsibility" 
that would animate a project of reclaiming cultural space to 
be occupied by a "public sphere," in a struggle analagous to 
that waged against feudalism and monarchical "Divine Right."
The study argues that communication and education, the 
essential minima of language, are the basic elements of all 
cultural development. It makes the case that, by deploying 
artificial antinomies, education and communication techno­
bureaucracy conceals fundamental similarities between the 
projects of journalism and pedagogy at the levels of both 
theory and p r a c t i c e - -with respect to their complementary 
roles in enabling citizen participation and appropr iat ing 
social knowledge in democratic culture--in order to better 
facilitate reproduction of dominant corporatist ideologies.
Tak ing as the parad igm case the U.S. Supreme C o u r t 's 
1988 decision in the matter of Hazelwood School District v . 
Kuhlme i e r , the study applies a Foucauld ian analytic to
v i
evaluate both the Court's decision and responses to it in 
mainstream press editorials, press industry trade and 
association periodicals, and journalism reviews. It finds 
mainstream acceptance on the grounds of its representation 
of real world" conditions, equivocal "balance" in the 
trades, and "resistance" themes in the reviews.
The study then thematizes the operation of techno- 
bureaucratic rationality in the decline of the bourgeois 
public sphere, and responds to critics who have disparaged 
social responsibility theory. Finally, it argues for the 
relevance of such a theory, and explores its implications 
as a rationale for educational praxis based on the public 
sphere as counterpoise to the hegemony of state corporatism. 
Suggestions for further research on the impact potential of 
desk-top publishing installed in communities, condominium- 
style, and prepared for by teaching journalistic praxis for 




T h e  p e o p l e  are the o n l y  c e n s o r s  of their 
g o v e r n o r s . . . .  T h e  w a y  to prevent, t h [ e i r ] i r r e g u l a r  
i n t e r p o s i t i o n s .  .is t. o g i v e  t h e m  full i n f o r m a t i o n  
of t h e i r  a f f a i r s  thro' the c h a n n e l  of the p u b l i c  
p a p e r s ,  and to c o n t r i v e  that t h o s e  p a p e r s  s h o u l d  
p e n e t r a t e  the w h o l e  m a s s  of the p e o p l e .  . . [ W ] e r e  it
left to me to d e c i d e  w h e t h e r  we s h o u l d  hav e  a 
g o v e r n m e n t  w i t h o u t  n e w s p a p e r s ,  or n e w s p a p e r s  
w i t h o u t  a g o v e r n m e n t ,  I s h o u l d  no t  h e s i t a t e  for a 
m o m e n t  to p r e f e r  the l a t t e r  but I s h o u l d  m e a n  
that e v e r y  man s h o u l d  r e c e i v e  t h o s e  p a p e r s  & be 
c a p a b l e  of r e a d i n g  t h e m  ( J e f f e r s o n ,  1966, p. 101)
We a r e  r e a c h i n g  the p o i n t  w h e r e  s o m e  of our m o s t  
b a s i c  b e l i e f s  a b o u t  h u m a n  life w i l l  be t e s t e d .  We 
w i l l  be f o r c e d  e i t h e r  to b r i n g  our e c o n o m i c  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  int o  line w i t h  the f u n d a m e n t a l  
h u m a n i s t  and d e m o c r a t i c  v a l u e s  we p r o f e s s  to or 
o p e n l y  r e j e c t  t h e m  in f a v o r  of the l i f e b o a t  e t h i c  
(Barnett., 196b, p . 56(J)
O n e  of t h e  m o s t  h a l l o w e d  of all A m e r i c a n  d e m o c r a t i c  
p r i n c i p l e s  is t h a t  the c o l l e c t i v e  w i s d o m  of the p e o p l e  is
1
2the best guarantor of responsible, humane governance and the 
nest effective constraint upon the power of their governors. 
This essential tenet of democracy is based on the capacity 
of its citizens to recognize their long-term interests and 
to act in ways that support their democratic convictions and 
traditions if they are possessed of the necessary and 
sufficient facts and educated in ways that liberate and 
enhance their faculties to discern truths from those facts.
Nevertheless, experiences and events occurring world­
wide over (at least) the last half-century appear to have 
raised significant challenges to the tenability of 
democratic assumptions about the people's collective wisdom 
and seem to have demonstrated the fallability of political 
acts founded upon it. The on-going development of state and 
corporate propagandas and other indoctrination techniques, 
the uses to wnich they have been put, and their apparent 
successes have cast into doubt not only the interpretive 
capabilities of citizens and their competence to participate 
in democratic culture, but also the viability of fundamental 
democratic principles themselves (Ellul, 1973). This study 
represents an effort to gain an understanding of those 
techniques, the cultural imperatives of their use, and the 
agendas of those who employ them, and to propose a means and 
a rationale for a renewed system of public participation and 
praxis that could serve as an antidote to the technocratic 
pollutants of the democratic polity.
3Critical Theorizing on the School and the Press
These techniques and their affective consequences have
not gone unrenarked, however, although they seen to have
succeeded in at least divert ing and and at worst
nanipulating the attentions of the people, such that
citizens nay be obstructed or prevented fron recognizing
their own enancipatory interests. The assentially un- and/or
anti-denocratic interests inscribed in and concealed by
doninant discourses of both technocratic capitalisn and
bureaucratic socialisn have been the subject of inportant
developnents in the critical social theory of Jurgen
Habernas (1964), Hichel Foucault (1972), Stuart Hall (1960)
1
and others, who have pointed to two principal culprits as 
conplicit in the pathological pollution of the people's 
attention to, concern for, and interest in the conduct of 
what is, putatively, their public business.
The Critique Modernity
The first of these is the growing synergisn of the 
state with the interests of trans-national, corporate 
capital accumulation; the second is the technocratic 
rationality by which these essentially un-, and possibly 
anti-, democratic interests have been made to seem to be 
natural concommittants of certain valorized knowledge codes. 
Under this rubric, notions of social advancement and 
technological progress supplant the normative claims of 
moral and aesthetic reasoning, and citizens are forced to 
choose among values that are portrayed as being mutually
4exclusive --or, rather, between clains of facts versus 
values, wherein the latter are deprived of legitimacy by the 
assignnent of the label of unreliable, undenonstrable, 
unscientific subjectivity.
The process of technocratic rationalization has enabled 
the systenatic supravention of even the cunulated basic 
interests of hunanity in naintaining a liveable planet 
— nuch less the comparatively minute interests of discrete 
persons in their individual or local life-worlds. This has 
been accomplished by two expedients: (a) the elevation of
cognitive-instrumental logic of science and technology to 
the position of sole arbiter among competing value claims, 
and (b) the denigration and delegitimation of the claims of 
either moral or aesthetic sensibility to offer convinving 
alternatives (Habermas, 1971).
Technocratic Rationality in the Press and. Lhfl. School
The twin forces represented by the modern technocratic 
corporate state and its pet philosophy, positivism, assert 
their hegemony by, in, and through the organization and 
domination of certain (perhaps all) cultural institutions 
according to the logic of technocratic rationality. Abetted 
by state-sponsored and legitimized developments in the 
knowledge of the mechanisms of individual and social control 
arising from advances in psychology, marketing, and 
sociology ( e.g., Foucault, 1979), the propaganda of 
technocratic logic is systematically employed in modern
5i n s t i t u t i o n s  as the p r e s s  and the s c h o o l s  - - p a r t i c u l a r l y  in 
a d v e r t i z i n g ,  p u b l i c  r e l a t i o n s ,  and the d e f i n i t i o n  of s c h o o l  
k n o w l e d g e - -  to a t t e m p t  to r e d e f i n e ,  r e s h a p e ,  or s u b v e r t  the 
s u b j e c t i v i t i e s  of its i n t e n d e d  c o n s u m e r s  to the n a r r o w  e n d s  
of the m a n i p u l a t o r s  (Hall, 198U)
T w o  of the m o s t  i n f l u e n t i a l  as well as the m o s t  
i n f l u e n c e d  of t h e s e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a r e  m a s s  e d u c a t i o n  and m a s s  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n .  B o t h  the p r i n c i p l e  of d e m o c r a t i c  p o l i t y  and 
its p o t e n t i a l  s u b v e r s i o n  e n t a i l  the p r a c t i c e s  and p r o c e s s e s  
o f c o m m u n  i c a t i o n  and e d u c a t i o n  at the m o s t  f u n d a m e n t a l  
l e v e l s  of d e m o c r a t i c  c u l t u r e .  T h i s  e n t a i l m e n t  has a f f e c t e d  
the e x i s t e n t i a l  and r h e t o r i c a l  c o n d i t i o n s  u n d e r  w h i c h  the 
p r a c t i c e s  of j o u r n a l i s m  and p e d a g o g y  h a v e  d e v e l o p e d  in the 
U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  the w a y s  t h o s e  p r a c t i c e s  are r e c e i v e d ,  and 
e n d s  to w h i c h  t h e y  a r e  d i r e c t e d .
H o w e v e r ,  a l t h o u g h  m u c h  c r i t i c a l  a t t e n t i o n  has b e e n  p a i d  
to the c r i t i q u e  of the i n f l u e n c e s  of p o s i t i v i s m  in s c h o o l s  
(e.g. , A p p l e ,  1979; C h e r  r y h o  lines , 1988; G i r o u x ,  1981;
M i s g e l d ,  1985; O ' N e i l l ,  1985), and m e d i a ' s  ( G i t l i n ,  1978; 
H a b e r m a s ,  1974; Hall, 1977, 1982; H a l l i n ,  1985; H o r k h e i m e r  &
A d o r n o ,  1972; M a r c u s e ,  1964) r o l e s  in r e p r o d u c t i o n  and 
t r a n s m i s s i o n  of the d o m i n a n t  r a t i o n a l i t y ,  1 am n o t  a w a r e  
that t h e s e  two c r u c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  h a v e  b e e n  e x a m i n e d  as 
p a r a l l e l  i n f l u e n c e s ,  or tha t  t h e i r  c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y  as 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  of the r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  and 
e d u c a t i o n  has b e e n  w i d e l y  d i s c u s s e d .  In t h i s  s t u d y ,  I 
a t t e m p t  to r e c t i f y  that o v e r s i g h t
6L Thesis: The Public Sphere Is. ft Social Responsibility
This study takes as its basic theme a critique of the 
conditions in education and connunication that have 
permitted, if not encouraged, a gradual but seemingly 
inexorable detachment of the Anerican people from the arena 
of substantive concerns and responsibilities imposed on them 
by their (at least nominal) participation in both democratic 
culture and form of government. It is thus my intention to 
seek among patterns created by certain hitherto seemingly 
overlooked or neglected relations between journalism and 
pedagogy --and their respective practices and theoretical 
affinities in the general context of the communicative and 
educational conditions required for the sustenance of 
democratic culture-- for a counter-hegemonic discourse which 
could unseat the dominant rationality of technocracy and 
bureaucracy. I undertake here to examine hermeneutically 
the fabric of recent discourse about communication and 
education, generally, and about journalism and pedagogy in 
particular, to reveal the skeins of thought from what, in 
the recent past at least, have been considered two discrete 
domains.
Heretofore, the journalists and teachers have seldom 
even been mentioned in the same breath, due to a generally 
accepted but nevertheless (as I show in the next chapter) 
false antinomy with regard to their apparently unique 
institutional imperatives. To the contrary, I shall argue
7that journalism and pedagogy operate in a similar relation 
to knowledge, both practically and theoretically, and 
therefore should themselves be regarded as related 
enterprises, that is, as cognates of the same process. I 
seek to join them as complementary, signifying activities by 
which professionals in their praxis mediate and intercede 
for learning, judgment, and, ultimately, public actions 
informed by those former two virtues.
My aim is to recuperate and redefine the concept and
rhetoric of social responsibility. and to apply them to the
2
project of reclaiming cultural space for a new version of 
the oublie sphere. an institution which was of central 
importance in the success of the Gnlightement's century-long 
struggle against the feudal state and the divine rights of 
monarchy. In particular, I am concerned to reunite the 
traditions of practice and preparation for the effective 
conduct of social and cultural praxis in school and the 
press: especially the sense of the moral duty and obligation 
owed by the press and the schools in putatively democratic 
culture to the establishment, support, and maintenance of 
conditions that would enable and encourage citizens to 
appropriate and then to use the cultural space for the re- 
invention of the public sphere. Both press and schools are 
vital to this enterprise and shouId be understood to be 
related through the similarity of their status and roles in 
the continuing evolution of democratic culture and society.
eHowever, since early in this century when, influenced 
by the emergent discipline of scientific management and 
industrial administration, schools abjured their natural 
domains in the construction of knowledge (Johnson, 1984), 
educators have lacked a rationale commensurate with the 
magnitude of the tasks they have been required to 
accomplish. This has to do with redefining and extending 
the ethos of social responsibility as an ethical obligation 
to practices of s c hoo1ing/teaching as well as to the press 
--which has recognized, though by and large resisted (e.g., 
Altschull, 1984, Herrill, 1974; Herrill 4 Lowenstein, 1979)
it, since it was proposed by the Hutchins Commission in
3
1946. Because I take it that a central concern of 
both schools and the press should be to contribute to 
establishing suitable conditions for the free exercise of 
democratic freedoms and the assumption of correlative 
responisibi1i t i e s , this study inquires whether a concept of 
social responsibility might fit the need.
Therefore, this study proposes to examine contemporary 
discourses of journalism and pedagogy from the standpoint of 
critical theory to examine the impact of technocratic 
rationality and instrumental logic on the practices of 
communication and education. It seeks to recover some of 
the hitherto separately carded and spun threads of discourse 
about the processes of creating and exchanging social 
knowledge in modern democratic culture. Through a critical 
examination and analysis of both the broad discourses of
9communication and education, and those naterial conditions 
which support current, restrictive, dehumanizing practices 
imposed by fiat on teachers and journalists, I endeavor to 
explore the interstitial spaces, the gaps and the 
overlappings, of this imperfect hunan construction for clues 
to a theoretically sufficient rationale for democratically 
oriented praxis of press and school, how it night be 
achieved and, if achieved, what night result fron it.
As they are rationalized in the contenporary, doninant 
culture of technological accountability and efficiency, the 
institutions of the school and the press perforn as if they 
are epistenologica1ly and structurally incapable of 
engendering or supporting the complex conditions which 
enable the acquisition and deployment of the critical 
judgment necessary for socially responsible democratic 
participation in public affairs. It is on rectifying these 
conditions that an effective renewal of the phenomenon of 
the public sphere would depend, and a space commensurate 
with what in former times was known as "the public sphere" 
could flourish. I take up this venture in the hope of 
suggesting a theoretical basis for establishing the social 
responsibility of the school and the press for two related 
objectives within the general problematics of democratic 
social relations: (a) a foundation for establishing an 
ethics of interpretive, practical competence for the press 
and the school, and (b) the actualization of conditions
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necessary for the reinvention of the public sphere as an 
arena for informed, responsible action that may enable 
participatory democratic praxis based on practical judgment 
in public and social affairs.
I take the audience for these considerations to be
primarily located among educators, and particularly teacher
and journalism educators and their students. Under the
tradition of academic disciplinarity, in which the relations
of discourses to one another are atomized and truncated for
the purposes of discrete understandings, the connectedness
of the projects of communication and education has been
lost, and their true interests dispersed. For this reason,
I shall attend mainly to the relation of those factors as
crucial elements in the recuperation and reconceptualization
of a meaningful conception of a public space in which
citizens may enact and experience emancipatory praxis. In
pursuit of this end, I re-analyze the concept of social
responsibility and apply it to both the press (in which
context it first appeared) and to the schools (which could
usefully appropriate it as a rationale for exceeding the
taken-for-granted boundaries of education). In this
project, I join critical theorizing on both public
communications and journalism in particular, with those
recent developments in curriculum theorizing relevant to
issues of aesthetics, ethics, and the spiritual dimension of
education that in recent years have been advanced and
4
deployed under the rubric of "Reconceptualism."
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Theoretical Framework
This project is informed by as well as being situated
in three diverse critical/theoretical stances or contexts
which frame the possibility of individual social action and
communitarian solidarity. The first context is derived from
the thought of the German critical social philosopher Jurgen
Habermas and his descriptions of the interactions of human
social interests, ( i n t e r a c t i o n s ,  and know l e d g e . His
project was begun with Knowledge and Human Interests (1971),
and has led him to what one commentator c a 1 led the
'linguistic'' --but which another averred would better be
called the p e r f o r m a t i v e "-- turn as a central part in the
evolution of virtually ail his subsequent work in the area
of language use (Forester, 1985) and the work of
communicative action (Held, 1980; McCarthy, 1979),
Habermas (e.g., 1984) is particularly valuable for his
insight in circumscribing work (understood in the Marxian
sense of production) and social interaction within the more
general ambit of communicative competence. His formulations
of the ideal speech situation and the universal pragmatics
of speech are both the necessary and sufficient conditions
for emancipatory (undominated, c o e r c i o n - f r e e ) communication.
These are communicative acts which challenge and seek to
overturn the structural inequalities and disequilibriums on
which the dominance of scientism as a tool for the
5
legitimation of knowledge has been built.
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Habermas's (e.g., 1973) value to this enterprise lies 
especially in his revelation of the artificial bifurcation 
of realns of social theory --where he has described the 
increasing tendency of technologically dominated society to 
define practical problems as ‘merely" technical issues-- and 
knowledge theory, where he has argued that positivism has 
displaced epistenology by its insistence upon the primacy of 
instrumental reason. I return to this topic in more detail 
in Chapters Two and Three; but it is relevant and should be 
kept in mind as well in the discussion of the general 
denocratic principles which I sketch out in the section 
below dealing with the tradition of participation in which 
this project resides.
The second context which franes this work is in an 
interpretation of French philosopher Hichel Foucault's 
theories of knowledge/power (savoir/pouvoir) relations and 
their reification as/in discourses (1970; 1972; 1880), as
well as his identification of the carceral effects wrought of 
scientistic-scientific investigations into the nature of 
humanness which were undertaken in the name of ostensibly 
non-ideological, value-free pursuit of knowledge in the 18th 
and 19th centuries (1973; 1975; 1979). I consider that 
Foucault's value to this investigation consists in the view 
that his work affords on the aura of seemingly ineluctable 
determinism with which discursive formations and practices 
constituted in the very structures of scientific knowledge 
(and social knowledge created scientifically) confront their
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critics, and his insight that this apparent determinism is 
not specious, but the result of social forces set in motion 
with a particular end in view. Foucault's ideas are more 
thoroughly examined in Chapter Four.
The third perspective from which this investigation 
addresses the knowledge codes, practices and activities of 
contemporary concept ions of journalism and pedagogy is based 
on the stance toward the production and reception of 
cultural phenomena foreshadowed in the discourses of Antonio 
Gramsci (e.g., Hoare & Smith, 1971), the Italian educator 
imprisoned by Mussolini, and most recently manifested in the 
work of the British Cultural Studies school (e.g., Hall, 
1977; 1980). The foremost exponent of this stance toward
cultural phenomena is Jamaican-born communication scholar 
Stuart Hall, whose neo-Harxian, cultural studies approach to 
media phenomena, especially, and their reception as 
expressions of a larger, ideologically founded and supported 
source of domination and control. Hall and other scholars 
at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) at 
the University of Birmingham (UR) have focused on "lived 
cultures," particularly the popular press, work, and school 
experiences of the working class.
The fundamental moment in the CCCS critique of cultural 
production consists in the recognition of the construction 
of hegemonic discourses by displaying in cultural texts that 
version of reality which is is ^orphous with the interests
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of the elite class. Sinnltaneously, according to Hall 
(19B2), ruling class elites endorse that version by their 
appropriations of the symbolizing system which invokes the 
"preferred reading." Through their effective control of the 
media, schools, and other institutions in which reality is 
framed, elites are able cast any competing versions of 
reality in terms favorable to, and reliant upon, the 
dominant class's horizons of thought --when they permit them 
to be exhibited at all. Hall and others have found a kind 
of evidence-manaue for this approach in their analyses of 
media presentations which systematically omit certain 
dysfunctional (to the dominant ideology) views rather than 
have to bother to reframe or discredit them. This approach 
to cultural production is important both from the point of 
view of what Hoam Chomsky and Edward H e r m a n n  (1989) have 
called "manufacture of consent" within intra-national social 
relations, and from the perspective of inter-, trans-, or 
supra-national compliance with the technical, consumerist 
agenda which Herbert Schiller (1876) identified as "cultural 
imperialism." I take up these issues again in Chapter Five.
From this stance, it is possible to show that practices 
of both the schools and the press, as they are currently 
realized as social and d iscursive formations (Foucault, 
1972), operate as if more was at stake in perpetuating 
communicative inequalities (Habermas, 1971), and in 
encouraging attitudes of alienation and passivity in the 
publics they serve (Ellul, 1973), than they have in
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eliminating then and encouraging a greater rather than a 
lesser scope for the exercise of truly public discourse. 
Hence, a part of this study is devoted to describing the 
ways in which certain institutional structural inperatives 
in the press and the schools have operated, at least over 
the last century, to inpede the development of students' and 
citizens' awareness of their capacities for critical and 
active participation in the democratic process.
Hy purpose in undertaking the ensuing enquiry, then, is 
two-fold. First, it is to explore the relations of 
communication and education, in their specific cultural 
representations as journalism and pedagogy, both in the 
construction of social knowledge and in the foundation of 
successful social praxis grounded upon that knowledge. I 
wish to show the extent to which these two crucial 
professions, whose purviews with respect to the formation 
and dissemination of social knowledge encompass nearly the 
entire range of practical and political concerns, have been 
affected by the dominant instrumentalist logic and technical 
rationality, which is thematized in prevailing attitudes 
about the school and the press, both popularly and within 
the institutions themselves. The second is to provoke a 
reconception of the meaning of professionalism in and for 
journalism and pedagogy, as cultural resources which can be 
drawn upon to establish and promote a pervasive sense of the 
efficacy of practical judgment, and an appropriate cultural
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space for its e n a c t m e n t .
The vital cultural resources, embodied in the schools 
and the press as the expert knowledge and practical judgment 
of teachers and journalists, are now and have been largely 
misused and undervalued with respect to the constitution of 
individual practical judgment and its natural expression in 
discourse within a public sphere. How they may be 
recuperated for the project of rescuing the discourse of 
participatory democratic institutions for the emancipation 
of individuals and the communities they comprise from the 
thrall of technocracy is the theme of this work.
C o n t e x t : Curse for an Age Crises
"Hay you live in interesting times!"
Interesting times are times of interesting choices, and 
ours is an age, certainly, of interesting --even crucial-- 
choices. The ancient Chinese malediction has perhaps never 
seemed more appropriate. It may be we are twice (or more, 
perhaps even exponentially) cursed: rampant nuclear
proliferation, the wholesale destruction of delicate m i c r o ­
environments and the species which depend upon them, and/or 
the impending social dislocations and reallocations implied 
by the yet to be properly understood potential macro- 
environmental, c 1ima t o l o g i c a l , and geo-political effects of 
phenomena such as the greenhouse effect and the erosion of 
the stratospheric ozone envelope. In these interesting 
times, democratic polity now confronts oblivion or, worse, 
irrelevance. The American ideal of democratic sovereignty
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--government of, by, and for the people-- faces Its most 
complex. Intractable, and subtle challenges. Interesting 
times and choices, indeed.
The choices seem to be three --all, for a variety of
reasons, equally interesting and apparently equally
untenable. He may choose instantaneous annihilation in a
thermo-nuclear conflagration, or slow extinction through the
incremental but inexorable despoliation of the ecoshpere; or
we may choose a rational, swift, and wide-ranging alteration
of the conditions that imperil not only us, but also the
entire planet. For it has become apparent that the deadly
multiplicity and the potentially fatal nature of the
dilemmas confronting humanity are fundamentally social and
cultural, and public in their constitution; that is, they
are of human construction, the results of human actions,
intentions, and policies. As Peter Berger and Thomas
Luckmann (1967) in their seminal work The Social
Construetion of Reality and latterly, Jean Gebser (1985) in
his recently translated The Ever-Present O r i g i n . have
persuasively argued, all knowledge is social knowledge and
intends social action, based upon the unavoidably symbolic
character of human relations with and within their
environment --particularly the constitutive processes by




That these hazards to the very survival of the planet 
have been allowed to proliferate, however, is the result of 
human inact ivity and inattent ion. Hence, the poss ibi1ity 
and the necessity of creating satisfactory resolutions to 
our dilemmas must be sought in the public realm of social 
endeavor, in just relations among and within hunan 
connunities, and in the capacity for wise and practical 
public deliberation by the individuals of whon those 
connunities are conposed. This study posits that the 
centra1 requirenent for --as w e 11 as the central problen 
of-- assu r ing the future v iabi1ity of democrat ic Aner ican 
soc io-cuItural institut ions involves the developnen t and 
perpetuation of conditions that would support and encourage 
citizens' acquisition and practice of a couplex set of 
competences requisite for necessary public deliberations, 
and wherein their exercise would be seen to be efficacious.
Democratic Visions, Democratic Outcomes
Democracy is not an easy, not a certainty-indueing, 
not a particularly efficient, nor always even a popular, 
system of governance. Yet if there are any issues upon 
which both apologists for and critics of contemporary 
American democracy might be able to agree, two suggest 
themselves. First, the complexity and extent of the changes 
occurring in the nation and the world, especially since the 
end of World War II, have cast into doubt and now threaten 
to overwhelm U.S. society's ability to satisfactorily
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address its internal and external challenges; and second, if 
there is yet any hope of meeting those threats and allaying 
those doubts, that hope still resides in taking seriously 
American society's democratic promises and releasing 
the culture's capacity for democratica1ly creating and 
implenenting solutions.
However, as the foregoing indicates, not only opinions
about the proper form and function of a particular
democracy, but also interpretations of the conception of
7
what actually constitutes a democracy, have varied and
8
continue to vary across time and circumstance. The scope 
of human social activities over which a democratic polity 
might legitimately exercise its dominion has been an issue 
of considerable contention. Politics, the economy, 
education, culture, work, knowledge: is it advisable or even
possible to draw a line over which democracy may not pass?
Do our dilemmas have their root in too little democracy, or 
too much? Different democratic visions --Lockean versus 
Rousseauian, or libertarian versus socialistic models-- 
manifest a variety of important conceptual, ideological, and 
philosophical differences relative to which groups' specific 
interests are supported — and whose are suppressed-- in 
particular renditions of the theme of democratic society.
The present inquiry begins with these problematic 
conditions in view, granting the contention around the 
issues thematized above, and recognizing the requirement 
that it characterize at the start the version of democracy
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it enbraces. Since this inquiry is not prinarily concerned 
with defining a concept of denocracy per s e . but with the 
nore 1 inited natter of setting forth a theory for a special 
set of related actions and actors within a specific context 
of denocratic participation, I linit nyself to a sketch of 
the outlines of the preferred version of denocracy in which 
these actions and actors would operate nost effectively.
Following Landon Beyer (1986) and Carole Patenan 
(1970), this study cleaves to a notion of denocracy as a 
cultural (i.e., value-laden, and necessarily participatory) 
forn. Patenan (1970) particularly, in Participation and 
Denocratic T h e o r y . has persuasively advanced the argunent 
that for their continued viability, participatory 
denocracies require the greatest preponderance of their 
citizens to be enabled, enpowered, and willing to 
participate --actively, consciously, and responsibly-- 
across the full range their nutual present and future 
interests. Such participation inplies that citizens in/of a 
denocracy have a certain grasp of natters which affect then 
in their relations with their fellows. That is, the success 
of participatory denocracy entails for its citizens, at a 
nininun, three levels of practical knowledge: (a) a
realistic understanding of their own situatedness in 
particular existential circunstances, (b) a sense of how 
those circunstances have cone to be effected, and (c) an 
appreciation of how they nay act to alter those conditions
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which thwart the social interests that denocracy exists to 
advance. To this sketch, I append two further presunptions: 
(a) the basic desirability and the justice of organizing and 
conducting public affairs according to a conception of 
denocracy as enlightened (as opposed to nerely short-tern, 
instrunental) participation, and (b) the necessity of doing 
so publicly.
What is needed, then, are the neans to engender both 
conpetent social actors and a forun from which they night 
speak their practical interests. The actors nust be 
critical, inforned, intelligent, reflective, thoughtful, 
wise, and numerous --capable of participating in a polis 
which collectively possesses, knows it possesses, and is 
capable of acting on such competence to expand, pronote, 
and protect denocratic interests as its own. The forun fron 
which such actors would speak nust be accessible to both 
speakers and auditors alike; capacious enough to acconodate 
a wide range and variety of ideas, opinions, and views; 
independent of narrow interests which would profit fron 
limiting discourse, and public in that whatever speech were 
spoken be known to impersonally represent a legitinate 
species of opinion.
Both the press and the school are essential in 
educating citizens for denocratic praxis, and for promoting 
the conditions which would enable that praxis to have a 
public forun fron which it could nount an effective 
challenge to --or at least articulate its disaffection for--
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the dehumanizing inperatlves to which people everywhere have
been subjected. However, it is a central contention of this
study that neither can teachers help but fail to adequately
prepare citizens, nor journalists fail to sufficiently
inform their publics, for responsible denocratic
participation. They cannot, that is, if those professionals
whose labor animates the press and the schools are obliged
to operate under the influence of the century-old, techno-
bureaucratic, nanagerial logic and interests. The last
decade has witnessed, along with a revival of deeply
critical analysis, the recrudescence of rationalities in the
pedagogical and journalistic practice that seen to guide, if
they do not ultimately deternine, the goals, purposes, and
the subjectivities of social actors toward an ever-
dininishing sense of efficacy, purposefulness, and
responsibility. In the Chapter Four, therefore, I examine
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the matter of Hazelwood
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School District Kuhlneier as a paradigm case for this 
analysis. As I will demonstrate, the Court did no more than 
to naturalize and reify discursive formations which had 
obtained dfi. facto from the beginnings of the modern age 
conceptions of the form and function of the school and the 
press.
Fron this perspective, it then follows that a critical 
understanding of the relations between communication and 
education will be central to the establishment and the
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enablenent of truly public democratic participation. The
discourses of communication and education are in a sense the
(phylo)generic categories in whose ontoClo)genies --their
means/ ends relationships-- the histories of publicity and
enlightenment respectively may be seen to be reenacted. In
the project which follows here, I aim to show that certain
conventions and traditions within those two categories
--specifically the traditions and conventions two important
sub-categories: journalism and teaching-- may usefully be
interrogated to reveal the fuller implications of their
professional practices for the democratic participation.
Jefferson's Caveat
The concatenation of enlightenment (education) and
freedom of the expression (communication) with the general
good of democratic society is a deeply entrenched — in the
public rhetoric, virtually an inviolable-- tenet in the
constellation of principles that comprise the firmament from
which coalesced the essential features of American
democratic life. Thomas Jefferson, for example, throughout
the more than 50 years of his p u b 1ic career advanced the
necessities of both an educated populace and unfettered
expression as inextricably and reciprocally linked in the
maintenance of democratic social institutions. From his
writings on the necessity of a free and robust press, as
well as his from his lifelong attention to the foundation of
10
a system of public education, it is plain that Jefferson 
clearly envisioned an educated populace with a guaranteed
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access to the means of inforning themselves on vital matters 
as the cornerstones of a truly free and democratic social 
order. Clearly, he recognized and feared the alternative. 
“Cherish... the spirit of our people," he wrote from Paris in 
1787,
and keep alive to the1r attent ion. Do not be too 
severe upon their errors, but reclaim them by 
enlightening them. If once they become 
inattentive to the public affairs, you and I, and 
Congress, and Assemblies, judges and governors 
shall all become woIves. It seems to be the law 
of our general nature, in spite of individual 
exceptions;...that man is the only animal which 
devours his own kind, for I can apply no milder 
term to [other] governments... and the general prey 
of the rich upon the poor, (in Lee, 1966, p. 103) 
He have not to listen too hard, nor look too far, to 
apprehend the modern technocratic lupines lurking by the 
door: the prevaricating pack of renegade admirals and 
administrators, colonels and coolies, arms merchants, 
spooks, and spokespersons, with their literally loose 
cannons, "off the shelf, off the books" subversions, 
shredder parties, and "plausible deniability.”
The only civil defense against them still, as Jefferson 
(fore)saw, continues to be the educated, enlightened, 
intelligent attention of a people to the social knowledge
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nade available and public by and through the free press 
responsible to the general public interest. In a subsequent 
chapter, we shall see that sone of the "judges and 
governors," forgetting or forsaking their responsibilities 
to enlighten, have acquiesced in abetting the wolves.
Bleaents of the Study
In the subsequent chapters of this study, I shall argue 
that journalists and teachers (to paraphrase the poet Dylan 
Thonas) are --like poets, in their crafts and soleiin arts-- 
capable of and both norally and ethichally responsible for 
creating not nerely plausible but true representations of 
social knowledges. These nust be susceptible to practical 
(versus to nerely technical) judgnents upon the data and 
opinions always already inscribed in such language/knowledge.
T h a t , indeed, is the beginn ing of their social 
responsibility. But it does not stop there. Journalists 
and teachers nust begin to forge new relationships, based on 
their two distinctive contributions to the reconstitution of 
a public sphere wherein, by virtue of their praxis, the 
citizenry of a truly denocratic polity would actively and 
vigorously exercise their connunicative conpetences to 
direct their governors toward naking noral and just 
policies. Because they deal in nediated (reported) speech, 
and inasnuch as it is those nediated representations upon 
which a version of denocratic society would depend which 
could to adapt to the challenges of the present age, this is 
the crucial prospect of journalistic and teaching
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professions.
Warrant for this claim resides in the ways in which the
work engaged in by teachers and journalist is similar in
nature and scope, and necessarily entails them in 
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phronesis; that is, in the application of their special 
knowledges toward "wisdom in determining ends and the means 
of attaining them" under contingent conditions. Heretofore, 
they have been misled and misdirected by historically 
situated and scientistically legitim&ted technical 
rationality to conceive their praxis ahistorically, as both 
incommensurable with, and even antithetical to, the speaking 
of any but technically prespecified and determinate ends.
In contrast, I shall argue that, in the present (desparate, 
and arguably deteriorating) circumstances, journalists and 
teachers, those who teach them, and those who learn from 
them must learn to recognize that they share the same t elos. 
and to understand what that means in terms of what I discuss 
as the "social responsibility" of creating the conditions 
which comport with the constitution and the provisioning of 
an informed citizenry.
In contemporary American life, it is to journalists and 
teachers perhaps more than to any others that has fallen the 
obligation and the duty of edifying and informing the pq1 is 
on matters that bear on the conduct and content of public 
affairs: in Jefferson's words, "to keep alive [the people's] 
attention." What follows in subsequent chapters is an
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effort to show why it is necessary and how it nay be 
poss ible to recognize, cuItivate, and then to draw upon the 
set of (renewable!) cultural resources immanent in a 
reconceived understanding of the crucial roles of the 
journalism and teaching professions in bringing new vigor to 
the task of constituting and sustaining the attention and 
judgment of that p o l i s .
The chapters of this study proffer an investigation and 
an analysis of certain fundamental conditions in two primary 
social institutions --the press and the public schools-- as 
they bear upon and reflect the abilities of citizens to 
participate cooperatively in meeting the demands of active, 
informed, and responsible democratic citizenship. In this, 
the present study analyzes current, dominant conceptions 
--the operant knowledge codes-- which are employed in 
hegemonic discourses to define and thereby to delimit both 
journalistic and educational/pedagogical competence (i.e., 
the ethical exercise of valued knowledge and skills). I 
argue that journalism and pedagogy are synergistically 
related at the nexus of democratic participation and 
comprise a field of overlapping necessities constituting the 
woof and weft of the fabric of a just and rational society:
(a) gathering and reporting the data of fact and opinion, 
and (b) critical discrimination among the content and 
sources of those data as they are transmuted by practical 
judgment into the stuff of knowledge and employed as a vital 
cultural resource.
28
Relations q£  Communication and Education
In Chapter Two, I trace historically and elaborate the 
relations between the general categories of education and 
communication as fundamental elements in the social 
construction of reality through language. After sketching 
in the general outline of that relation by following the 
paths demarcated by the linguistic functions of information 
and injunction, I describe the Habermasian projects of the 
ideal speech situation and his universal pragmatics as they 
instantiate communicative competence. I follow this with a 
section on the existential similarities and differences 
between the institutional and existential demands of 
teachers and journalists, highlighting the rhetorical 
differences as they imply contradictions in existential 
similarities. These convergences are then shown to be 
related to a final section on the problematics of democratic 
theory. This section explores further the nature of the 
American ideal of democratic participation, how it is 
situated historically, and how it may be shown to revo1ve 
around two essential, fundamentally complementary nexi of 
competences: acquiring, and critically discriminating among, 
different sources of social/political knowledge.
The Public Sphere. Social Responsibility. and. Technocratic 
Rationality
In the third chapter, this study examines more closely 
the key concepts whose conflicts it is an attempt to
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resolve. First, the dinensions of a theory of discourse are 
discussed, and discourse as a category of human interaction 
is shown to encompass problems posed for a democratic system 
of schooling and the press by the continued dominance of 
technocratic rationality and instrumental logic. Then the 
historical relations of the school and the press are 
elaborated from the Reformation through modern times. A 
section then deals with the rise and fall of the public 
sphere in its historical setting in early 18th Century 
Britain, using the disappearance of the critical public 
sphere as the paradigm of the influence of a perversion of 
Enlightenment sensibility. Habermas's (1971) critical 
typologies of interests, the legitimation crisis of late 
capitalism (1973), and communicative competence (e.g. 1984)
are deployed as markers to point toward the possibility of 
renovating the concept of the public sphere and I discuss 
the disappearance of the distinctions among the intimate, 
private,and public in the social geography. I re-examine 
the concept of social responsibility as it has been applied 
to the press in order to refurbish its rhetorical and moral 
impetus for changes required in conceptions of schooling. A 
criticism of social responsibility theory in the past has 
been that it has lacked a specific focus or a tangible locus 
on which its affective power might be brought to bear. I 
suggest that the newly rejuvenated conception of the public 
sphere provides precisely such a locus and focus, and could 
become a powerful rationale for needed change. Finally, I
3 0
present the critical theory critique of technocracy. 
Discourse.. Discipline, and Hazelwood
In the next chapter (Chapter Four), this study takes up 
the U.S. Supreme Court ruling, in January 1968, in the 
natter of Hazelwood Independent School District 
Kuhlneier. This case is chosen as a paradign, because it 
represents the situation wherein the interests of both 
journalise and pedagogy have been seen to cone into conflict 
with the technocratic rationality of the doninant forces in 
society. Depending on the part of the opinion to which 
one attends, the decision upholding a principal's 
d iscretion to expunge a vaguely defined class of naterials 
fron a school newspaper and otherwise suppress on technical 
grounds unpopular or controversial student expression, 
either "returned to the school officials" their rightful 
control over the curriculum or justified “brutal 
censorship."
In any event, I suggest that Hazelwood represents the 
paradign case of how Foucauldian discursive formations and 
disciplinary technology operate to undermine the schools' 
abilities to engage, promote and teach the competences 
necessary for democratic citizenship. As such, it affords a 
unique opportunity to examine the significance of journalism 
within the dominant conception of the curriculum as an 
example of the spurious claims that instrumental logic and 
technical rationality exert upon the counterclaims of
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conpetence which arise in the existential conditions of the 
school.
I support this view with a review and a critical 
analysis of responses to the decision within the community 
of journalists "talking to thenselves" in the professional 
association and trade journal discourse about the Haze 1 wood 
decision. This literature is shown to be relevant to (a) 
regarding and understanding the professional socialization 
of journalists, (b) how transcending elements of that 
socialization process nay be effected, and (c) what that 
night nean to teachers if their relation to school knowledge 
is sinilar to journalisn's relation to the knowledge it 
publicly constructs. Also in this part of the study, I 
suggest that the rhetorically persuasive, but nevertherless 
i1legitinate, conception of journalisn evident in the 
Hazelwood najority opinion and widely supported by editorial 
voices in the nainstrean U.S. press, denonstrates a 
fundanental misinterpretation of the ways both the 
curriculum and journalisn should be understood in the 
context of the "social responsibility" for advancing the 
ideal of denocratic participation by dininishing the 
possibility of redefining and reconstructing the public 
sphere.
Inventing the Counter-Public S phere; Hie Social 
Responsibility q£. Journalisn and Pedagogy
In the final chapter, I return to the struggle to 
reclaim a place in the denocratic process for a truly public
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discourse. I draw a parallel between the colonization of 
the New World by technologically advanced Europeans and the 
colonization of the life-world by technocratic rationality 
by examining the concept of the marketplace of knowledge and 
ideas. I then sketch the historical conditions which 
have influenced contemporary conceptions and the 
consequences of the place of the press and the school as an 
emancipatory agent involved in social change. Those 
consequences are shown to have important implications for 
the ways in which citizens, already heavily reliant upon 
journalists' professional competence for a preponderance of 
the material substance upon which they base their own civic 
practices, appropriate and utilize knowledge that is 
constructed journalistically in such a way as to conceal 
from them their own potential for efficacy in participation 
in the public sphere.
Conclusions and Implications. These investigations lead 
me to conclude, in the final parts of this study, that any 
emancipatory potential of the press and schools must be 
related to undoing the prevailing conception that their 
projects are marketing problems: that is, in effect, 
"selling'' the socializing process as 'education." I 
therefore argue that understanding this conception is of 
central importance to the task of redefining the 
institutions as agents of social emancipation and 
empowerment. I tender a description of the intersection of
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Journalisn and pedagogy identified and discussed in earlier 
chapters as a nexus around which could be fornulated a new 
conception of the Journalistic project, conceived as 
critical, self-reflective praxis, is learned and practiced.
I then suggest an outline of a plausible theoretical nodel 
for the professional education of both teachers and 
Journalists that is founded upon and situated existentially 
in those professionals' necessary sensitivity to their roles 
and responsibilities in contributing to the construction of 
other peoples' connunities of reality. Suggestions are 
proffered for further research on the potential of 
installing desk-top publishing and low-power, narrowcast, 
neighborhood infornation transmission, prepared for by a 
curriculum in which journalistic competences are highlighted 




It is odd that conspiracy theories are eschewed even by 
those who, through the enploynent of critical analysis, have 
uncovered and described such arrangenents and paraphernalia 
whose only logical explanation lies in the intention for 
then to be used in just such a way as to suggest a 
conspiracy. That the enunciation of conspiracy theories is 
so widely disparaged suggests just how narrowly the U n i t s  
of dissent are defined, even by, of, and for critical 
theorists. States recognize and punish certain kinds of 
conspiracies. Why then is it unsc ient ific to propose that 
they also engage in then? One is left to suppose that 
either there are conspiracies afoot to circunvent, corrupt, 
or subvert rational responses to doninant systens, or that 
Foucault (1972) is correct, and discourses assune lives 
of their own over which hunans are able to exert only 
nininal and insubstantial power to direct. Which reasoning 
could lead to the conclusion, ultinately, that bacteria 
evolved into higher fonts in order to have an adequate 
supply of hosts upon which to feed.
2
By “project" I refer to Alfred Schutz's (1962) views of 
action as a “projection" of present views and past 
experiences into the future, which stresses the social 
actor's design and praxis to bring then about. Schutz 
suggests by this that actions in the present and the past 
have the grannatical effect of locating the basis for action
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in the future perfect tense; that is, social action regards 
the expectation of what will have been the case.
3
See Commission on Freedom of the Press, 1947; Siebert, 
Petereson & Schramm, 1956, e s p . Chapter 3; see also Chapters 
2 and 3 of this study.
4
William F. Pinar is widely acknowledged as the preemminent 
figure in the development of ’’Reconceptual ism" in the field 
of curricular studies and theorizing. He has written 
recently and modestly of the enterprise in the past tense, 
signaling the end, or at least the cessation, of debates 
which prompted "a group of iconoclastic curricularists.... 
[who] challenged the dominant tradition of the field [which 
was] characterized by behavioral activities, planning, and 
evaluation" (1987, p. 1). While the internal conflicts in 
the field of curriculum studies, which marked the genesis of 
Reconceptualism, have largely been ameliorated, still the 
impact of its contributions to theorizing about the 
curriculum remains somewhat marginal. Reconceptualism's 
avowed interest is in conceiving and creating the curriculum 
as a "space" rather than as a fixed or constant entity or 
program (Daignault & Gauthier, 1902).
Similarly the viewpoints of many of its adherents and 
proponents reside in traditions that are often 
systematically marginalized in the lifeworld of schools. An 
education bureaucracy influenced (to say the least) by the 
William Bennetts, Diane Ravitches, Chester ("Chueker")
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Finns, and Mortimer Adlers would not be inclined to look 
with nuch favor upon the Marxist, neo-Marxist, critical and 
post-critical, aesthetic, religious, and above all humanist 
leanings of scholars who eshewed the developnent-nanagenent 
agenda in favor of "the scholarly and disciplined 
understanding of the educational experience, particularly in 
its political, cultural, gender, and historical dimensions" 
(Pinar, 1987, p. 2).
Evidence of the Reconceptualists‘ inpact is far nore 
apparent in the nainstrean of acadenia as represented by 
scholarly organizations such as the Auerican Education 
Research Association. At AERA over the last decade, the 
neetings under the aegis of Division B, the curriculun 
division, have seen "reconceptualist thenes litter the... 
landscape, in particular political, feninist, post­
structuralist, phenomenological, and autobiographical" 
presentations, symposia, etc. (Pinar, 1987, p. 4).
5
Sciential. in the sense that it is used here, refers to 
the tendency of technical interest and instrumental logic to 
assert a claim of privilege or primacy for a particular, 
positivistic way of knowing; that is, it is the claim that 
only phenomena amenable to investigation by and evaluation 
against prespecified "empirical" criteria may yield true 
knowledge, and that the only legitimate knowledge is that 
which is "discovered" in this fashion. (See Popper, 1972; 
c f . Feyerabend, 1975. For a helpful overview of the whole
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conflict between scientism and its critics, see Bernstein, 
1963. )
6
Intensi on here is meant in the phenomenological s e n s e : 
intending subjects both construct and are simultaneously 
constructed by their relations with objects whose existence 
is immanent in their presence as phenomena, but whose 
meaning is always already symbolic by virtue of the 
intentional act.
7
Democracy is essentially a liberal political phenomenon in 
this part of the 20th Century. See Benjamin Barber's 
(1964) Strong DgHflgracy ; Participatory Politics for a Hew 
Age for an interesting typology of liberal democratic 
stances: "anarchist," "realist," and "minimalist." Barber 
argues against the philosophical tenability of a “thin" 
conception of democracy, pointing out that the excesses of 
this century are attributable to too little, rather than too 
much, democracy in the workplace, the community, the 
schools, and other institutions wherein normative concerns 
for praxis are contested.
8
See C.B. McPherson (1966; 1977); cf. D. Held (1967).
9
Hazelwood School District Kuhlmeicr, ______U.S.______ ,
108 S.Ct. 562, 96 L .E d . 2d. 592 (1966).
10
Jefferson's memorable, poetic aphorism that (1 paraphrase 
here) a nation which expects to be ignorant and free, and in
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a state of civilization, expects what never was and never 
will be, elegantly expresses his opinion on the natter of 
the central place of education in the constitution and 
naintenance of a denocratic society. It becane a lifelong 
enterprise, and the unifying thene of his post-Presidential 
years, to organize a universal systen of education for the 
Anerican people. See Gordon C. Lee (Ed.), (1966), Crusade 
Against Ignorance; Thonas Jefferson on Education. especially 
Chapter 3, for a representative sanple of Jefferson's 
writings on the subject. Lee's introductory essay is also 
valuable, and cites the extensive body of both private 
correspondence and public writings in which the topic of 
popular education figures; the subject was, in Jefferson's 
own words, "the ear 1iest.. .[a nd] the latest of all the 
public concerns in which I pernit myself to take an 
interest" (Letter JLtt J o s .  C ^ .  C a b e l l . January 14, 1818, in 
Lee, 1966, p. 24, f n . 33).
Robert Pattison (1982) takes rather a more jaundiced 
view of Jefferson's actual plans for education. Quoting the 
Jefferson's program for universal education in Virginia, he 
points out that, while advocating "teaching all the children 
of the State reading, writing, and common arithmetic," the 
full course of grammar school was to be reserved for "twenty 
of the best geniuses...[to be] raked from the rubbish 
annually, and instructed at public expense" (p. 73).
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Henceforth in this document I shall refrain from treating 
such terms as "phronesis" and "praxia" as foreign or 
otherwise specialized vocabulary. Both are contained in the 
most recent RftndQB House Dictionary of. the English Language 
(2nd e d ., Unabridged, 1987). Phronesis is used by Aristotle 
in the Rhetoric to distinguish the practical wisdom and 
knowledge required for making decisions regarding human 
matters from theor i s . the immutable truth of nature which 
is for Aristotle the province of science. A similar 
distinction exists in German thought, between 
Geisteswissenschaften and Haturswissenschaften. or loosely 
translated, human and natural orders of knowledge. They are 
important distinctions in the immanent critique of positivist 
modernism engaged in by critical theorists, distinctions 
which are displaced in the Anglo-American divisions among 
natural and social sciences on the one hand, and moral and 
aesthetic concerns on the other.
CHAPTER TWO 
RELATIONS OF COMMUNICATION AND EDUCATION
Their world view has renained a connon-sense 
positivisn that finds a real world out there, a 
sincere soul inside all of us, and a prose style 
that opens a transparent window between the two.
(Lanham, 1986, p. 136)
The arbitrary and speculative nysticisn attaching 
to the traditional interpretation of connunication 
can be called, in a precise sense, idealisn. in 
that it purports to treat the naterial sign as the 
mere appearance of an underlying ideal reality.
(Silvernan & Torode, 1980, p. 3)
[T]he word is inherently 'dialogica1'. [It] is 
oriented to, and takes account of the use of, 
words in the utterances to which it is a response.
...[E]ver responsive to the word of others, [it] 
is subject to incessant nodification. . . . [It] is 
never spoken without innediately altering or 
qualifying discourse... (Sarup, 1984, p. 154)
A great deal that seens to be obvious resides in terns 
such as connunication and education. As categories, each is 
grossly abstract; taken together they enconpass an enornous
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range of social actions and practices. Considered 
separately or jointly, connunication and education are 
dauntingly familiar social phenomena; so readily are they 
associated with one another that it might be difficult to 
discriminate one from the other. The actions and practices 
of which they are composed are of sufficient magnitudes of 
similarity as to at first appear to render trivial an 
hypothesis that would rely for its force simply on the 
demonstration of the connectedness that their coincidence in 
discourse elicits. In this chapter, I examine the 
obviousness and the taken-for-grantedness of those 
relations, first by situating the relation in a historical 
context of the social functions of language, then by 
examining the institutional and existential relations, and 
finally by focusing on the implications of those relations 
for the American ideal of democratic praxis informed by the 
technologies of communication and education.
Communication and Education:'To Inform, to Enjoin'
The history of all culture (that is, of human 
communities) is, at a fundamental level, a history of the 
processes of commun icat ion and educat ion. Humankind ' s 
capacity to create complex social arrangements is a 
consequence of its ability to inform its members of diverse 
conditions and to enjoin them in cooperating to meet those 
conditions (e.g., Geertz, 1973; Gunperz A Hymes, 1972). The 
processes of informing and enjoining both recapitulate the 
knowledge of individuality and recognize the social need for
42
cooperation.
The British linguist Michael Stubbs (1883) has written 
that, while it is possible to "imagine in principle a 
connunity in which language is used only to inform and to 
enjoin someone to do something," it is impossible to imagine 
a language which does not both inform and enjoin (p. B). 
Occurring at the onset of a book devoted to examining the 
operations of discourse, the statement captures the sense of 
the centrality of the two basic uses of language to the 
activities of human culture: communication ("to inform") and 
education ("to enjoin"). In modern usage, communication and 
education comprehend more than the two infinitives imply by 
themselves; nevertheless, they are fundamental attributes of 
both of speech and of language. Stubbs's observation links 
them existentially in m utua1 relatedness with one another
1
and with the community which they were developed to serve.
The distinctiveness and their relationship is implied 
in Stubbs's (1983) further observation that it is possible, 
if not unavoidable, that "utterances typically serve more 
than one function at the same time" (p. 6). The capacity to 
inform is a commonsensica1 sine qua non in any systematic 
attempt to educate; yet it is not the same thing. One may 
inform without at the same time necessarily enjoining: jokes 
or puns or other word games may do that. Simultaneously, to 
enjoin another is a fundamental element in communication.
Yet one may enjoin without at the same time informing:
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orders, connands, etc., are examples. Although it may be 
argued that orders, etc., inform their auditors of the 
intention of their speaker, they typically do not convey 
such information as to why the order was issued, for 
instance, or inform their recipients of the conditions under 
which they were issued, or when they might be ignore. This 
aspect may explain the difference between the illocutionary 
and the perlocutionary speech act described by the ordinary 
language philosophers John Austin (1962) and John Searle 
(1975). Statements (constatives) inform and, as Habermas 
(1984) argues, they typically enjoin agreement, but 
agreement is the essential element of the Habermasian 
interpretation of language functions. It does not, perhaps, 
militate against the existential relation between informing 
and enjoining, nor does it imply their mutual exclusivity.
The junctures at which the two processes intersect 
in the community constitute both the process of learning and 
the production of knowledge (Campbell, 1982). It is for 
this reason that rhetoric, in which information and 
injunction are the conjoint project, held a position of such 
importance in oral cultures (e.g., for in rhetoric the 
relation of communication and education is formally 
acknowledged and structured in act of utterance). Because 
oral speech is ephemeral (or was, prior to the advent of 
audio and audio-visual recording technology), rhetoric in 
oral cultures relied on relatively invariant formulas for 
the construction and transmission of knowledge and for
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enactment of learning as a process by its auditors. The 
effects (and affects) of speech were U n i t e d  to the range of 
the speakers' voices and the recognition of the rituals 
which the fornulas and patterns of such speech enacted in 
the local connunity of auditors. Infornation was passed, 
and action enjoined, as nuch by the fornulas that speakers 
invoked as by the words that they uttered (e.g., Levi- 
Strauss, 1967; Turner, 1979). The advent of technology 
altered these relations.
Thft Linguistic Turn
Even ’merely" writing is after all a technology, both 
in the instrunental sense by which the word is understood 
today, as well as in its classical sense of art or artifice. 
Technology neans, literally, words of process and 
production (techne: naking, production; logos r discourse, 
knowledge). In the word alone, production of knowledge and 
the process by which it is produced are artificially 
sundered and rejoined. In that division and reconnection 
reposes the demise of preliterate orality and the 
construction of the universes of infornation and injunction.
Understandably, therefore, the relations conprehended 
by oral rhetoric underwent a substantial change with the 
onset of literate technologies (e.g., Pattison, 1962). In 
consequence of the technical capacity to reproduce it, 
speech became endowed with a more tangible materiality and 
more widespread possibilities of affect. Over time, the
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discrete disciplines and sciences (of which connunication 
and education are certainly the former, less certainly the 
latter) began to supplant rhetoric in the cultural space 
wherein the construction of knowledge and the process of 
learning occurred. Technology permitted (and, in a sense 
which will become important in a later chapter, finally 
required) local observers to "connunicate1 and to "educate" 
--rather than merely to inform and to enjoin-- other 
observers similarly situated but no longer localized insofar 
as the observer's immediate community was concerned.
With the proliferation (another problem to which I 
defer responding at this point) of technologies, sciences, 
and disciplines, and the (apparent ) d isplacenent of rhetoric 
into a mere category of commun ication and of learn ing, the 
distinctively human element of the process of acquiring 
knowledge was also displaced. The structures of language, 
which as speech were developed "in face-to-face interaction" 
(Lyons, in Stubbs, 1983, p. 6), evolved away from their 
bases in interpresonal interaction, and into a radically 
self-sufficient domain of reality.
The Two Roads Diverge
At this point the already strained fabric of language's 
social functions appears to have parted. Techne separated 
from logos, for all intents and purposes, and scholars and 
philologists who pursued the matter followed their now 
divergent threads. The techne thread, which both privileges 
and problemat i zes act ion, raveled cff to become a concern
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primarily with praxis and production: first as Marxian, then 
functionalisn (e.g., Parsons, 1951a, 1951b), later speech- 
act theory and finally the critical, linguistic-perfornative 
theory of Habernas (1979, 1984), to which I will return in 
due course. The logos thread, which privileges and 
problenatizes discourse, took up the banner of the word. To 
recall the original distinctions, where techne became the 
praxis of injunction, logos instantiated objectified 
infornation. I follow this latter skein in the section 
b e l o w .
Xilfi. Sapir-Whorf (Boaa?) Hypothesis. In the domain of 
the word, the social and cultural conditions, to which 
language itself arose as a response ("to inform" and "to 
enjoin" to action), were transformed. Experiences which had 
once seemed generative of the 1inguistic practices of 
communities began to be recognized as owing their reality to 
the language which spoke them and in which they were (now) 
inscribed. Edward Sapir (noted in an essay first published 
in 1929 that
The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is 
to a large extent unconsciously built up on the 
language habits of the group. No two languages 
are ever sufficiently similar to be considered b b 
represent ing the same social reality. The worIds 
in which different societies live are distinct 
worlds, not merely the same world with different
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labels, (in Handelbaum, 1949, p. 162)
Not only was the domain of reality that language spoke
different from language to language, but also the 
inhabitants of each different language were arguably quite 
unaware of it. Although the anthropologist Franz Boas 
(1911) had noted in the introduction to Handbook of Amer ican 
Indian Languages that "the purely linguistic inquiry is part 
and parcel of a thorough investigation of the psychology of 
the people of the world" (p. 63), he overlooked or failed to 
recogn ize the epistemological import of his own observation, 
Rather, Boas had noted the methodological significance of 
the unconscious regulatory power of language:
The great advantage that linguistics offer in this 
respect is the fact t h a t . ..the categories which
are formed remain unconscious, and that for this
reason, the processes, which lead to their 
formation can be followed without misleading and 
disturbing secondary factors of secondary 
explanation, (pp. 70-71).
It was the epistemological dimension of the unconscious 
regulatory authority of language upon which Sapir (1931), 
and later Benjamin Whorf (1952), fixed upon, and which 
provides the animating force behind the so-called Sapir- 
Hhorf hypothesis. Sapir's observation was more elegant and 
galvanized further, and more immediate, investigation --a 
fact which perhaps explains why it is not now called the 
Boas-Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Sapir wrote:
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Language is not merely a nore or less systenatic 
inventory of the various itens of experience which 
seen relevant to the individual...but is also a 
self-contained, creative symbolic organization, 
which not only refers to experience largely 
without its help but actually defines experience 
for us by reason of its fornal conpleteness and 
because of our unconscious projection of its 
inplict expectations into the field of experience. 
(in Hoijer, 1974, p. 121) .
That Hhorf (1952) was influenced by Sapir is evident:
[L]anguage is not nerely a reproducing instrunent 
for voicing ideas but rather is itself the shaper 
of ideas, the program and the guide for the 
individual's mental activity, for his analysis of 
impressions.... He dissect nature along lines laid 
down by our native languages. The categories and 
types we isolate from the world of phenomena we do 
not find there because they stare [us] in the 
face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a 
kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be 
organized by our minds --and that means largely by 
the linguistic systems in our minds, (p. 5)
Comment ing on the Sapir-Hhorf hypothesis, Harry Hoijer 
(1974) has written that there is admittedly a tradition of 
European scholarship "particularly in the German-speaking
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world," which extends back into the late 18th Century and 
includes "Herder, ...[a nd] von Humboldt" along with moderns 
such as "Cassirer.... Levi-Strauss... P i aget... and 
Wittgenstein" (p. 121). But Hoijer takes it as significant 
that both Sapir and Hhorf "had a major interest in [Native 
American] languages, idioms far removed from any in the 
Indo-European family, and so ideally suited for contrastive 
studies" (p. 121). Those studies, Hoijer says, led Hhorf to 
to express the principle of linguistic relativism, in 
consequence of which
[UJsers of markedly different grammars are pointed 
by their grammars toward different types of 
observations and different evaluations of 
externa1ly similar acts of observation, and hence 
are not equivalent as observers, but must arrive 
at somewhat different points of view. (Hhorf, in 
Hoijer, p. 121)
The basic idea, then, of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is 
clear. Language is not "merely" a device for recording or 
reporting experience; it is also, and perhaps more 
importantly, a way of defining --of actually constructing—  
experiences for its speakers. Human institutions are human
products, hypostatized in language without necessarily
2
turning them into "real things". As such, they may be seen 
also to condition the experiences of those whose existences 
are defined by them. From there it was but not many strides 
to a conception in which language veritably defined the
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speakers thenselves. The first step was taken
(interestingly, once again einer Deutschnr sache1 by the
sociologists of knowledge, whose most recent and arguably
best known adherents are Peter Berger and Thonas Lucknann
(1967), in their landmark work The Social Construction of 
3
Reality -
Sociology Knowledge. The essential tenet of this 
approach was to attempt a synthesis of epistenology and 
ontology (both of which are linguistic categories), in a 
universe in which something like the Sapir-Hhorf hypothesis 
obtained. The difference is that language is not seen as 
the sole conditioning factor. Rather, diverse social 
"agglomerations of 'reality' and 'knowledge' pertain to 
specific social contexts" (Berger A Lucknann, 1867, p. 3), 
and that these relationships have to be accounted for 
when, as it must, the taken-for-grantedness operating in 
what counts as knowledge in different social arrangements 
differs from society to society (Zjiderveld, 1971).
According to Berger and Luckmann (1967), individuals' 
cultural and social environments work upon them as if those 
environment had a reality which was independent of them.
As indeed it does have, as a function of the social and 
cultural institutions into which individual are born, and 
through which they are socialized. Through language and 
(and here sociologists of knowledge add an additional, 
crucial element) other social behavior, a dialectic process
51
of externalization, objectification, and internalization is 
developed.
The dialectic involves relations of individuals to
their natural environments. In language, "the most
important item of socializat ion" (Berger & Lucknann, 1967,
p. 59), and social relations, individuals construct a
symbolic universe in which meanings and institutions are
"historical and objective facticities" (p. 60) external to
4
themselves out of "anthropological necessity" (p. 52).
Because the meanings of phenomena are perceived to be 
external, meanings are objectified in the phenomena 
themselves: a tree is a tree is a tree because it cannot be 
anything else, and the same applies to institutions. "The 
priority of institutional definitions of situations must be 
consistently maintained over individual temptations at 
redefinition" (p. 62). Meaning becomes independent of the 
individual. The dialectic is then completed in the 
subsequent process of internalization, by which the now 
objectified universe is finally internalized, "by which the 
objectivated social worId is retrojected into consciousness 
in the course of socialization" (p. 81) and becomes part of 
the individuals' and their society's personalities.
As part of the experienced universe, an institution by 
definition is greater than the individuals who experiences 
it because it subsumes them. Albeit the institution is the 
product of individuals' activities and their language, it 
nevertheless becomes independent of the ind ividuals of which
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it is conposed. Although it is the results of human praxis, 
by nature of its very size, scope, and pervasiveness the 
institution is able to exert control over hunan activities. 
In the process (and in the aggregate) institutions also 
provide individuals with modes of action, speech, feeling, 
etc. Language, as we saw above, is a crucial, but not the 
sole, conditioning agent; nevertheless, a person "becomes a 
cavalryman not only by acquiring the requisite skills, but 
by becoming capable of understanding this language" (Berger 
& Lucknann, 1967, p. 139).
Importantly, in this scheme, knowledge --especially 
scientific knowledge, because of its putative objectivity 
and its supra-institutional character-- is not seen 
routinely as the product of human praxis, but as external to 
human being. '[A]n entire legitimating machinery is at work 
so that laymen will remain laymen ...happily" (Berger & 
Lucknann, 1967, p. 89). It is something to be learned, but
only it is produced only by those individuals who have 
earned their ways into the broader institutional context of 
knowledge production: ’ [T]he scientific universe of meaning 
is capable of attaining a good deal of autonomy against its 
own social base" (p. 66). This applies to social as well as 
to scientific knowledge, because social knowledge is defined 
by the institutions which have defined social knowledge as. 
scientific knowledge: "...[A] meaningful totality that
explains,' perhaps also justifies them (...dreams may be
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'explained' by a psychological theory, both 'explained and 
Justified by a theory of neteupsychosis, and either theory
will be grounded in a nuch tore conprehensive universe --a
5
scientific one" (p. 86).
This attitude of sociologists of knowledge toward 
institut ions f inds its apodaemon is is (to coin a phrase) in 
the analytic applied to it by Michel Foucault (1972, 1973, 
1979), for whon institutions represent the material 
extensions of the operations of power in relation with 
knowledge. Foucault's work will be discussed in detail in a 
later chapter. To some extent, however, a critique of the 
sociology of knowledge actually antedates its enunciation. 
This is to be found in the work of W.I. Thomas (1967), whose 
famed theorem (articulated in The Unadjusted G i r l . in 1923) 
offers both an affirmation and a rebuttal to the concept.
It will be recalled that the sociologists of knowledge 
maintain that, despite their normative and regulative 
authority, institutions should not be hypostatized. Rather, 
Berger and Luckmann (1967) insist that they are, after all, 
human social constructions and therefore to some extent at 
least imaginary creations. Institutions must be thought of 
as inautonomous, dependent creations of human consciousness 
and therefore subject to human control. Thomas's (1967) 
theorem, however, postulates that (I paraphrase) to the 
extent that things are perceived to be real, they are real 
in their consequences. That is, contrary to sociologists of 
knowledge, institutions do have real --and not merely
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arbitrary-- effects on hunan activities. This is a central 
point to be recalled in understanding Habernas, whose 
project I discuss in the next section, because it implicates 
the act as distinguishable from, although related to, the 
word in the human construction of reality.
The Banner &£. the Act
When last we left the other skein of the now thoroughly 
sundered fabric of techne-logos which, when whole, created 
the fabric of language/speech as a totality of information/ 
injunction, I had noted that the techne aspect had divided 
from logos and set its focus on action. Since the 
consequences of this pursuit comprise a large measure of the 
next chapter, I will leave aside for now an exhaustive 
exploration of this project. But there is an important 
actor in this quest whose work might be introduced in the 
aspect of it which bears directly on our fable of the 
fabr i c .
Jurgen Habermas's (1979, 1984) notions of "universal 
pragmatics" and communicative competence privilege the 
injunctive (educational) aspects of the formulation set out 
earlier in this chapter. His theory of communicative action 
comprehends both the speech act theory of John Austin (1962) 
as well as its extensions (e.g., Searle, 1975) and an 
account of the conditions under which systematic distortions 
of communication arise. His theory, based on the postulate 
that all speech is action directed toward arriving at
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agreements, is predicated on this relation.
His project was announced in 1965, aocording to his 
long-time translator, Thomas HcCarthy (1979), in his 
inaugural lecture upon being appointed to a chair at 
Universitat Frankfurt. "What raises us out of nature," 
McCarthy reports,
is the only thing whose nature we can know: 
language. Through its structure, autonomy and 
responsibility are posited for us. Our first 
sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of 
universal and unconstrained consensus. Autonomy 
and responsibility together (Mundigkeit) comprise 
the only idea we possess a priori in the sense if 
a philosophical tradition, (p. xvii)
In this declaration it is possible to see, if not the 
imprint of Sapir-Whorf, at least that the solution to the 
problems and failures of past efforts to come to grips with 
the seemingly intractable social problems lay in the 
direction of the theory of language. Habermas's (1979) 
first systematic attempt to theorize about the relations of 
language to its historical unity with, rather than its 
domination of, the community of speech is to be found in the 
essay "What is Universal Pragmatics?" In it he articulates 
the principle which would underlie virtually all his future 
labors: "[Tjo identify and reconstruct the universal 
conditions of understanding (Verstanditfuntf)....1 prefer to 
speak of the general presuppositions of communicative action
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because I take the type of action aisied at reaching 
understanding to be fundanental" C p . 1).
This project lays the struggle to reach agreenent at 
the very foundations of social action, fron which other 
f o m s  of action, "conflict, conpetition, strategic action in 
general" (p. 1), ultinately derive. Particularly, he is 
interested in speech a c t s . the utterances which comprise 
everyday connun icat ive experience. His theory, therefore, 
is actually nore in the species of interaction, pragnatic 
intersubjectivity, and neaning theory.
His analytic begins with the senantic theories which 
seek to describe speakers' intentions. While he does not 
share with Sapir-Whorf the nearly absolute deterninisn with 
which they describe the influence of language, he does argue 
that 1ingu1st ic s igns are not isolated elenents, but take 
their neanings fron shared systens of signs which are 
publicly available. As he later puts it, "only those 
analytic theories of neaning are instructive that start fron 
the structure of linguistic expression" (Habernas, 1964, p. 
275) .
Although this presentation (and Habernas's prose) tends 
toward density, his contentions rest on the possibility of 
reintegrating the connunicative functions of inforning and 
enjoining. However, in this reading, every speaker has the 
authority to enjoin an auditor by virtue of the force of 
logic and rationality with which the case is nade. For
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Habermas, all too often (in fact, in almost every 
situation), speakers avail themselves of illegitimate 
advantages in order to prevail in the negotiation of 
neaning. This is what he means by systematically distorted 
communication, which it is the purpose of his theory to 
provide the neans --or at least the rationale-- to reject.
Speech and communication are moral actions for 
Habermas, and the only ethical stance for a teacher or other 
communicator is to attempt to ameliorate systematically 
distorted communication. The structures of speech acts, 
their force (locutionary, i1locutionary, perlocutionary, 
(Austin, 1962), and their intention are the analytic tools 
by which distortions may be recognized. Habermas intends 
that his theory should serve and emancipatory interest, not 
a technical, instrumental one.
This (or rather some) notion of communicative 
competence has achieved a certain amount of currency in 
recent years. The term has gained the status, almost, of a 
buzz-word, However much of it misses the point. For 
example, in a recent number of Journalism Monographs.
Shirley Ramsey (1988) inquired into the "communicative 
competence for the science interview." Yet her approach is 
almost exclusively instrumental: "[A] study of communicative
competence. . .should provide insight into the development of 
science writer/scientist, cognitive/1anguage behaviors... 
and look at how these... patterns affect communication 
products" (p. 2).
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This approach is far removed fron the ways in which 
Habernas intends his project to be understood. It provides, 
in fact, a paradignatic instance of the colonization of 
discourse by the rationality of technocracy, which is the 
subject of the third chapter of this study. Rather, it 
corresponds to the competence agenda in the schools, and 
resounds with the behavioral objectives that have 
contributed to turning teachers into nanagers and students 
into products. The effects of such practices are addressed 
in the next section of this study.
The Situation of CoMunioation, Eduoation Profesaionals
In theory, the press is held to provide the wherewithal 
fron wtiich "inferences" are to be drawn, as well as the 
forun for robust debate, and to present infornation that 
situates the terns of such debate within a set of contextual 
references for the interpretation of differences of facts 
and opinions. Similarly, the schools are seen to supply the 
tools, and the training in their use, for "discriminating" 
anong the different presentations of fact and opinion and, 
through the curriculum, to situate the context of the 
cultural and social traditions with reference to which 
critical social choices are made. Either in the discursive 
practices which construct them as uniquely influential modes 
of ensuring popular conformity to technically prespecified 
e nds, or as projects which could create the conditions which 
foster the capacities of citizens to participate rationally
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in the the democratic governance of society, the two domains 
are inextricably linked in the potential possessed by the 
discursive and social practices of which they are 
constituted to influence such an outcome.
There is considerable evidence of the pervasiveness and 
prevalence of the press and the school as influential, 
material e 1ements in the lives of American citizens. Since 
1970 at least, the great majority of Americans have finished 
high school (Ravitch, 1983). This would mean having spent 
upwards of six hours per day, 180 days per year for 12 or 13 
years of their youth in environs of the school. Then as 
parents, they may be at least indirectly involved in 
relations with the school of approx imately the same du rat ion, 
as they see to their children’s education.
With regard to the media, recent research (Becker,
1988) has revealed that adult Americans spend over 50 
percent of their leisure time in media-related activities. 
Among young people, the time spent with media is even 
greater because, along with an estimated average of three- 
four hours of media use per day at home, students are 
encountering growing amounts of media in their classrooms as 
schools incoporate newspapers, periodicals, films, video
presentations, etc., into their curricula and instructional
6
methods. However, no current theories of either the press 
or of the curriculum specifically address this phenomenon or 
adequately account for the potential conflicts which it may
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engender.
To the extent that that environnent is constructed by 
ned iated presentat ions, the ability to understand and to 
recreate nediated representations of reality nust figure 
proninently into the schena of "nornal adjustnent."
Students as well as aduIts, who take an active, conscious 
part in the mediation of events, and who understand that 
their understanding is always and already related to 
interpretations of events rather than to the events 
thenselves, can then contribute to the construction of 
environnents which better suit their own existential 
pu rposes.
Therefore, an examination of the conceptual naps of the 
contenporary Anerican cultural landscape nust include, if it 
does not in fact beg in with, an account of the natures, 
processes, and effects of two proninent socio-cu1tura1 
features, the press and the schools, and of the relations 
between then. The press and the schools are cultural 
resources which, fornally and infornally, nay conduce both 
fornative and persistent influences on social and political 
activities, and on individual citizens' understand ings of 
their situatedness as individuals with respect to those 
activities. As resources, they nay be understood to frane 
the essential contexts in which individuals cone to be 
socialized as citizens for participation in the broader 
arenas of civic and social institutions. It is in this 
regard that they are influential in the construction and the
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endurance of the informed populace upon which the theory of 
American political and social culture resides.
Technical Communication
Such a relation implies at least a system for 
recognizing or constituting agreement on basic phenomena: 
how else is agreement (learning?) to be acknowledged? By 
its very nature, a concept of 'communication’' at minimum 
carries with it a series of relations among implied subjects 
and obj ects: ” . . . f rom," "... about," "... through," "... to,"
and "... for."
Even the rankest beginning student of communication 
could be expected to recognize the foregoing string of 
prepositions and know that it represented Harold Lasswell's 
(1971) model-turned-taxonomy of communication: Who says
Hhat to whom along which channels to what effect■ Likewise, 
a beginning education student would recognize in this brief 
typology a (probably all too) familiar species of pedagogy. 
To have a concept of "education" already entails a similar 
set of actors and actants. We may simply plug in some more 
or less specific entities and interests to the taxonomy to 
have a model for education. Such a commonsense model might 
look like this:
(1) Teachers communicate knowledge to students 
through lectures, books, worksheets, etc., to 
promote learning.
In this case, the commonsense model seems altogether
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unproblenatic. But is it? One way to understand the issues 
is to plug in other sets of elenents into the taxonony. For 
instance:
(2) Society connunicates values to children 
through schools to foster social honogeneity.
Even that fornulation seens benign enough and still 
relatively unproblenatical, though the possibility for 
anbiguation arises with the introduction of such terns as 
"values" and "honogeneity." For another, less anbiguous 
exanple, take the fo 1low ing:
(3) Governnent connunicates nyths to citizens 
through the press to nanufacture consensus and 
suppress criticisn about its policies.
In this case, it is seens clear that it is no longer 
spurious or trivial to clain the inportance of exanining the 
conflation of such broad conceptions as education and 
connunication. Yet another exanple will nake the point nore 
forcefu1ly:
(4) Teachers connunicate discipline to students 
through "school knowledge" to subvert critical 
thinking capacities and please adninistrators.
Exanples such as these illustrate a technical nodel of 
connunication and of education sinultaneously. Even when 
other variables are introduced such as "noise" (Shannon & 
Weaver, 1949) to account for inperfect transnission or 
reception of nessages, and "feedback nechanians" (Wiener,
1961) to relieve the nodel of its one-way, deterninistic
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problems, the model exhibits traits of a rationalizing 
principle which objectifies all its constituent parts. The 
alienating logic Paolo Freire (1970) decried in his Pedagogy 
of the Oppressed as banking model of education --the teacher 
depositing knowledge into the empty cognitive accounts of 
students-- fits isomorphically over the Lasswell model or 
its information processing and cybernetic progeny.
Regressive Influences
Although there have been notable advances in the areas 
of conceptualizing the potency of both communication and 
education for emancipatory praxis, still there are 
ideologies in place at fundamental levels of our culture 
which impede the growth of recognition of the full import of 
such developments. The divisiveness and parochialism of 
academic disciplinarity, along with the commodification by 
the "culture" and "knowledge" industries, have had effects 
which critical reconsiderations of the fields have neither 
reconciled nor repaired. In the first instance, scholarly 
parochialism has exacerbated the fracture of the fields 
along the same lines as elsewhere the division of labor -- 
and more recently and perhaps more fundamentally the 
division of knowledge itself-- deprived work of its 
coherence and satisfaction. In the second instance, 
commodification has tended to trivialize and thus to impede 
the abilities of either to influence the other for the cause 
of the actualization of a truly democratic society. Both of
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these conditions militate against the development and 
naintenance of informed publics possessed of the capacities 
to judge critically among the claims made by representatives 
of interests seeking public approval for policies.
One reason for this is that, as we have seen in the 
beginning sections of this chapter, education and 
communication historically have been constructed as 
categories of "mere" behaviors enacted by beings whose 
autonomy was irrelevant if not altogether spurious.
Latterly psychological behaviorism and industrial management 
theories have been influential in determining certain 
fundamental aspects of theorizing u p o n , and therefore the 
expectations which might be held out for, both communication 
and education in general, and for journalism and pedagogy 
specifically. These will be explored in Chapter 3; in the 
next part of this chapter, I present evidence of the 
existential and institutional similarities and the 
differences between communication and education on the level 
of their structures and on the lived levels of the people 
who labor, often at seemingly cross purposes, to construct 
realities within the two professions which derive such 
authority as they have from their respective disciplinary 
structures.
Communication and Education: Likenesses and Differences
As I indicated in Chapter One, the real interests of 
journalism and pedagogy are existentially related. Thus it
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would seen inportant to exanine any perceived tension 
between the institutional discourses of education and 
journalism. A persistent ambiguity and ambivalence pervade 
the relations between the schools and the press in the 
United States, and not only on the level of press coverage 
of educational issues and problems. At the technical level 
of discourse, both are commonly considered to be affective, 
effective, efficient, essential, powerful, and if sometimes 
ineffable, nevertheless complementary socializing agents 
(e.g., Herelman, 1984; c f . Parenti, 1986).
Over the course of this century, traditional "non- 
political" institutions, such as the family, churches, and 
peer networks, along with traditional political institutions 
such as parties and unions, are generally conceded to have 
d e c 1ined both in influence on and importance for the process 
of socialization of citizens: the formation of children's 
political and social attitudes and preferences (e.g.,
Chaffee, Tipton & Hard, 1970; Herelman, 1984). Heanwhile, 
media influence upon the young people, on whom the 
perseverance of democratic society will inevitably depend, 
has been shown to have increased dramatically, particularly 
among older youth (Hollander, 1971; Jennings & Niemi, 1968; 
Hiller & Reese, 1982; Ninno & Coombs, 1980). Almost by 
default the press and, though perhaps to a lesser extent, 
the schools have become the principal institutions to which 
task has fallen to fulfill the conditions and to meet the 
requirements which the critical eye of Jefferson detected
6 6
and identified 200 years ago as requisite for the success of 
democratic government.
Nevertheless, since the 1920s at least, the managers of 
the press --publishers and editors-- have steadfastly 
resisted recognizing an "educational mission" in which that 
term wouId be understood to have other than an instrumental 
meaning. All the while mouthing myriad platitudes about 
public service, the press has sought to avoid the 
concommitant, uncomfortable issue of the press's potential 
social responsibility to readers considered s b  learners, 
students, or publics. Rather, in the cynical rhetoric of 
the marketing ethos, a commercial relation is called forth 
to supplant a social one.
This is accomplished in a way that suggests that the 
institution of the press is aware of the potential 
correctness of the implications of the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis, and has taken the step of creating individuals' 
identities in linguistic practices. Readers who might 
properly call upon the press to regard them as members of a 
do 1 is or, at a minimum, of a public --and thus, if not the 
legitimate beneficiaries of the rights and privileges 
bestowed by the First Amendment, at least their residual 
legatees to whom the press owes a fiduciary responsibility-- 
instead are themselves interpellated as consumers by the 
very institutions which trumpet their records for public 
service as at least a partial justification for their
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existence. That is, the press-a u a -business in effect 
ignores the readers' and viewers' claims to define their own 
subjectivities, meanwhile recasting then in the nore 
desirable (for the press, since all that is owed to an 
audience is a performance) aspect of audiences, consumers, 
and product. In the process, any legitinate public to which 
the reader/viewer might belong, as well as the individuals 
themselves, becomes objectified as a commodity that is 
actually created for the sole purpose of being sold back to 
the actual beneficiaries: the advertizers.
The Paradox ClI Effects: The Svengali Synd r o m e . In this 
reading of the press/school relation, the public has ample 
grounds for fearing that the media --especially, but not 
exclusively television-- were having deleterious effects on 
social phenomena ranging from health (cigaret ads/lung 
cancer), democratic politics (TV debates, and convention 
coverage/decline of political parties), and youthful 
violence (TV violence/ rebellious, violent students).
This public concern creates the paradoxical situation 
mentioned a b o v e . The problem is this: Media must be able to 
present themselves to their clients, their advertizers, as 
powerful and effective messengers whose services are worth 
the exorbitant sums they extract for delivering messages. At 
the same time, they also require some mechanism to provide 
"plausible d e n i a b i 1ity" (as Admiral Poindexter put it), that 
is, it means presenting themselves to their audiences in ways 
that assuage the common-sense fears of excess ive dominance
6 8
and influence. Meanwhile, the nedia are constantly engaged 
in market research employing the positivist, behavoiral 
techniques of psychology, political science, educational 
technology, and sociology, and constantly refining those 
techniques, to devise better ways to overcome buyers' 
resistance and, thereby, better sell the messages, while 
using the same information to provide more audience/product 
to sell back to their advertizers.
In the aftermath of the 1968 Presidential election, 
there occurred another predictable round of chest-beating. 
This has consisted of a campaign (self-choreographed, 
-generated, -promoted, and -serving ) within the press itself 
to constitute the press as pitiful, weak dupes of skilled 
manipulators, with abilities far beyond those of mortal men 
and well outside the media's power to control or to resist, 
and who are possessed of media knowledge superior to that of
6
the practitioners themselves (e.g., Hayer & HcMannus, 1988).
I refer to this attitude as the Svengali Syndrome. By 
maintaining this posture, the media assure both their 
advertizers and their audiences of the predictability of 
their putative neutrality and effect(ive/less)ness. That is, 
sponsors are assured that the media are themselves incapable 
of or unwilling to unmask their participation in the 
charades acted out to impress the consumer. Meanwhile, the 
audience is offered the solace that, if they are being 
duped, the messengers are equally helpless and stupefied, or
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at least studiously neutral.
This attitude within the nedia conports with a
paradoxical situation for the nedia vis & vis their position
as a broker in the transactions of information and attention 
with their clients and publics. The nodal of the nedia as
brokers differs in significant ways fron the simple vending
model, the connunication typology of Lasswell (1971): "Who 
says what to w h o n , through what channeIs and to what 
effect." The nass nedia, in the capitalist model, "sell" at 
least two products: one is the channel (and sonetines the 
message, in the case of seIf-pronotion) by which the message 
is transmitted by the sender; tne other is the audience, 
which is packaged around a given message matrix and sold 
back to the sender. A given nedium brokers both products; it 
is an active participant, and a benificiary of, both 
transact ions.
I would argue that, in the brokerage model, we can 
detect a clear analogy with schooling: The state is the 
source of the message as well as sponsor/advertizer; the 
curriculum is the medium; "school knowledge" is the message/ 
product, and students are the audience/product. Meanwhile, 
socialization researchers in the schools --educators, 
sociologists, political scientists, and psychologists-- seek 
newer and better ways to market the message. Students differ 
from audiences for other mass-directed knowledges in that 
they are not conceived of as being simultaneously resold. 
Rather, the completion of the transaction is deferred. It is
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finalized after the student haa dropped out or graduated; 
then youth are encouraged to adopt an easy payment plan: to 
repay the sponsorship of their education with minimal levels 
of political demands, docility or indifference toward 
national policies, and at least tacit --but at most, only 
nominal--leveIs of participation.
I would argue now that there is at least the 
possibility that broker's paradox and the Svengali syndrome 
couId apply, with equa1 relevance, to schooIs insofar as 
they function to socialize in the name of education. You 
pay your money, you take your chances. This matter may lie 
at the core of the schools' problems with fundamentalists 
who fear the contradiction of values instilled at hone by 
the expression and discussion of ideas at school which are 
seen to conflict with parents' desires that their children 
cleave to the home orthodoxy.
It may also explain the inability of socialization 
researchers to locate significant detectable effects of 
schooling on students' political attitudes and practices. 
Schooling must be shown to have some effects, in the 
efficiency-dominated social model, in order to Justify the 
expense; but those effects must not be great enough to 




D e s p i t e  t h e s e  p o t e n t i a l  and ac t u a l  s i m i l a r i t i e s ,  at the
level of s t r u c t u r e  w i t h i n  the r e s p e c t i v e  i n d i v i d u a l
i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  j o u r n a l i s m  and e d u c a t i o n  have r e g a r d e d  one
a n o t h e r  as e s s e n t i a l l y  a n t i t h e t i c a l  e n t e r p r i s e s ,  w i t h
a n t i p o d a l  p u r p o s e s ,  c o n f l i c t i n g  goals, and d i v e r g e n t
agendas. For e x a m p l e ,  on one hand, as a m a t t e r  of
t r a d i t i o n ,  A m e r i c a n  j o u r n a l i s t s  have at least r h e t o r i c a l l y
a c c e p t e d  a c e r t a i n  o b l i g a t i o n  to i n s t r u c t  t heir r e a d e r s  as
well as inform, e n t e r t a i n ,  or e n t i c e  them. S i m u l t a n e o u s l y ,
however, they --or t h e i r  m a n a g e r s - -  have a r e a d y  b a r r a g e  of
r e a s o n s  why this c a n n o t  be a c c o m p l i s h e d  C I n t e r n a t i o n a  1
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I n s t i t u t e  for I n t e l l e c t u a l  C o o p e r a t i o n ,  193b). T h e s e  
r h e t o r i c a l  f l o u r i s h e s  n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , h o w e v e r ,  w h e r e  the 
m a n t l e  of suc h  an e d u c a t i o n a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  has been 
a s s u m e d  by p a r t i c u l a r  j o u r n a l i s t s ,  t y p i c a l l y  they have been 
s u p p o r t e d  n e i t h e r  by a m i n i m a l l y  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  
of what a p r a x i s  of j o u r n a l i s t i c  p e d a g o g y  w o u l d  a c t u a l l y  
enta i l ,  nor by any m a r k e d  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  or m a n a g e r i a l  
e n t h u s i a s m  or s y m p a t h y  for the task of d e v e l o p i n g  and 
s u p p o r t i n g  s u c h  an u n d e r s t a n d i n g .  It d o e s  not s e r v e  the 
v e s t e d  i n t e r e s t s  of p o w e r  that the p r e s s  s h o u l d  be 
s u f f i c i e n t l y  e d u c a t i o n a l  to p r o b l e m a t i z e  the s t a t u s  quo or 
e x i s t i n g  a r r a n g e m e n t s  and p e r q u i s i t e s  w i t h i n  d o m i n a n t  
i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  or to c h a l l e n g e  the e s t a b l i s h e d  b o u n d a r i e s  of 
p e r m i s s i b l e  d i s s e n t  ( C h o m s k y  & H e r m a n n ,  1989; E d e l m a n ,  1988; 
P a r e n t  i . 1986).
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On the other hand, journalism's popularly accepted, 
though in reality seldom deserved (Altschull, 1984), 
reputation for abrasive adversariality and watchdoggery, and 
its a l 1-too-potent agenda-setting capacities, as well as its 
connotation of skepticism of authority do not readily 
comport with or comfortably reside in the atmosphere of the 
contemporary culture of the school. Indeed, as a subsequent 
chapter will show in detail, school officialdom frequently 
has suppressed even the tamest exercises of journalistic 
enterprise, judging them to be inimical to the interests of 
good order and discipline within the rigidly bureaucratized 
environment of the contemporary American school.
By the same token, within the professional community of 
educational theorists and researchers, "journalistic" is a 
term of opprobrium, connoting a certain shallowness, a 
glibness, and a lack of seriousness. Classroom teachers, 
however, often seem content to rely on the representations 
of events contained in news publications to authorize and 
convey to their students a reliable (and testable) version 
of social situations wherein students locate and recreate 
their existential realities. For example, in current events 
un its within the social educat ion curr iculum, it is 
relatively and understandably commonplace for those 
"newspaper in the classroom" exercises and current events 
quizzes to figure in students' overall grades. Teachers are, 
by necessity, pragmatists. But it is important what the
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practice says about the contents of the news, what it
implies about the views that are expressed there and those 
8
that are n o t .
Sone Structural Similarities. Despite these apparent
differences, even a cursory glance at the two fields reveals
substantial, important similarities between the goals,
objectives and practices of journalism and education. For
example, there is a remarkable parallelism between the
interests of journalism and education, taken as
institutions. As Jacques Ellul (1973) noted, their projects
and machineries are convergent in many ways. Berger, Berger,
and Kellner (1974) in their study of the sociology of
modernization and consciousness, The Homeless M ind. identify
communication and education as "secondary carriers" which
function under the aegis of the dominant narratives of
bureaucracy and technology (p. 105). In the United States,
as in any industr ia1 and post indust r ia1 state where
knowledge has been commodified (e.g, Lyotard, 1985),
education and mass media --the schools and the press-- are
designed to operate primarily as (a) socializing influences
on their audiences, (b) authorized conduits for transmission
of approved, "official knowledges" to those audiences
(Hexler, 1981), and (c) propagandizing agents of the state
9
and other vested interests (Ellul, 1973).
Hethodological Likenesses. Also, in terms both of the 
methodology by which they describe and pursue their aims and 
of the systems by which knowledge about the institutions has
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been gained, the schools and the press resemble one another. 
In order to justify to their sponsors --advertizers and 
taxpayers, respectively-- the enormous expenses involved in 
both enterprises, both mass education and mass communication 
units have felt compelled to adopt the criteria of exchange 
values. That is, they have been required to demonstrate the
efficacy of their interventions.
In an age that is still predominantly influenced by the 
positivist ethos, both in the school (e.g. Finn, 1985) and 
the press (Cranberg, 1989), this has meant that some sorts
of measurable outcomes have been required. Thus the
seemingly endless parade of tests and polls began, spawned 
originally by consequences of putting the country on war­
time footing during the First World War (Gould, 1981). The 
measurement industry in education and the market research/ 
advertizing/ public relations industries in communications 
arose in response to these requirements and, though it is 
probably a moot point as to which came first, intelligence/ 
aptitude testing and market/opinion research have come to 
dominate the ways in which the outcomes of the processes of 
communication and education are appraised and rewarded.
In their professional discourses, apologists for both 
the press (e.g., Cranberg, 1989; Mencher, 1987) and for the 
schools (e.g., Adler, 1982; Ravitch, 1965) proclaim value- 
and/or content- neutrality for their representations of 
factual content, the scientific '‘objectivity" of their
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m e t h o d s  of d i s c o v e r i n g '  and r e p o r t i n g  --as o p p o s e d  to 
c o n s t r u c t i n g - -  r e a lity, and l e g i t i m a t e  t h e i r  a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  
and u s e s  of s u c h  s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  r e v e a l e d  r e a l i t y  u n d e r  the 
i m p r i m a t u r  of the a u t h o r i t y  a c c r u i n g  f r o m  t h e i r  e x p e r t i s e .  
E i t h e r  e x p l i c i t l y  or tacitly, u n d e r  the e n c o m p a s s i n g  
d i c t a t e s  of m e a s u r e m e n t '  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  (Martin, O v e r h o l t  & 
Urban, 1976 ) or m a n a g e r i a l  e f f i c i e n c y ,  by t h e s e  s t r a t e g e m s  
i n d i v i d u a l s  - - t e a c h e r s  and j o u r n a l i s t s - -  are d e p r i v e d  of 
c r e a t i n g  and a s s i g n i n g  t h e i r  own m e a n i n g s  to a c t s  of 
s i g n i f i c a t i o n  in t e r m s  of t h e i r  own a b i l i t y  to c o m p r e h e n d  
th e i r  e x i s t e n t i a l  real i t i e s .
A f f i n i t i e s  for S o c i a l i z a t i o n
For a n o t h e r  e x a m p l e  of inst 1 t u t i o n a l  s i m i l a r i t i e s ,  both 
the p r e s s  and the s c h o o l s  pay at least lip s e r v i c e  to their 
r o l e s  as i n f o r m a n t s  of and e d u c a t o r s  for the p u b l i c  weal. 
D u r i n g  c a m p a i g n  s e a s o n s  n e w s p a p e r s ,  t e l e v i s i o n ,  and even 
s eme r a d i o  s t a t i o n  s e 1f - p r o m o t i o n s  r o u t i n e l y  a n n o u n c e  their 
i n t e n t i o n s  to p r o v i d e  you, the v o t e r , "  w i t h  the i n f o r m a t i o n  
"you need' to e x e r c i s e  r e s p o n s i b l y  "your right" to vote. 
S c h o o l s  a l l e g e  that they t e a c h  c r e a t i v e ,  c r i t i c a l  t h i n k i n g  
and p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g ,  a l s o  for the p u r p o s e s  of p r o v i d i n g  
t o o l s  for r e s p o n s i b l e  c i t i z e n s  to e x p l o r e  the w o r l d  that is 
r e p r e s e n t e d  in the m e d i a  and to t h e r e b y  r e s p o n s i b l y  e x e r c i s e  
t h e i r  f r a n c h i s e .  School a c t i v i t i e s  s u c h  as s t u d e n t  
e l e c t i o n s ,  n e w s p a p e r s ,  and v a r i o u s  c i t i z e n s h i p  e n r i c h m e n t "  
p r o g r a m s ,  w i t h  e d u c a t i o n a l  t e l e v i s i o n  b r o a d c a s t s  d e p i c t i n g  
s t u d e n t s  i n v o l v e d  in c o m m u n i t y  issues, a p p e a r  to p r e f i g u r e
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adult responsibilities. Press units such as newspapers and 
magazines are incorporated into the curriculun, and students 
nay be required to watch certain television prograns, with 
the view that even a docu-drama or an info-tainnent 
presented on television is superior to students' not being 
familiar with the infornation therein presented.
But it is possible that school and press share only 
the appearance of investing the citizenry with the 
capacities for attention and competences for debate to which 
they proclaim their dedication. Generally, they both share 
in defining the legitimate telos of their projects: 
education and information in the cause of suffrage. Yet 
even rational suffrage does not come near to exhausting the 
minimum responsibilities required of citizens competent to 
cooperate in the government of society." Knowledge of 
political facts and a concommitant sense of active 
responsibility for policies have been established by the 
culture as measures of the success of the journalistic and 
pedagogical enterprises. Even by their own standards, 
established within the institutions, the press and the 
schools in America seem to have failed (Cirino, 1971; Jones, 
1980; Picard, 1985; Wasburn, 1986).
Yet even in their failure, the potentiality for an 
emancipatory praxis in the professions of journalism and 
teaching (which have been identified as holding central 
places in the possibility of actual democratic
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participation) are routinely denigrated in the popular 
culture that so sorely needs their professional offices.
For exanple journalism, according to an anonymous nag, is 
said to be "the calling of those who have missed their 
calling." Teaching is similarly disparaged: "Those who can, 
do; those who can't, teach, and those who can't teach, teach 
teachers," is a canard of ancient lineage. Journalists and 
teachers are in the unpleasant and over time untenable 
position of being the messengers carrying news of the 
accumulating c u 1tura1 d isaster and be ing blamed for the 
unpalatable tidings they bring.
It is possible that deprecation is an understandable 
response of a public which recognizes the potential 
authority, influence, and power vested in the practitioners 
of these most public of arts. It may then be that these 
rank bromides have a salutary effect, reminding the artists 
of their fallibility and providing a caveat against hubris. 
These laudable possibilities exist. There is, however, 
another, more insidious interpretation that, more or less 
unbidden, attaches to such slanders. That is, these attacks 
are a kind of generic artfumentum ad hominem. the goal of 
which is to discredit newspeople and teachers (for such is 
much of the knowledge that is the common fare in schools: 
news; certainly no less "new" to most students than the 
events reported on by the nation's newspapers and television 
newscasts are to their consumers) and thereby to discredit 
in advance the achievements of which, under different
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conditions, their praxis is capable.
Indeed, George Gerbner (1973) indicates this 
possibility in his study of the images of teachers as they 
are characterized in popular nedia, particularly in books, 
movies and television. Gerbner states that his examination 
of the evidence in those nedia the image projected of 
teachers, scholars, and schools "helps to explain --and 
determine-- the ambivalent functions and paradoxical 
fortunes of the educational enterprise in American society' 
(p. 265). There is little to wonder at in that, given that 
teachers (when they are portrayed at all) appear as weak and 
ineffectual ("They do not get the girl"), or as mad 
scientists' (p. 263), or as alien to the community...and 
often in conflict with its values' (p. 277).
If teachers have seldom had a favorable or symbolically 
strong portrayals, journalists' fortunes have risen and 
fallen: From the gritty, witty Cary Grant character in His 
Girl Friday. to the William Hurt character in Network News 
with stops at Network and other less savory stations along 
the way, journalists are in the throws of losing whatever 
stature they once had and are being held up either to public 
censure or ridicule in the success game. The good reporter 
in Network News loses his job, the girl, his self- 
respect (albeit temporarily), and winds up working at a 
station in Spokane; meanwhile, the bubble-headed, bleach- 
blonde (unethical) anchorman goes on to fame and fortune.
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Individuals la the System
Similarities such as these are largely concealed by the 
institutional discourses that describe the limitations --the 
parameters of inclusion and exclusion-- of the spheres of 
knowledge with which the two disciplines are concerned and 
by which they are defined. But, inasmuch as they are seen 
as providers of (at least) the information and as sources of 
the concommitant competences necessary for the populace to 
make appropriate political, economic, and social decisions, 
the press and the schools may be seen as principal agents 
for either socialization or education.
Nevertheless, if it is true, as one pundit has it, 
that one need only scratch a journalist to find a social 
activist underneath, often there also bleeds a reformer when 
a teacher is nicked. Journalists, in the main, at least 
begin their careers imbued with a desire to seek social 
justice or to correct social ills. Former Associated Press 
reporter turned journalism professor J. Herbert Altschull, 
in one of the rare moments of optimism in Agents of Power. 
his otherwise somber and rather pessimistic assessment/ 
indictment of contemporary journalism, has remarked that
There is built into journalism the possibility of 
inducing change and of helping to create a world 
that is more just and more peaceful; it is this 
possibility that has fired and continues to fire 
the imagination of journalists everywhere on earth 
(1984, p. 273, emphasis in original).
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Teachers, too, frequently begin their teaching lives 
with imaginations fired by the possibilities for effecting 
change that seems to inhere in their chosen profession. The 
potential for effecting change locally ("helping kids") and 
globally ("oaking the world a better place") are among the 
major factors in attracting individuals to the teaching 
profession (Lortie, 1975). A similar sentiment is echoed in 
the literature of a number of teacher-centered educational 
reform projects. Among the central understandings 
motivating the National Writing Project, for instance, is 
that teachers are uniquely situated to act as change-agents 
in their schools and have the potential to affect both the 
teaching practices of their colleagues and the future 
prospects of their students by means of their own models for 
pedagogy (Daniels & Zemmelman, 1985).
All too often, however, the high hopes of newly fledged 
journalists and teachers come acropper on the institutional 
realities in their respective workplaces. Virtually all 
former journalists and teachers have stories about the 
dashing of their expectations on the rocks of institutional 
managerial intransigence. Altschull (1984), for example, 
includes in the preface of his book an account of his own 
disillusionment at the hands of obdurate editors who refused 
to accept his account the effect of the outcome of the West 
German elections. Ernest L. Boyer's (1983) High School. an 
account of the findings of the Carnegie Foundation for the
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Advancement of Teaching on secondary education in America, 
and John I. Goodlad's (1984) A Place Called School■ both 
report that a major cause of teacher burnout is the 
perception that school administrators either undervalue or 
reject out of hand teachers' attempts to reclaim their 
classrooms for education rather than discipline and control.
At the level of the individuals who actually do the 
work of the press and the schools, the similarities are even 
more striking. Henry Giroux (1988), for example, has 
described the conditions which ’define teachers merely as 
technicians." Their working lives are
overwhelmingly replete with organization 
constraints and ideological conditions....Their 
teaching hours are too long, they are generally 
isolated in cellular structures, and they have few 
opportunities to work collectively with their 
peers. Moreover, they are prevented from 
exercising their own knowledge with respect to 
selection [and] organization of. . .materials.... 
[E]ven worse, they were asked to teach kids how to 
take risks, weigh alternatives, and exercise 
independent judgment while being restricted to ... 
practices that emphasized rote, mechanical, and 
technical aspects of learning, (pp. 74-75)
Giroux also reported that "the rhetoric often associated 
with the public's view of schooling was decidedly at odds 
w i t h ...functions in their jobs" (p. 74).
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These are conditions with which editorial staffers on 
nost large and intermediate size dailies newspapers would 
empathize. Along with low pay (though typically not as low 
as most teachers receive) and long hours, lower echelon news 
people routinely accept forms of organizational and 
ideological constraints, including institutional self­
censorship and obeisance to the interests of management and 
advertizers that limit the topics they may report and 
approaches, sources, and points of view that are acceptable 
(HacDougall, 188 9). Journalists are typically encouraged to 
conceive their enterprise as competitive rather than 
collaborative (Breed, 1955), and are pigeonholed according 
to the "beat" they cover. These practices may substitute 
for the "enclosure" within their classrooms that constitute 
teachers working situations.
Given then that there is a relation between the schools 
and the press in the United States, educators and others 
interested in the social and cultural implications of 
journalism and of the curriculum need to be concerned about 
the attitudes and competences for which citizens are 
educated. He have seen, in the context of a dominant vision 
of American participatory democracy, that both the press and 
the schools are conceived of, primarily, as playing roles as 
socializing agents in the continuance of democratic 
institutions, a point which I shall develop at greater 
length later.
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Communication, Education, and tha DileBBas of Deaooraoy
It was precisely this vision of an informed citizenry 
which that aristocratic travailleur Alexis de Tocqueville 
identified in Democracy in America as requisite for the 
realization of the American experiment in political and 
social ideals. As he did with many of the nascent American 
cultural forms he observed, de Tocqueville alluded pointedly 
to the problematic relation between the expression and the 
actualization of that ideal.
"When the right of every citizen to cooperate in the 
government of society is acknowledged," de Tocqueville 
w r o t e ,
every citizen must be presumed to possess the 
power of discriminating between different opinions 
of their contemporaries, and of appreciating the 
different facts from which inferences may be 
drawn. The sovereignty of the people and the 
liberty of the press must therefore be regarded as 
correlative... (1845, Vol.l, p. 190 , emphasis 
added ) .
Volume I of Democracy in America consists primarily of 
caveats about and criticisms of American democracy, intended 
for the leaders of the French Republic, rather than for 
domestic consumption on these shores. Nevertheless, it is 
typical of de Tocquevi1l e 's perspicacity that his 
representation of the minimum conditions necessary and
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sufficient for democratic participation should be as 
relevant today as it was a century-and-a-haIf ago, perhaps 
even more so. In the next section of this chapter, 1 will 
discuss certain ramifications of these democratic minima: 
how and what it may mean that they are problematized; how 
they are to be realized, and in whose hands that realization 
resides.
Ths Social Contrast
The problematic aspect of American republican democracy 
rests squarely on the presumptive condition that de 
Tocqueville articulated in the citation quoted above, as 
well as in a set of observations concerning the effects of 
equality on the possibility of a public life. These latter 
comprise the major part of the second volume of Democracy In 
Aneriea. composed some five years after Volume 1 appeared, 
and are germaine to my concern with reconstituting a public 
sphere as an arena for which the schools should prepare, and 
in which the press permit, citizens to participate. I will 
expand upon the first of these here, and postpone the second 
until later in Chapter 4.
The first problematic presumption is this: Lacking 
evidence to support the presumption of the competence of its 
citizens to comprehend and evaluate the government and its 
policies, it is doubtful that even an elected government or 
other normative (much less coercive) social institution 
would for very long entertain the necessary respect for, or 
obedience to, the will of its constituents. Thus, the
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possibility of of actualizing or satisfying the presumption 
resides in two subjunctions: (a) that there be avenues by 
which citizens night obtain sufficient knowledge about the 
“different opinions" and "different facts," and (b) that 
there be neans of engendering the requisite discernment and 
discrimination which "every citizen m u s t ... possess."
In other w o r d s , a democratic government --even a 
limited republican one-- which invites the cooperation of 
its citizens and then legitimizes its existence by that 
cooperat ion requ ires c it izens to evaluate in a mean ingfu1 
and thoughtful way the actions, claims, and policies of the 
government in which those citizens are cooperating. But not 
only must they evaluate those claims, they must also debate 
them; then, having been exposed to the different opinions 
and facts, they may agree to cooperate in such policies as 
may emerge from that process. Their cooperation, in turn, 
directly entails the citizens with a moral responsibility 
for their government's actions, policies and claims exactly 
because those citizens are cooperating in and, in that 
sense, legitimizing them. Thus citizens of a democracy must 
have-'Bust demand-- access to a veritable cacaphony of 
voices presenting them with "different" facts and opinions 
about the activities of their society, their raucous or 
distractingly dischordant clamor notwithstanding. Indeed, 
they must participate in that clamor. Equally, they must 
possess the ability both to .iudwe among those voices, to
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consider the possible consequences of actions which those 
voices advocate, and to bring to bear faculties of critical 
judgment which enable them to examine their own opinions. 
along w i t h , and in view of, those of their compatriots.
I take this to be a stronger claim than that contained 
in the bromide Hurray Edelman (1988) poses and effectively 
rebuts at the onset of his recent investigation of the 
contribution of the press to the "spectacle" of politics: 
"(C)itizens who are informed about political developments 
can more effectively promote their own interests and the 
public interest" (p.l). He continues:
That response takes for granted a world of facts 
that have a determinable meaning and a world of 
people who react rationally to facts they know... 
(when) neither premise is tenable.... Whether 
events are noticed and what they mean depend upon 
observers' situations and the language that 
reflects and interprets those situations....If 
political developments depended upon factual 
observation, false meanings would be discredited 
in time and a consensus of valid ones would 
emerge.... There is no politics respecting matters 
that evoke a consensus about the pertinent facts, 
their meanings, and the rational course of action. 
(PP. 1-3)
To follow Edelman s arguement out further, under 
conditions of perfect consensus there would be no politics
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at all. In effect, there would be no news either, at least 
no political news; but as Edelman also notes, all news is 
political in that it fits into the matrices of crisis and 
solution which political necessity manufactures for the 
legitimation of policies and as "reinforcements of 
ideologies (p. 12) and no need for an informed, thoughtful 
polity. Hence there would also be no need for an education 
that could engender in citizens a faculty for Judgment among 
rival discourses. In a strange way, that end would seem to 
be the end towards which dominant conceptions and practices 
of education are directed: toward consensual silence -- 
orderly, vast, and authoritarian. That conception echoes 
Isabelle Hoe 1le-Neumann's (1973, 1974) theory of "the spiral 
of silence" as an explanation of media's power to limit 
discourse and to stifle rival voices.
A Fix on the Press and the School
American society is heavily dependent upon the press 
and other media for the images and pictures it receives of 
itself and of the internal relations among its various 
elements. It is still more dependent upon mediated messages 
for representations of reality it relies upon for the 
construction of its relations in and with the rest of the 
world. Schools are implicated in this dependency inasmuch 
as they have been identified, in a landmark U.S. Supreme 
Court civil rights decision as a "principal instrument in 
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him
B6
(sic) for later professional training, and in helping him
10
(sic) to adjust normally to his (sic) environnent."
Hence, de Tocqueville's perspicuous articulation of the 
problenatic of denocracy nay be read as caveat, which is 
probably how he intended it (Sennett, 1978). The grand 
experinent of acknowledging "the right of every citizen to 
cooperate in the governnent of society" cannot succeed 
absent the "presumed" conpetences pertinent both to the 
dissenination of and debate over political facts and 
opinions and to the reflective interpretation and thoughtful 
exercise of action based on citizens' appropriations of 
those facts and opinions. If a society takes seriously the 
ideal of a cooperative, democratic polity, then that society 
may not presume anything about the critical competences 
which define and enable it, except that they are necessary. 
Such a society must empower, leg it im i z e , and maintain those 
social institutions which respond to broadly conceived and 
realized notions of civic competence, even though some 
disorder or some discord ensue. Vocal and voluble debate 
and disagreement and the clamor of widely divergent voices 
should not be interpreted as symptoms of failure or of 
weakness in a democratic state; rather they are, as de 
Tocqueville observed, the signs of its vitality. They must 
be encouraged by and in social institut ions whose goals and 
purposes --whose very raissons d 'etre—  include, if they are 
not actually founded upon, incorporating within them space 
for such disputes to o ccur.
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The press and the schools are the two primary cultural 
resources upon which American society has cone to depend for 
creating the proper conditions in which such an enlightened 
citizenry would evolve. Thus, both the requirement and the 
problem that de Tocqueville identified clearly entail issues 
that are important in domains broadly defined as philosophy 
of communication and philosophy of education, and more 
particularly curriculum theory and theory of the press. For 
the former, this involves theorizing about the curriculum in 
relation to how it should be organized to best foster both 
an appreciation of the scope of the challenges and the 
abilities to meet them. A democratic curriculum theory 
should address how and for what purposes a curriculum is 
conceived and implemented; whose interests it serves, and 
what society may expect from students who have been educated 
under its influence. No less than these, however, it should 
also regard the communicative competences of those whose 
charge it will be to put it into practice: teachers. 
Similarly, a theory of the press responsive to the 
requirements of participatory democracy should conduce 
replies to questions about press structures, interests, and 
effects; and it should contain reference to the journalists, 
--though not necessarily newspapers or television news 
organizations-- as exemplars for social competence, both in 
appreciation of the terrible complexity of the challenges, 
and in pursuit and support of the democratic ideaIs by which
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those c ha1lenges nay be n e t .
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N O T E S : Chapter Two
1
I am n o t  t r y i n g  to d r a w  an e x p l i c i t  h o m o l o g y  h e r e  b e t w e e n  
cotnmun ica 1 1 o n / i n  f o r m a t  ion and on the o n e  hand and e d u c a t i o n /  
e n j u n c t i o n  on the ot h e r .  T h a t  s m a c k s  e n t i r e l y  too m u c h  of 
f u n c t i o n a l i s m ,  for one thing; for a n o t h e r ,  it p l a c e s  too 
m a n y  l i m i t s  on b o t h  of the p r i m a r y  terms. N e i t h e r  one 
n e c e s s a r i l y  e x c l u d e s  the other. H o w e v e r ,  it d o e s  s e e m  that, 
in the c a s e  of e d u c a t i o n  at least, to c l a i m  t h a t  its 
e s s e n t i a l  H a b e r m a s i a n  p r a c t i c a l  i n t e r e s t  o u g h t  to be 
e n j u n c t i o n  is n o t  p r o s c r i b e  any of the a c t i v i t i e s  that 
t e a c h e r s  c o u l d  l e g i t i m a t e l y  p r a c t i c e :  to r a t i o n a l l y  e n j o i n
y o u n g  and old l e a r n e r s  to c r i t i c a l n e s s  and s k e p t i c i s m  v i s  a. 
v i s  the c l a i m s  of t h o s e  w h o s e  i n t e r e s t s  a r e  c o n c e a l e d .  And 
by the s a m e  to k e n ,  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  n e e d  n o t  e s c h e w  i n j u n c t i o n ;  
t h a t  w o u l d  r e m o v e  f r o m  it the r h e t o r i c a l  p u r v i e w  w h i c h  is a 
l e g i t i m a t e  c o m p o n e n t  of its o p e r a t i o n .
2
E x c e p t  in t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  W. I. T h o m a s  ( 1 9 6 7 ) ,  i m p l i c a t e d  
in his t h e o r e m :  T h i n g s  tha t  a r e  t a k e n  to be real are real in 
t h e i r  e f f e c t s .
3
B e r g e r  and L u c k m a n n  < 1 9 6 7 )  a t t r i b u t e  t h e  g e n e s i s  of the 
t e r m  s o c  l o l g y  k n o w l e d g e  (W i s s e n s Q z i Q l . Q g i e ) to M a x  
S c h e l e r ,  w h o  t h e y  say c o i n e d  it in 1923 It is p o s s i b l e ,  
p e r h a p s  e v e n  like l y ,  t h a t  --at a t i m e  w h e n  a f a i r l y  r i g i d  
p r o h i b i t i o n  e x i s t e d  a g a i n s t  t r a n s - d i s c i p 1 i n a r i t y - - had Boas, 
Sap i r ,  and W h o r f  b e e n  s o c i o l o g i s t s  and n o t  l i n g u i s t s  they
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would have participated in the discourse. The difference 
night be that, where Scheler and others suffered fron or 
sought to prevent the "vertigo of relativity" (Berger A 
Luckmann, p. 5), Sapir and Hhorf enbraced it.
4
In a footnote, Berger and Lucknann (1967) attribute this 
point to Arnold Gehlen. Habernas (1983) provides an 
extensive critique of the Gehlen, as well as other West 
Gernan "neoconservative cultural critics" and the Anerican 
strain of that breed as well.
5
Bowers, (1984), elaborates in great detail and with equal 
erudition on the direct application of the sociology of 
knowledge approach to education. He also cones down on the 
"connunication" side. His thesis is that socialogy of 
knowledge explains the world the way it is, is perceived by 
students, and is rooted in the "prinacy of the socialization 
process" (p . 97) .
6
It nay be supposed that, in addition to assisting students 
to cone to terns with the vagaries of the "real world," 
newspaper and newsnagazine publishers pronote the use of 
news publications in the classroon by such devices as 
"Newspapers in the Schools" prograns in an effort to assure 
a continuing narket for their products. This could have the 
further consequence of providing additional and essentially 
unchallenged reinforcenent both to the connercial nature of 
the relations between reader and text, and of naturalizing
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that relationship, and to the facticity of school knowledge, 
The very nadir of this relationship is now under way as a 
pilot program of the Whittle Communications Network in 
Memphis. Called C h a n n e 1 1, this enterprise offers free 
audio-visual equipment to the schools which accept the 
program on the proviso that it be shown to every child in 
the school. Costs of the equipment and production are 
assumed by companies whose advertisements are embedded in 
the 8-to-10 minute " info-tainment" programs.
7
The educational role of the press was presented us a 
rhetorical possibility in the first widely recognized "code 
of the profession, the Canons of Journalism, promulgated by 
the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) in 1922.
In its preamble, the Canons commit their subscribers to an 
explicitly educational stance: ‘‘[TJo communicate to the 
human race what its members do, feel, and think" ("The 
Canons of Journalism," 1935).
An approach more seriously directed to the educational 
role of the press may be found in the International 
Institute for Intellectual Cooperation's (1934) The 
Educational Responsibility the F.ress ■ This is a slim but 
fascinating volume, commissioned by the League of Nations to 
enquire "whether the Press is actually accomplishing its 
great educational mission o f . ..the provision of information 
concerning...the requisite material for the formation of 
judgment and understanding by its readers" (p.9).
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11 contains essays by five leading international 
journalists of the day: M. de Juvenel, former editor of 
Matin in Paris; Kinglsey Martin, writer and editor for 
London's Mew Statesman and Mation: Paul Scott Mowrer,
Pulitzer Prize-winning foreign correspondent of the Chicago 
Daily H e w s : Sanin Cano, of Macion in Buenos Aires, and 
Friedrich Sieburg, Frankfurter Zeitung. Each in his own way 
responded to the question: "[l]s the Press able to raise the 
intellectual level of the people and, if so, how?" (p. 9).
Each in his own way (except de Juvenal, whose dialogue 
between the reader and the listener is quaintly poetic and 
Romantic) reluctantly answered in the negative, citing the 
commercial nature of the press, the low class of nany 
readers, and the political pressures of national governments 
to see their own positions accepted.
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Indeed, as Ellul (1973) notes in Propaganda: The Format ion 
Oi M e n ' s f sic 1 Attitudes. his important and seminal study of 
the history, conditions, operations, and practices of the 
books eponymous subject, mass communication and education 
are essential elements of the preconditions which afforded 
propaganda its entry into the fundamental matrices of the 
modern state. A certain amount of education and a wide 
dispersion of communication technology in effect guarantee 
the success of the propagandistic enterprise. Ellul 
contends that, paradoxically, the more education the 
propagandee possesses, the more susceptible that person is
a 5
to t h e  b l a n d i s h m e n t s  of i n t e r n a l  — as o p p o s e d  to a g i t a t a  on
( ag i t ) - - p r o p a g a n d  a (p. 1 0 2 - 1 1 7 ) .
10
b j a M n  T o p e k a  B o a r d  q_£ E d u c a t  i o n , 34 7 U.S. 483, at 493,
74 S.Ct. 666, at 691. 91 L .E d .2d. 873 (1954).
CHAPTER THREE 
THE PUBLIC SPHERE, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND 
TECHNOCRATIC RATIONALITY
T h e  f a u l t s  i n d i s p e n s a b l e  to this o p e r a t i o n  of 
a c c o u n t a n c y  c o n s i s t  in the m o r a l i t y  of the t erms  
u sed. A c c o r d i n g  to an old t e r r o r i s t  d e v i c e  (one 
c a n n o t  e s c a p e  t e r r o r i s m  at w i l l ) ,  o n e  j u d g e s  at 
the s a m e  t i m e  o n e  na m e s ,  and the word, b a l l a s t e d  
w i t h  p r i o r  c u l p a b i l i t y ,  q u i t e  n a t u r a l l y  c o m e s  to 
w e i g h  d o w n  on o n e  of the s c a l e s .
( B a r t h e s ,  1972, p. 01)
[If] l e a r n i n g  is t r a n s l a t e d  i nto q u a n t i t i e s  of 
i n f o r m a t i o n .  . . . a n y t h i n g  in the c o n s t i t u t e d  b o d y  of 
k n o w l e d g e  t h a t  is n o t  t r a n s l a t e d  in t h i s  wa y  will 
be a b a n d o n e d  ... [and] the d i r e c t i o n  of n e w  r e s e a r c h  
w i l l  be d i r e c t e d  by the p o s s i b i l i t y  of its b e i n g  
t r a n s l a t a b l e  into c o m p u t e r  l a n g u a g e .
( L y o t a r d ,  1985, p. 4)
T h e  a b o l i t i o n  of r e l i g i o n  as p e o p l e ' s  i l l u s o r y
h a p p i n e s s  is the d e m a n d  for t h e i r  rea l  h a p p i n e s s .
T h e  d e m a n d  to a b a n d o n  i l l u s i o n  a b o u t  t h e i r
c o n d i t i o n  is the d e m a n d  La ab andon the cond i t ion
1
that demands the 1llus ion ■ (Marx, 1967)
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Scholars and students of speech/language/knowledge 
relations' have long recognized, but only such core recently 
begun to fully develop, the implications of the role that 
the speech/language relation plays in actually creating 
social reality. In one way or another, most of those 
investigating that phenomenon have concluded that social 
reality may be the only relevant reality there is. Even 
scientific knowledge of some independent reality is lodged 
in terms of human origin and meaning. In such a case, 
investigating the ways in which that reality is created and 
perpetuated is a central task of those who attempt to 
understand how and why things come to seem the way they 
seem. Since practices and processes of communication and 
education are widely understood to define or at least to 
delimit the possibilities for democratic culture in the 
present age, in the previous chapter I suggested that 
examining the relations between the concepts and practices 
of education and communication could prove to be a path 
worth pursuing in the furtherance of such an investigation.
This path was suggested because concepts and practices 
of communication and education were adduced to be the 
contemporary representations of two mutually supportive but 
apparently contradictory imperatives of language in the 
manufacture of human culture: to inform and to enjoin. If, 
as I have urged, those infinitives capture the primal level 
of language activity, and if as I also have urged they can 
be represented culturally by the processes of communication
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and education, then communication and education figure 
large as aspects of the role language plays in constituting 
social reality. That being the case, the systems and life- 
worlds of journalisn and pedagogy, upon exanination, night 
yield clues as the the hows and whys of the ways things seen 
to b e .
Thus, in the last chapter, I explored existential and 
institutional arrangenents of Journalists and teachers. This 
analysis showed then to be crucial to actualizing a 
foundation for democratic political and social culture, 
while the conditions of Journalisn and pedagogy showed then 
to be susceptible to the colonial predations of technocratic 
rationality. This I discussed in terns of particular 
institutional discourses and structures that conceal or 
distort inportant interactions and interrelations which 1 
argued existed between connunication and education on levels 
of experience sufficiently specific as to support the clain 
of a parallelism of interest. I indicated that these nay 
have been glossed over, overlooked, or disnissed as suspect 
on grounds of overgenerality, which resulted in their 
division by positive science into discrete realns of 
inqu iry.
1 argued that this sundering has led to a division 
between informing and enjoining by which at a fundanental 
level all human culture is accomplished. 1 then showed 
that, in Journalisn and pedagogy, the breech is more
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apparent than real, based on the existential conditions 
under which journalists and teachers work, and that their 
functional similarities overwhelm the differences between 
their projects. I then showed how the competence of 
citizens to participate in democratic political and social 
culture depends upon their being accorded the opportunity 
and afforded the training to exercise practical judgment 
on the data and opinions that constitute social knowledge.
The network of concepts and practices of commonly 
understood as communication and education comprises a system 
of discourse located in a historical framework and about 
which certain theoretical possibilities may be examined. In
the first sections of this chapter, I discuss theories of 
discourse and sketch the development of communication and 
education systems which led to the model of the public 
sphere that animates much of this study and outline those 
historical cond itions.
The d iscourse of intimate, private, and p u b 1ic spheres, 
however, has been muddied by what critical theorists have 
shown to be a systematic interference in the domains they 
represent. I therefore sketch in the foundations of this 
argument, before examining the meaning of the public sphere 
and the social responsibility principle that would support 
its re-invention. I conclude this chapter with a 
description of the operations of technocratic rationality 
and its implications for the emancipatory practice of 
journalism and pedagogy.
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Disoursiv© Formations, Discursive Acts
Conditions supporting the development of institutions 
and concepts such as the public sphere (e.g., Eagleton,
1984; Habermas, 187 1, 1973), social responsibility (e.g.,
Altschull, 1984, Commission on Freedom of the Press, 1947), 
and technocracy and technocratic rationality (Habermas,
1971; Horkheimer & Adorno, 1972), and the problems to 
which all three are in different ways an attempt to address 
solutions are united in the problematics of communication 
and education examined in Chapter Two. These issues revolve 
around two main foci which are captured, as I have sought to 
show in the context of the existential relations of the 
press and the school, in the two infinitives ("to inform 
and "to enjoin") by which the communicative and the 
educative functions or purposes of language are expressed as 
the constitutive minima of speech.
The infinitives (grammar never perhaps more aptly 
characterized the real world than in this situation) exist 
in a dialogical and a dialectical relation that has in 
recent times been represented by two distinct approaches to 
the phenomena of language and speech. Each approach, while 
granting the validity of the other, has sought to privelege 
its own domain: those who cleave to the primacy of the 
communicative/informative privelege the word, to the 
educative/enjunctive the action. While neither would claim 
exclusively to define the language/speech relation, the
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history of nodernity (though perhaps not the history of 
other ages) would seen to indicate that "to inforn" has 
proven so far to be the doninant paradign. In this chapter,
I trace out the reasons for this doninance, suggest its 
consequences, and exanine the clains of the other paradign, 
through an exploration in the two cultural fornations in 
which the two infinitives find their nost public expression 
--the press and the school.
Critical Theory Discourse
The issues addressed in this chapter have to do with 
discourse theory, broadly conceived as the essentially 
political arena wherein all that individuals do, say, and 
write is shaped by structures of power (Hacdonnell, 1986).
In this sense, discourse theory nay be seen to subsune both 
the infornative and the enjunctive donains under their 
relations with those structures. A central prenise of such 
theorizing would be that of the politicizing of the 
differences between connunication- doninated discoures and 
education-doninated ones.
This process of politicization nay be understood as 
follows: As they are expressed in the words, expressions, 
and forns of knowledge, and in the sources of those 
knowledges and in their objects in institutions and 
individuals' daily lives, the tensions in the dialectic/ 
dialogic relations of language and speech are thenselves the 
subject of discourse theory. Connon utterances such as 
conversations and even nore fornal discourses such as
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classroom interactions and news reports, along with any and 
all formal scholarship and research on such topics, are 
transformed into an unrecognized (or unadmitted) terrain of 
political struggle upon which the contest for hegemony is 
played out (e.g., Silverman & Torode, 1980). Social forces 
with particular objectives and purposes in view traverse the 
significations of common utterances, as well as those 
discourses whose modification or modulation is already 
presupposed by their location and participation in more or 
less formal discursive situations, such as the knowledges of 
academic, scientific, and/or occupational disciplines.
The conflictual nature of these relations is concealed 
behind commonplaces, the taken-for-granted ideological 
product ions wherein are con tained the mean ings naturalized 
by institutions which demarcate the boundaries of the 
struggle over significance/signification. This struggle has 
has an historical dimension, which may usefully be adduced 
by fo1lowing (necessarily briefly) the paths trod by such 
institutions as communication and education through the 
periods in which their influence on our present conditions 
came to be constituted. I undertake this task in the next 
section of this study, tracing the historical developments 
of those elements of discourse that I have identified as the 
word and the act f rom the t ime at which they became a 
realizable element in the day-to-day lives of citizens. For 
this purpose, I have focused mainly on the institution of
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the press, since it has had the nore oppositional or 
confrontational role in these developments.
The Press end the Sohool: Some Historloal Relations 
It is almost a question of the chicken and the egg, 
this matter of education and communication. The thirst for 
knowledge encompasses both. Press historian Michael 
Stephens <1988) has pointed out that, in pre-literate and 
non-literate societies, greetings between strangers are 
likely to be followed immediately by the question "What's 
new?" or "What's the news?" (p. 14). At the same time,
education in the sense of "deliberate, systematic, and 
sustained" efforts to introduce the young to the accepted 
and acceptable practices of their communities is as old as 
society itself (e.g., Cremin, 1976). News provides the 
grist, and education provides the framework --the wheel and 
the stone, if you will-- for interpreting it. The two are 
to that extent inseparable and have become even more so 
since the advent of generally dispersed literacy upon which 
the modern age has depended. That event that for our 
purposes can be located fairly precisely.
The Universe qL Modern Discourse
The Reformation was announced in 1517 with Luther's 
"publication" of the 95 theses nailed to the cathedral door 
in H u m s .  Through the medium of publication, his act was 
known and was a topic of intense interest within "a 
fortnight in Germany, and within a month throughout the rest 
of Europe" (Stephens, 1988, p. 87). The Reformation,
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therefore, began less than a century after the introduction 
of Gutenberg's printing press in the West.
Educational historian Erwin Johanningmeier (1880) has 
noted that schooling in a formal sense began to be made 
relatively widely available as a result of the Protestant 
Reformation and the establishnent of the "priesthood of 
believers" (p. 5). Within this community, individuals could 
be responsible for their own relations with God through 
private interpretation of sacred texts. Acceptance of the 
doctrine "within a generation [by] over half of Europe" (p. 
5) led to the establishnent of schools by and in religious 
connunit ies.
In consequence, literacy spread rapidly, because, in 
order for individuals to be able to interpret those texts, 
they had to be able to read. Yet another significant 
element in the success of Luther's program must have been 
the ready availabity of relatively cheap printed copies of 
the Bible --which were made possible by advances in 
mechanical printing (Lortz, 1864, e s p . Chap. 4). The two 
events led directly to a signal readjustment of the 
relations of the individual with the "Creator.” But they 
also heralded a realignment of the individuals' relations 
with their temporal rulers (Johanningmeier, 1980) and, 
though indirectly to a similar and equally far reaching 
shift in their relations to the universe they inhabited.
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The developnents that spawned the Refornation, with its 
emphasis on interpretation (an activity prior to anything 
else), seen to have inclined the speech/language relation in 
the direction of action. And indeed, as Heinz Otto Lortz 
(1964) has shown, the period virtually seethed. The 
important developnents for this study were in the area of 
journalisn, particularly as it --unlike education for the 
nost part-- strove to liberate itself fron the yokes of 
nonarchy with the audience that it was in the process of 
sinultaneously constituting and being constituted by: the 
niddle c lass.
Once having learned to read, readers becone nore or 
less undiscrininating as to what is read. People, if they 
are able to read at all, will read anything that cones into 
their hands. Newspapers (that is, printed broadsheets, 
ballads, corantoa. newsbooks, letters, panphlets, etc.) and 
secular books soon appeared (Stephens, 1866). By 1533,
Thonas More could complain that nore than 40 percent of 
Englishmen could not read, but that meant, as Robert 
Pattison (1982) points out, that over half could.
Reformation and. Regulation.
The power and the threat to power which the burgeoning 
spread of literacy and the ancient appetite for news and 
knowledge represented was equally soon seen by those who 
wielded power and feared for their authority to do so. This 
fear spawned efforts by authorities to suppress (or at 
least to regulate) the process (Emery & Emery, 1984). This
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presented a problen, however. Monarchs and their Ministers 
(of both sorts: More was Archbishop of Canterbury as well as 
Minister of State) recognized that literacy served vital 
political and theological purposes and ends. What was nore, 
like the contents of Pandora's box, it was already out there 
as something to be reckoned with. Churches having pretty 
nuch a monopoly on schooling were or were already in the 
process of becoming official arms of civil government 
(Anglicanism in Britain, Catholicism in France and Spain, 
Presbyterianism in Scotland are examples). Thus the 
effective control of interpretation was guaranteed by 
effective state control of the schools, as long as these 
alliances were maintained, a system which obtained from that 
date forward.
Licens ing. With the notable exception of Catholic 
monarchies where the Inquisition held sway and enforced 
proscriptions by eliminating readers, most states recognized 
the inefficiency of attempting to control the reading habit 
of their citizens. The solution lay in the control of the 
presses. This was soon enough effected by the expedient of 
official licensing, which ironically borrowed a page from 
the Catholic Church. The first official licensing of 
presses in England was announced on Christmas Day 1534; 
thereafter all legal printed material bore the imprimatur of 
the Crown. Queen Elizabeth I took the matter so seriously 
that in 1576 she authorized flying squads to make weekly
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searches of London printers' shops "to record works in 
progress, nunbers of orders, identity of customers, and 
wages paid" (Enery & Eatery, 1984, p. 6).
Still, this did not suffice to prevent the periodic 
appearance of polemics for papisn, opposed to Protestantism, 
or other similar threats to the realm. Sterner measures 
were called for. Thus another Elizabethan innovation, the 
Star Chamber edicts of 1586, imposed torture and death as 
punishments for unauthorized, dissenting, or otherwise 
rebellious political publications, and not a few 
surreptitious publishers paid with their lives for their 
temerity. It was not until 1644, three years after their 
repeal by the Long Parliament, that John Milton would 
publish his justly famed paean to the free press, the 
Areopjgitica (Stephens, 1988, p. 171).
That tract, influential though it would become a 
century later, was not widely disseminated at the time, and 
in any case only articulated the freedoms that rather 
accidentally came to the English press of the 1640s in the 
power vacuum created by the struggles of Charles I with the 
Puritans. With the arrival of Cromwell, the English press 
again fell on hard times again, and it was not until 1679 
that Par 1iament allowed licensing of 1662 to lapse. At 
that, the measure was revived from time to time, but by then 
the power of absolute monarchy was on the wane, politics had 
become a public matter, and the second, more efficient and 
less obtrusive method of control and regulation was in
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p l a c e : economics and patronage. These matters are taken up 
in the next section, as they bear upon a description of the 
rise and fall of the bourgeois public sphere in the 18th and 
19 th centur ies.
The Sett intf for the Rise of Public Sphere
Great Britain (England hav ing un ited with Scot land in
1707) at the beginning of the Eighteenth Century was still a 
rising power, not yet having reached the pinnacle it would 
command (and fall from) within the next 150 years. Despite 
the rising aspirations and influence of the mercantile 
middle class, monarchy (when it chose to exert it) still 
could wield nearly absolute p o w e r . The previous century of 
political strife and the abortive efforts of "The Pretender" 
(the last Charles Stuart) notwithstanding, Queen Anne sat 
four-square on her eponymous chairs, and Parliament could
threaten and often exacted imprisonment as punishment for
2
publishers of "seditious" libel.
Great Britain, then, was a society in flux. The civil 
war had at least diminished monarchical authority.
Parliament was an equal partner with the monarch, having 
exerted itself to cast off the papist Stuarts and install 
the Dutch scions of English royalty. Hitherto
unthinkable acts of lese mai este even unto regicide had
challenged (though not broken) the royal personage, and 
their perpetrators had gone unpunished. The Absolute power 
and the Divine Right of monarchs were no longer quite so
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absolute, and even divinity was in an unprecedented anount 
of durance. The cause of the latter was the second major 
intellectual revolution in the preceding 200 years, the 
Enlightenment.
The curiosity of E n 1ightemnent scholars and scientists 
had opened a new cultural and intellectual space. In it, if 
not outright criticism, at least a healthy skepticism was 
growing of long-held dogmas about the relations of man with 
the universe in which he abode. The changes that the 
movement already had encompassed were substantial; what it 
forbode was even greater. By century's end, little that an 
Addison, or a Steele, or a Defoe, or even a curmdgeonly Ben 
Jonson might have recognized in 1710 would remain unchanged.
Consider: Isaac Newton, who had 'discovered' gravity, 
was presiding over the Royal Society. Francis Bacon was 
even then polishing the academic style of writing which 
survives to this day. Edmund Hailey had already predicted 
(correctly) the return of a comet last seen in 1658. John 
Locke was barely six years in his grave. Bishop Berkeley's A 
Treatise Concerning the Principles q£_ Human Understanding 
was even then at the printers (Durant & Durant, 1663). And 
that was just in Britain. Elsewhere Leibniz, Huyghens, 
Fahrenheit, Voltaire, Hontesquieu, and Leeuwenhoek were at 
work; Racine, Descartes, Spinoza, Hobbes, and Galileo, were 
part of the living memory, their works in print and widely 
circulating, their influence unabated.
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These were stirring tines in other areas, too. The War 
of the Spanish Succession raged across nuch of Europe.
Great Britain had an arny under the Duke of Marlborough 
(Winston Churchill's ancestor) in the field in France, 
another under Prince Eugene in the Netherlands, and were 
engaged in colonial wars with the French in North Anerica 
which would end with the British securing Canada and its yet 
unguessed at but well inagined wealth.
The colonial enpires that girdled the globe were the 
prizes at stake in these interninable conflicts; and in 
truth if the sun ever set on one of then, it arose in the 
sane nonent on another. Connerce within that sphere throve, 
wealth was accunulating with every ship that nade landfall 
at Gravesend (or Antwerp, Brest, Cadiz, or Oporto). The 
British had consolidated their hold on India and were 
expanding the influence of their colonies in the New World; 
the French were active in North Africa, North Anerica, and 
Southeast Asia; the Dutch, their own trade hanpered by the 
wars ranging back and forth across their countryside, were 
nevertheless financing everything they could get a line on, 
and the Spanish were still taking shipsful of gold and 
silver out of Central and South Anerica while extending 
their Enpire into California.
The Public Sphere: A Place the Critic
This was truly the beginning of the nodern period. In 
it are visible virtually all the characteristics that occupy 
so nuch of our attention today. The Cartesian split of nind
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from body was fait accomp1i . Empiricism was in the
ascendant: scientific discourse was beginning to dominate
academic, political, and public life, and faith was waning,
Berkeley's Principles q£_ Human Understanding and Newton's
revision of his Principia Mathemat ica in the second edition
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notw ithstanding (Du rant & Durant, 1963 ) .
Criticism became an honorable calling early in the 
Eighteenth Century. In London in 1709, amid the comfortable 
round of convenient coffee- (Hill's, or St. James'), 
chocolate- (White's) and public houses (The Trumpet, or The 
Graecian), or accessible commons (Shire Lane), a circle of 
convivial friends and acquaintances which included Joseph 
Addison, Richard Steele, Jonathan Swift, Daniel Defoe, 
Alexander Pope, along with other lights great and small, 
were accustomed to foregather and to imbibe of one another's 
wit and wisdom on all manner of current topics, along with 
their good Spanish snuff and sundry potables. It was in 
this Company and their public (as well as publicized and 
published) institutions that, according to Terry Eagleton 
(1984), the perimeters of the domains of modern criticism 
were laid d o w n .
It was here, Jurgen Habermas (1974) has argued, that 
the concept of the public sphere was born --a category he 
shows is "central to an understand ing of the modern per iod" 
(Hohendahl, 1974, p. 45.). Joseph Addison, Richard Steele, 
Daniel Defoe, and Jonathan Swift [all latterly labeled as
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literarists, or journalists, or literary journalists, 
despite --or because of, as Eagleton (1984) argues-- their 
shared penchant for social criticism] were giving a voice to 
the newly empowered class as it strove to emancipate itself 
from absolutist monarchy. The public sphere arose in part at 
least with journalistic midwives in attendance.
Yet the events of the conflicts between the Stuart 
kings and the Puritan Parliament, the Civil War, and the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688 were still fresh in memory.
Albeit the worst of them were some several decades past, 
recent events had refreshed the awareness. "Bonny Prince 
Charlie" had landed in Scotland (and had shortly thereafter 
returned hast ily to France when the Scots had refused to 
answer his call) only a year prior to the founding of The 
T a t l e r . Steele (1965), in one number of The T a t l e r . had 
occasion to gently lampoon one of the Company, “Major 
Matchlock,...who served in the last Civil Wars and has all 
the Battles by Heart....[EJvery night [he] tells us of his 
having been knock'd off his Horse at the Rising of the 
London Apprentices for which he is in great Esteem among us"
(p. 21). The event referred to occurred in 1647; the little 
satire on it was published in 1709. Likely the worthy 
"Major Matchlock" was a figure of imagination, but his 
presence in the narrative seems to signal at least that some 
veterans of the wars still survived in garrulous old age, as 
reminders of perils not forgotten.
113
Emancipation was a central theme of the Enlightenment,
and if political or economic emancipation were one species
of that state which was pursued, another was emancipation
from ignorance. That was, after all, one of the raisons
d'etre for the pursuit of science: by the various arts
available to the learned, to advance the cause of knowledge
and to free the ignorant from the oppressions for which
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their very ignorance was a guarantor. Evidence of the 
soundness of this interpretation is found in various numbers 
of both of the papers with which Addison and Steele were 
associated, The Tatler during the period 1709-1711, and The 
Spec t a t o r . from 1711 through 1712.
One of numerous examples, written by Steele <1965) in 
The Tatler under his nom de plume Isaac Bickerstaff, is 
dated May 27, 1709, and reproduces with a letter received on 
the subject of recent witch trials in the city of York.
Written by a correspondent identified as "Bickerstaff's" 
cousin, the letter is an ironic account of what were 
assuredly three actual witchcraft trials, the last of those 
not having occurred in Britain until three years later 
(Grun, 1982). In such a climate, it could be expected that 
authors might take steps to protect themselves, even though 
their identities were either known or guessed at. As we have 
seen, the author/publishers of The Tatler were no exception.
The use of fictitiously named or "feigned" authors and 
correspondents by Addison and Steele was in part a necessary 
sort of camoflage in that period, and part a ploy to entice
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readers. The camoflage was necessary because of the tenor 
of the tines: dueling had not been outlawed, and seditious 
libel was a real threat. The publishers of the day which 
essayed to comment critically on the aristocratic class, 
which both The Tatler and The Spectator did with obvious 
relish and no little acerbity, still ran a considerable 
risk. And, in as much as both men served at times in the 
Whig governments that came and went during the period, they 
could ill afford to give offense that would attach to 
themseIves.
The Public Sphere: A Space Whose Time Had Come
What has been variously characterized as "public 
opinion," "the public body," "the body politic" and "the 
public sphere" arose as the literacy and the political 
acumen of the earlier period accumulated to reach a critical 
mass, the bourgeoise. This institution occupies a space 
that is between the intimate realm of the home and the 
formally public sphere of the state with its laws, protocols 
and authority, "One of its primary goals was to make 
administrative decisions transparent," Hohendahl (1974) 
writes. That function has been assumed, howsoever badly, 
all considered, and certainly incompletely in contemporary 
American society by the press (though I postpone that 
discussion for a later section).
In any case, by the middle of the 18th Century, all the 
elements by which we have come s u b s e q u e n t l y  to identify and
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characterize the succeeding ages even unto our own were in 
place. The schools were for the most part safely ensconced 
with the churches which were either allied tr, the state or 
were fleeing its donains and proscriptions in order to found 
their own states. The press had fledged itself, and was 
steadily taking the shape of an adversary to the established 
autocratic/monarchical relations. The sciences were 
launched, and directed toward a new legitiiiation network 
that was to emancipate all from the yoke of ignorance and 
superstition. The commerce of the age was reallocating 
resources away from the Crown and into the pockets of the 
people. In other words, all was in readiness for the long- 
awaited golden age. That it never came; that, precisely 
because of the conditions set entrain at the time, it 
probably never could have, is what the remainder of this 
chapter is concerned with.
Discourse, Social Responsibility and Rationality 
I now return to the themes articulated in the beginning 
of this chapter, having set up the historical conditions 
under which they have become of surpassing relevance to the 
contemporary understanding of the relations that they 
entail. In the sections that follow, I am providing a 
further grounding for the concluding chapter of this study 
by exam in ing certain concepts which bear upon the struggle 
for knowledge, the conditions of its communication and 
acquisition, and the te los that is implicated therein. I 
turn first to a concept that describes the struggle.
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Hegemony: The Contest for Authorizing Meaning
The complexity and extent of the interrelation between 
commun icat ion and education generally, between the press 
and the schools, and between the j ourna1ist and the teacher, 
becomes in terest ing w h e n , as Anton io Gramsc i recogn ized in 
his Prison Notebooks (Hoare & Smith, 1971), the commonplace 
is recognized to conceal sites of hegemonic conflict. Such 
sites are precisely where the struggle for meaning occurs 
among the various structures and interests which are always 
embroiled in contests for legitimizing authority to define 
the "proper" limits on the construction of knowledge. 
Gramsci's meaning for the term hegemony connotes a constant 
struggle for the powe r that authorizes the creat ion, 
invocation, and perpetuation of what constitutes the 
legitimate codes for basic signifying systems of cultural 
knowledge at a given time. That power is the prize that 
beckons all social interests to contest on any field where 
such authority may be gained. At stake in the struggle is 
not only the ability to influence behavior; it is, even more 
importantly and fundamentally, the power to approve or 
disapprove social relations by the subtlest and yet the most 
direct of m e a n s : by def inition.
Nor is the importance of the contest lost upon all 
the contestants. Certainly, it is understood expressly by 
those who, for the last century at least, have exercised 
their claim to define and valorize what counts as knowledge.
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It is less perfectly and nore intuitively grasped by those 
who struggle to expand or to explode currently legitimated 
neaning systens to make way for their own hitherto excluded 
categories; and it is understood imperfectly --if at all-- 
by those who either have failed to recognize the paramount 
importance of the stakes involved, or have uncritically 
accepted the status quo and thus have either acquiesced in 
their own manipulation by it or relinquished by default 
their natural claim to contribute to their own definitions.
On Gransci s analysis, commonplaces about communication 
and education reveal themseIves to be a clains that the 
conjunctures common both to communication and to education 
are sufficiently well understood as to obviate the need for, 
and to cast into doubt the wisdom of, any further 
examination. However, the great number of discursive and 
non-discursive practices intuitively inscribed as common to 
the sets of social phenomena differentiated as communication 
and education also problematizes their differentiation. Of 
course, this makes the commonplace no less common; but it 
does invite an investigation of the common places for 
evidence of how amd why knowledge and social reality are 
defined in certain ways at a particularly busy nexus of 
contention concern ing the leg it imat ion of knowledge. Such 
evidence may be found in what I take to be the paradigm 
cases of those most commonplace disciplines, journalism and 
pedagogy respectively, and the systems of press and school 
in which they operate.
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The Naning of Parts
The three topics that are the subjects of this chapter 
are in that category of discourse which is just outside the 
connonplace, but still faniliar enough to be taken for 
granted. The public sphere, social responsibility, and 
technocratic rationality are, in this sense and in others, 
discursive entities --what Foucault (1972) in the last 
chapter called discursive fornations. Two, the public 
sphere and social responsibility, share an explicitly public 
aspect which inclines then at the outset toward an 
allegiance with action; the third is a nethodological 
construct and an epistenological nodel which locates it 
initially under the banner of the word. It renains to be 
shown the category --either connunicative or educative-- 
into which each fits, if indeed they nay be so categorized 
at all.
However, before attenpting to test these speculations, 
it will be necessary to first be necessary to nake certain 
distinctions as to the neanings I intend to be taken with 
respect to the terns I use to describe the social geography 
of these issues. Thus in the next section, I will attenpt 
to foreground such notions as p u b l i c . private. intinate. 
etc., as they bear on this discussion.
The Socia l  Geography
The distinction between public and private is of 
ancient lineage. The Ronans defined an order of things that
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were res publica (things altered by relation with p u b e s . or 
adults); hence, the variant poplicus. by which they seen to 
have neant to distinguish between p o d uH cub . things of the 
people. This was distinguished fron, but not perhaps 
contrasted to p r i v u s . by which was neant separate or 
particular and fron which derived orivatus. neaning not of 
the state. Intinate derives fron intinus. the superlative of 
intus. neaning within; hence, the nost within, or the nost 
essential, as in the "intinate structure of the aton"
(Webster's New World Dictionary, 1978).
As historian Richard Sennett (1978) has renarked, the 
history of the public and the private and the changes they 
have undergone are *key[s] to the understanding [a] baBic 
shift in the terns of Western culture" (p. 16). Sennett
found the first recorded appearances of the word "public" in
English (around 1470) to be used to connote "the connon good
of society" (p.16) and sone 70 years later to have the added 
dinension of objects or discourses that were "nanifest and 
open to general observation" (p.16). He records that in the 
usage of that tine, "private" neant "priveleged, at a high 
governnental level" and ‘that by the end of the 17th Century 
[there was] an opposition of 'public' and 'private'” (p. 16)
which was sinilar to that by which the distinction is nade 
today: “ Public' neant open to the scrutiny of anyone,
whereas 'private' neant a sheltered region of life defined 
by one's fanily and friends" (p. 16).
In nodernity, the distinctions have becone, to an
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extent that Sennett ( 1978) argues is of fundanental 
inportance, a 1nost neaningless. Sennett argues that the 
popular interest in equality has had the politically 
paradoxical consequence of undernining the realization of 
denocraey. He naintains that the confusions surrounding 
what is the proper purview of intinacy, privacy, and 
publicity has corrupted and rendered irrelevant and useless 
the concept of a disinterested discourse on natters of 
social consequence in Anerican life.
The inportance of any distinction, Foucault (1973,
1975, 1984) has long argued, has disappeared under the 
relentless onslaught of nodern sciences' investigations of 
the nechanics and the psychics of the hunan organisn. In 
the service of the discursive interest of the state in a 
greater ability to control that organisn through the 
technologies of discipline, such differences as are today 
preserved are purely fornal.
For Foucault (1973), there is no paradox. The 
discursive fornations of science serve precisely the 
interests of power. By their legitination in the apparently 
''objective" pursuits of knowledge about hunanity, the 
scientifically denonstrated saneness of individuals is used 
in the project of naintaining existing power relations. By 
naning as "dysfunctional" (to those who instantiate the 
power/knowledge relation and exert the power) those 
discursive "pathologies" which question the otherwise
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unchallenged exercise of power, power justifies its 
repression of "deviance" and effectively truncates those 
discourses which night thwart its ends.
At all events, the terns public, private, and intimate 
have become problematic behind the transformation and 
translocation of the meanings that are assigned to the terms 
which are used to signify (or, if we may believe Sapir- 
Whorf, actually determine) the existential conditions by 
which we make sense of the social (life-) world. He now 
have a substantia 1(even dominant) discourse that advocates 
the privatization (by which is meant the industrialization) 
of the public weal in the name of efficiency. The hitherto 
intimate sphere is continuously and perpetually invaded 
(critical theorists say colonized") by a science that is 
indentured to the state and to the private" interests to 
which the "public" interests of the previously private 
sphere responded. He have been pursuaded by David Riesman 
(1961) and others that our turning inward constitutes a 
virtue --though Christopher Lasch (1964) has recently 
provided an antidote to, or at least a more complex 
statement of the consequences of doing so.
The critical theorists' attack on positivism and their 
intense interest in its concommitant realization in the 
discourses of technocratic rationality (on which more 
later), articulate a program that, while not explicitly 
recognizing Foucault's insights, thematizes these abuses. 
Habermas's (1974) representation of the theory of the public
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sphere identifies an agency which, if reactualized and 
reinvigorated, night provide a salutory counterpoise to 
then. Countering the abuses of nodernity seens to be the 
project toward which his universal pragnatics and his 
description of connunicative competence is directed.
Or, if --as Habernas (1974) hinself seens to have 
recogn ized-- it is no longer possible to recreate the 
necessary conditions for recuperating the public sphere in 
the forn and substance it took when it first appeared in the 
bourgeoise's struggle against absolute nonarchy, it night be 
possible to re-invent such an agency. (This possibility, and 
a synopsis of what I believe it would require to actua1ize 
it, constitute the contents of Chapter Five.) In any case, 
we are now in a position to turn to the concepts in which 
that possibility is contextualized, and to discover their 
discursive affinities, if any.
The Public Sphere. That the nature of the public 
sphere is that of a discursive fornation in this sense is 
suggested in Habermas's (1974) definition of it as "the 
realm of our social life in which something approaching 
public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all 
citizens" (1974, p. 49). Habernas thus appears to consider 
the public sphere to be a discursive space situated between 
the intinate sphere of fanilial and domestic arrangements 
and the state constituted as the expression but not the 
collectivity of the general will.
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This sphere is created of the communicative capacity of 
the collectivity when "private individuals assemble to form 
a public body...[to] confer in an unrestricted fashion... 
about natters of public interest... Although the state 
authority is...the executor of t h e . ..public sphere, it is 
not part of it" (p. 49). Neither do they overlap, as Peter 
Hohendahl (1974), a European interpreter of Habernas's work, 
has explained. Just as Habermas's conception of a public is 
not be confused with a crowd or the mass which assembles 
randomly and without purpose, Habermas means that the public 
sphere and the state should confront one another across a 
gulf delimited by potential social action or policy.
He is concerned with an institution that (once having 
accumulated the rational sense of the public opinion 
immanent in the conversations for which it also serves as 
the forum) can address the state, independently of coercion, 
in the expectation of both being heard and garnering some 
response. "To be sure, state authority is usually considered 
"public" authority, but it derives this task of caring for 
the well-being of all citizens from [its relation with] the 
public sphere" (p. 49).
It may be seen from the foregoing remarks, and from the 
description of the historical conditions under which the 
concept that has been described arose, the initial impu1se 
to locate the concept ion of the p u b 1ic sphere in the camp of 
enjunction was not misplaced. Albeit it is a discursive 
pract ice, the p u b 1ic sphere en taiIs conversat ion,
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confrontation, and connunieative capacity employed to enjoin 
compliance with an expression of democratically informed 
public opinion. If I am correct in my supposition that "to 
enjoin" rational action is the telos of education, the 
public sphere is then an inherently educative medium, or one 
whose telos is enjunctive; concomittantly, if I am correct 
that "to inform" is the telos of communication, then it is 
also a communicative medium. This relation of the public 
sphere to an educational praxis is founded in a historical 
situation which lends further creedence to its 
representation here; I shall return to it later in this 
chapter. Next, however, I shall take up the issue of social 
responsibility, which was also hypothesized as being 
enjunctive.
Social Responsibilitv. For reasons that will also be 
made clear later in this chapter, the space that Habermas 
(1974) intends should be occupied by institutions that are 
representative of the public communion of the voices of the 
social collectivity are, in the United States and other 
advanced capitalist societies, instead held to be the 
private domain of the media, especially the press. Yet it 
may be that an inkling of the inadequacy of the "private" 
paradox with which we dealt in one of the previous sections.
Social responsibility emerged as a specific category in 
the discourse of mass communications ethics in the late 
1940s in a document prepared by Robert Haynard Hutchins and
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a coupany of other scholars. Philosopher Killian Ernest 
Hocking was generally accorded the authorship. The document 
was called A Free and Responsible P r e s s . and in it were 
presented sone fairly pungent caveats to those who, 
espousing the libertarian-pluralist model of freedom of the 
press, nevertheless have advocated a laissez-faire attitude 
toward the "marketplace” philosophy under the rubric of 
which the modern press as a social agent has been developed 
and theorized.
The theory has been troubling, though more honored in 
the breach, since its emergence more than 40 years ago in 
American mass media studies, especially in relation to the 
p r e s s . As a theory of the press, and as (1 shall argue in 
more detail in the last chapter) a heuristic for educational 
practice, social responsibility owes its importance to the 
(even in 1947 already growing) awareness that, as media 
soc iolog ist Denis MeQua i1 ( 1984 ) explained with customary 
understatement, in "important respects the free market had 
failed to fulfill the promise of press freedom and to 
deliver expected benefits to society" (p. 90).
It can be argued that those are the least of the faults 
of press freedom constrained by the "free market;" but it is 
an observation filled with portents, both for the press and, 
as will later become apparent, for education. For, in its 
acknowledged failure, the free market theory of media --and 
theories which embrace literally metaphors of commerce in 
ideas generally-- presents an example to educators and
126
others concerned with perpetuating and strengthening the 
denocratic way of life of the folly of permitting 
unrestrained market forces to govern access to, and
distribution of, intangible but nevertheless primary social
5
goods such as knowledge or its precursor, information.
The theory has had fewer defenders than critics, 
however. Here is John C. Merrill (1974), one of social 
responsibility's most persistent critics: ” [T]his new theory 
maintains that the importance of the press in modern society 
makes it absolutely necessary that an obligation of... 
responsibility be imposed on the mass media...'' (p. 36).
He continues: "So we are led to believe that if democracy
fails, it is the fault of the American press" (p. 86). To 
forestall that failure, Merrill has argued, the concept of 
social responsibility --if it were generally adopted-- would 
"necessarily imply governmental control" (p. 91), which 
would be contrary to the very principles of the free press 
which the concept was developed to promote: ‘[T]he
definition of responsible would be functional in a 
monolithic way --defined and carried out by government or by 
some non-kournalistic power" (p.91).
The argument is representative of an assembly of 
critics of the social responsibility theory who have 
complained that (a) the theory itself lacks a locus of 
potential pragmatic effect and a focus with which to assure 
it of internal consistency (e.g., Altschull, 1964), and that
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(b) in any case, the only agency with sufficient authority 
to inpose such a responsibility as as inplied by the theory 
is the government; such intrusion on the rights of the press 
is unconscionahle and, if that were not enough, certainly 
unconstitutional (e.g., Altschull, 1984; Merrill, 1974; 
Merrill & Lowenstein, 1979; Merrill ft Odell, 1983).
While I an in at least partial agreement with the 
critique that Merrill and other traditionalists have lodged 
against a certain interpretation of social responsibility, I 
cannot agree that theirs is the only interpretation.
Critics who fear state intervention appear to ignore the 
ways in which the corporate-state alliance already exerts 
control over the press. Their faith in the the efficacy of 
their own agency seems to exist without an accompanying 
recognition that, whatsoever efficacy they possess, it is 
the product of social and discursive formations which have 
already been colonized and naturalized by corporate 
imperatives and the technocratic rationality that is their 
invariant accessory. These permit an illusion of agency 
while also limiting it in accordance with tolerable levels 
of dissent. And even such dissent as is permitted is subtly 
directed toward issues on which the press's effects are 
either necessary for or negligible to the discursive system 
of predetermined obj ec t i v e s .
This may help to explain the fascination of the modern 
press with strategies: in federal, state, even local
elections, in reportage on Congressional business, in the
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c o v e r a g e  of w a r s  and r e v o l u t i o n s ,  or r e p o r t s  on d o m e s t i c  
issues. Th e  m a i n  cast of the m a j o r i t y  of t h e s e  r e p o r t s  is 
f r e q u e n t l y  on the i n t i m a t e  d e t a i l s  of c o n f l i c t s  a m o n g  the 
e l i t e s  for a u t h o r i t y ,  not to d e t e r m i n e  e n d s  but r a t h e r  to 
s p e c i f y  the p a r t i c u l a r  m e a n s  by w h i c h  t a k e n - f o r - g r a n t e d  ends 
m a y  b e  mos t  e f f i c i e n t l y  a c c o m p l i s h e d .  T h e  p r e s s  is a 
m o u t h p i e c e  for c o n t e n d i n g  p o i n t s  of view, b u t  the c o n t e n t i o n  
is o v e r  m e r e l y  the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l  a p p r o a c h e s  to v a r i o u s  
issues, r a t h e r  t han o v e r  the full r a n g e  of a l t e r n a t i v e s .
Th i s  is the e x i s t e n t i a l  flaw in the m a r k e t - p l a c e  of i deas  
i d e o l o g y  w h i c h  has d o m i n a t e d  d i s c o u r s e :  the m a r k e t - p l a c e  is
it s e l f  a so c i a l  f o r m a t i o n  u n d e r  the d o m i n a t i o n  of t h o s e  
i n t e r e s t s  w h i c h  p r o s p e r  by c o n t r o l l i n g  and l i m i t i n g  a c c e s s  
to a c c e p t a b l e  and n o n - d i s r u p t i v e  v o i c e s  ( e . g . , Hall, 198u; 
H a l l i n ,  1985).
The M a r k e t - P l a c e  Ideas
W h a t e v e r  e l s e  it m a y  be, the m a r k e t p l a c e  is no t  
c o n d u c i v e  to d e m o c r a c y  in any w a y  that is c o m m e n s u r a t e  with 
what p o l i t i c a l  p h i l o s o p h e r s  t h i n k  a b o u t  w h e n  t h e y  u s e  the 
term (e.g., H a b e r m a s ,  1984, 1987; Rawls, 1970), T h e  m a r k e t
t e n d s  a l w a y s  t o w a r d s  m o n o p o l y  ( G a l b r a i t h ,  A d a m s  & M u e l l e r ,  
1975; Litman, 1988). In and of itself, the m a r k e t  p o s s e s s e s  
no i n h e r e n t  c l a i m  u p o n  k n o w l e d g e  ( L y o t a r d ,  1985). It may 
only e x e r t  its s o v e r e i g n t y  over t h o s e  t h i n g s  that have been 
g i v e n  up to as c o m m o d i t i e s  in an e x c h a n g e -v a l u e  m a r k e t .  
N e i t h e r  may it o b l i g e ,  in and of itself, a t h i n g  to be
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offered or maintained as a commodity once producers and 
creators of a thing recognize their own interest in or of 
the thing is guaranteed by their acts of creation or 
production. Knowledge, then, is only capable of being 
connodified when certain social conditions can be induced to 
prevai1.
An essential condition for the commodification of 
knowledge is that its creators cede to capital their 
constitutive authority in specifying social meanings. So it 
is in the interests of capital markets to dissuade the 
individual creators of neaning fron appropriating to their 
own ends the connunicative resources that enable the 
creation of knowledge and provide it with a supportive 
nediun in which it nay flourish. In the inage of the unseen 
hand is disguised the unpallatable knowledge of what it 
ultinately nust nean to consune everything: extinction. In 
that way, then, the narket is the true expression of self­
decided, self-dedicated d e terminism econonic Calvinisn.
In that respect, the narket nay be the quintessential 
expression of nihilism: despair in the face of the knowledge 
that once begun, the process can never be arrested except by 
natural n e a n s . Those, ultimately, are extinction. Politics 
will never suffice. Once introduced, politics naturally 
interferes with any attempt at interrupting the natural 
sequence presupposed by the rationality of the marketplace. 
Politics is the expression of the individual; education is 
the expression of community; conmunication is the nediun of
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e x p r e s s i o n .  And we u n d e r s t a n d  at a n o t h e r  l evel of 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  B r o o k e  S h i e l d ' s  d e c l a r a t i o n :  " N o t h i n g  c o m e s
b e t w e e n  me and my C a l v i n s . "  E m b l e m ,  icon, to t e m ,  that 
li t t l e  g i r l  s e n s u o u s  f a c e - f i g u r e - v o i c e  r e p r e s e n t s  the 
u l t i m a t e  s e d u c t i o n  of c o m m u n i t y  by the m a r k e t :  C a l v i n s - i s m .  
R e d e e m e d  by f l o u r i s h i n g ;  f l o u r i s h i n g ,  t h u s  r e d e e m e d .
S o c i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  is a n o t h e r  e x p l i c i t l y  d i s c u r s i v e  
f o r m a t i o n ,  i n a s m u c h  as that, w h e n  it w a s  f i r s t  p r o p o s e d  by 
the C o m m i s s i o n  on F r e e d o m  of the P r e s s  (1947), it was 
i n t e n d e d  to a p p l y  to an e x p l i c i t l y  d i s c u r s i v e  m e d i u m  as wel l  
as a d i s c u r s i v e  f o r m a t i o n  in its own right. Yet, b e i n g  a l s o  
l o d g e d  in the c a m p  of a c t i o n ,  s o c i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  is n o t  a 
t o p i c  w i t h  u n i q u e  r e l e v a n c y  o n l y  to the p r e s s .  T o  the 
e x t e n t  t hat we a d m i t  the a u t h o r i t y  of the s c h o o l  in 
s o c i a l i z i n g  the y o u n g ,  it is in, of, and t o w a r d  s o m e  n o t i o n  
of s o c i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t h a t  e d u c a t o r s  a r e  d i r e c t i n g  them. 
T h e  c u r r i c u l u m ,  then, is in e f f e c t  the s t a t e m e n t  of the 
p r i n c i p l e s  by w h i c h  c o m p e t e n c e  to act on i n f o r m a t i o n  in a 
s o c i a l l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f a s h i o n  is to be b o t h  f o s t e r e d  and 
u n d e r  s t o o d .
Technical V. Practical Rationality
It is w i d e l y  a c c e p t e d  t h a t  b u r e a u c r a c y  and t e c h n o c r a c y  
a r e  the two d o m i n a n t  s o c i a l  o r i e n t a t i o n s  at l a r g e  in the 
c o n t e m p o r a r y  w o r l d .  W h a t  is not w i d e l y  d i s c u s s e d  o u t s i d e  
t h e  d e s m a i n e s  of c r i t i c a l  t h e o r y  is the r e l a t i o n  of t h o s e  
m o d e r n  d e v e l o p m e n t s  to the a s p i r a t i o n s  of the E n l i g h t e n m e n t .
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In their treatise, The Dialectic of. Enlightenment. Max 
Horkheiner and Theodor Adorno (1972) set out something like 
this position as the practical agenda of the period: ridding 
the oppressed of the pain, force, and suffering upon which 
traditional authority historically relied for its 
persistence. But they also provide a critique of the 
Enlightenment in which they assert that, in challenging and 
eventually overturning one set of despots, the period 
prepared the stage for another, less material sort of 
despotism. This is the tyranny of Bcience, of rationalism, 
of met h o d .
The p o l lu t ion  of. Cultural Resources
The cultural resources represented by the press and the 
schools are the well-springs upon which democratic social 
order draws for substantial parts of its nourishment. But 
like fresh air and clean water, the sustaining resources of 
a democratic polity have become increasingly polluted under 
conditions similar to those by which essential physical 
resources have been contaminated by the toxic by-products, 
effluents, and residues of unrestrained technological 
development. Ideological detergents, pesticides, and 
preservatives have been introduced into the discursive 
environments of communication and education.
The most prevalent of these, the most damaging to the 
possibility of democratic polity, and the most dangerous by 
virtue of its almost universal acceptance in the public and 
political discourses of the age is the ideology of
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technocracy. Both by Habermas's account (1971) and by the
accounts of the Frankfurt School theorists whose work was
6
influential in Habermas's development as a theorist, the 
pervasive domination of discourse by instrumental logic and 
technological rationality marks a crucial watershed in the 
evolution of social relations. The success of these nodes 
of legitimation to validate only that knowledge derived fron 
a narrowly circumscribed methodology has enabled interests 
which define the nature of social relations as technical 
problems amenable to technically defined solutions to 
subsume concerns for the attainment of practical goals.
These are synptonized by developmental trends which 
Habermas (1971) describes as having figured prominently in 
the objectification of the processes of journalism and 
pedagogy since the burgeoning of advanced industrial 
capitalism. Of primary importance among these has been 
permanent regulation of economic processes has become the 
foremost determinant national policies (Habermas, 1971).
This has meant that other legitimate interests of the state 
have been steadily overtaken by the interests of capital 
accumulation and management, to the extent that the state 
has effectively ceded its authority in any sphere to make 
political decisions which are not in the interests of 
capital; and the rationalities of economy and efficiency 
have colonized domains in which such categories as efficient 
management, cost-benefit analyses, etc., are inappropriate
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at best, illegitimate at worst. Emphasis on economy and 
efficiency priveleges the means-ends, accountability-focused 
relations that obtain and in which the status quo is assumed 
as a given, reifying inequities and justifying their 
perpetuation as functional necessities (Held, 1980). 
Colonization oX the School and the Press
Dieter Hisgeld (1985), the German-born Canadian critical 
education theorist, has noted that this on-going and so far 
successful "cultural invasion" of the sites of such resources 
has transformed them "into technically planned courses of 
action" (p. 77). This is crucially true of schools where, as 
was shown in the previous chapter, it is symptomatic of and 
necessary for what Habermas (1981) called colonization of the 
lifeworld --the systematic, rather than ad. h o c . subjugation 
of ordinary life experiences to "managerial rationality"-- 
that radical inequities in communication and education are 
made to seem indisputably natural within a context of 
unexamined assumptions.
Technocratic Rationality in the S chool. For some time 
now, educators have known that, in the words of one science 
educator, "Knowledge is not (something) which can simply be 
transferred from those who have it to those who don't....It 
is not a torch...passed from hand to hand. (It) is something 
which... individual learner(s) must construct for and by 
(themselves)" (Lochhead, 1985, p. 4). In other words, to 
regard education as simply a mechanical or a technical 
program of pre-determined
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objectives,...along with programmed learning and 
competence-based instruction....[which] refers 
only to the business of instruct ion ....capable of 
producing anticipated and planned results...on the 
appropriate range of diagnostic-evaluative tools 
(hisgeld, 1983, p. 89), 
is at least nisleading, arguably mistaken, and ultimately 
illegitimate. Knowledge is always interpretation (Gadamer, 
1975), mediated by social relations (Friere, 1970; Geertz, 
1973), ideologies (Althusser, 1886; Nexler, 1981), and/or 
generalizab1e human interests (Habermas, 1971).
Yet, despite this, a predominantly technical 
rationality (e.g.. Rice, 1914) has remained the mainspring 
driving most 20th century administrative (e.g., Cubberly, 
1916; Taylor, 1947) and pedagogical (e.g., Bobbitt, 1924, 
1941; Tyler, 1949) theories and practices of schooling. It 
has been at the root, as well, of periodic school reform 
movements (e.g., National Commission on Excellence in 
Education, 1983; Conant, 1959; Thorndike & Gates, 1929).
The model was borrowed from "scientific" industrial 
management (Johnson, 1964) and has since been adapted to 
accommodate advances in cybernetics, computer science, and 
information processing theory. This rationality has assumed 
two different, though related --and as employed, ultimately 
reductive-- metaphorical constructions: the mechanism, and
the organism (Foster, 1986). However, each --taken
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separately, or considered together-- has justified a "means- 
ends" model for schooling.
The technical rationality model has not been without 
critics, even among conservative educational philosophers.
For example, R.S. Peters (1963) warned about the dangers of 
narrowly conceiving an educational practice whose goals and 
objectives are already predetermined, prespecified, and 
least in principle, quantifiable: (T)his model of adopting
means to premeditated ends is one that haunts all our 
thinking about what is valuable.... It is my contention that 
this model misleads us in the sphere of education" (p. 88). 
Nevertheless, over time the potential affective consequences 
of the mechanical, technical model of schooling, either for 
teachers or for students, were not subjected to close 
scrutiny.
Recently, however, critical reexaminations of 
educational practice have supported the view that a means- 
ends rationality may be an inadequate and inappropriate 
framework for understanding schooling. Scholars such as 
Michael Apple, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Henry 
Giroux, Hichael Katz, Joel Spring, and others have denounced 
that dominant view of schooling and education for school 
professionals for conceiving school work in the same plane 
with factory or shop work. In the views of these critics, 
the dominant conception of professional school work --and 
thus practitioners' institutional and professional 
identities --has occasioned the practice of education as an
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almost purely technological enterprise. They recognized and 
articulated the effects of applying to students and teachers 
the mechanistic model similar to those by which, for 
example, industrial engineers assess the performance of 
mills, presses, and stamping plants, and businesses measure 
profit and loss. Technical rationality permits, even 
encourages, the construction of student identities--both 
future clients as well as future professionals— as so much 
raw material to be fashioned into so many replacement parts. 
"In this way, schools become more 1 ike ... factories dominated 
by concerns for input and output, efficiency, and cost 
savings" (Beyer & Apple, 1988, p. 4).
This is not to suggest the bulk of past inquiries into 
the purposes of schooling and into school professionals' 
roles and pract ices have been irrelevant, or to diminish the 
importance of their findings. To the contrary, many such 
inquiries have brought to light important and significant 
issues for the education of teachers and other school 
professionals, the study of their practices and their 
working environments, and the development of the special 
competence and knowledges that schooling professions entail. 
Nevertheless, critical scholars have shown that much prior 
research and many of the programmatic recommendations 
arising therefrom have been constrained by the limited, and 
limiting, technical conception both of the purposes of 
schooling and of school professionals' roles and
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responsibilities vis a vis those purposes within that 
conception. What has been needed is a an educational model 
in which professional intercession and mediation in meeting 
individuals' needs transcend the administrative-technical 
interests of engineering/management. Such a model would 
instead establish and implement a viable alternative 
conception of legitimate professional school practice.
Med i at ion is t. he Message . It remains to be shown that 
schooling involves an equally compelling and fundamentally 
important struggle and that school teachers intercede and 
mediate in it in ways which both justify and require 
professional competence. Paradoxically, that struggle is 
evident in the expectations that hitherto have elicited as a 
solution the same technical rationality whose usefulness has 
been shown to be insufficient to the task.
Schooling has been deemed among the most affectively 
influential experiences in American life. For almost a 
century, Americans have been encouraged to regard academic 
education as the key to the good life (Cremin, 1961, 
Ravitch, 1985; Shor, 1986). During that time, the social 
institution of education has grown to be perceived as an 
effective instrument for both individual and societal 
achievement. For individuals, it is seen as a means of 
achieving satisfying personal lives, social mobility, and 
entry into employment hierarchies; for society in general, 
it has been touted as a means for the amelioration of 
numerous and frequently desparate social problems.
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Accordingly, educational institutions responsible for 
engendering succeeding cohorts of school professionals have 
undergone periodic readjustnents to their curricula, as a 
substantial literature indicates. Since the early 1870s, 
departnents, schools, and colleges of Education have 
retooled a minimum of three tines, to acconodate succeeding 
waves of reforn agendas: career education, back-to-basics, 
and the recent push for "excellence" (Shor, 1986). However, 
in the last decade, the clanor over the state, stature, and 
status of U.S. public education has not declined. If 
anything, it has been exacerbated by the linking of 
education to the vicissitudes of international econonic 
conpet it iveness.
Technocratic Rationality as. Effect: Media Research
Essentially the sane process is occurring, and the sane 
rationale is being applied, with regard to the headlong rush 
of U.S. nega-nedia companies to concentrate. This has 
presented more of a problem for the press that night be 
expected though less than for the schools. I indicated near 
the end of Chapter Two that the nedia faced a structurally 
paradoxical, potentially troubling and possibly devastating 
contradiction in the presentations of their project to 
either their advertizers or their audience. This I called 
the "Svengali Syndrome."
The syndrome is a consequence of nedia effects 
research, which has swung through at least two complete
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revolutions since Berelson, Lazarsfeld, Lasswell, and the 
Frankfort schoolmen took up a serious interest in the issue. 
Until early 1930s, based on a common-sense notion that 
something so novel and so compelling as the media (i.e., 
radio, film, comic books, newspapers) must by its very 
nature have broad and not altogether salutory effects, media 
researchers posited a "bu1let"-1 ike character for messages 
(e.g., Curran, Gurevitch & Woollacott, 1977). That is, the 
media were credited with a very strong influence, and 
messages were thought to penetrate their audiences quite 
unmediatedly, piercing consciousness like a bullet. This 
theory was supported by the uses to which the media were put 
by European dictatorships in the years between the wars.
McQuail (1984) notes that this evidence "tended to confirm 
what people were already inclined to be 1ieve--1hat the media 
could be immensely powerful" (p. 177).
That paradigm was discarded after World War II, in
favor of theories that, while still crediting the media with 
some power, directed attention to the good which could come 
from responsible use of the media to address and hence 
ameliorate social problems. After about 10 years, this 
approach was also abandoned in research on media effects 
when some critics claimed the field was in danger of 
"withering" (Berelson, 1989), It gave way to a model of 
communications influence in which effects were deemed 
considerably less potent, and mediated beyond recogn izable--
or at least, beyond verifiab1e --1imits by the plenitude of
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intervening psychological and sociological variables 
(Gitlin, 1976) .
The iiodel of effects which evolved out of the British 
Cultural Studies group around Stuart Hall in the 1970s swung 
the pendulum back towards a More potent nedia conception 
(e.g.. Hall, 1977). This model saw media as once again 
almost supremely powerful, but a kind of gloved fist veiled 
behind an ideological support for the status quo in the 
contest for hegemony. It took as evidence an evidence- 
manaue. That is, it infered influence in terns of what 
seemed to be excluded from the most powerful media channels 
(McQuail, 1984). That model has had a continuing influence 
and has been elaborated in much of the recent research aimed 
at redefining the parameters of the study of communication 
(e.g., Ferment in the field," 1983).
Hedia sociologist Herbert Gans (1963) put the problem 
succinctly: "Because the news media are themselves political
institutions, p o 1icy-oriented studies inevitably have 
political and ideological implications which science cannot 
resolve but which the researcher cannot avoid" (p. 174).
Unfortunately, those implications seem studiously to have 
been ignored by the working press, with consequences that 
have not yet been felt ot their fullest. Those are hinted 
at (one is not prescient), along with other implications.
Techne-cratos v^ Techne-logos. It may be objected at 
this point (if not sooner) that I am in danger of
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o'ertipping the carefully crafted series of relations that 
were enployed to attempt to distinguish among social 
responsibi1ity, the p u b 1ic sphere and the rationality of 
technocracy.
The distinctions still hold, I believe, if I be 
permitted to assert the difference between technocracy and 
technology. Technology, as I have been using the tern, 
inplies a dialectic and a dialogue; technocracy contains no 
such resonances. There is no vital tension in technocracy.
Cratos views its appropriation of techne as nerely a nore 
efficient neans of asserting the power of which it is the 
synbo1 than is d e n o s . By def in it ion the ends of techne are 
systenatic and prespecified (techne. for Aristotle, is that 
species of knowledge which is applied instrunentally toward 
the production of artifacts, as was shown earlier). But in 
technology, there exists the counterpoise of the logos. the 
redeening indefinicy of the word. Therefore, while 
technocracy dominates, technology negotiates; it is this 
human dimension which the former lacks which distinguishes 
between the t w o .
The colonization principle is exemplified in much of 
the discourse surrounding the Hazelwood decision, which will 
be discussed in the next chapter. School is seen as the 
arena in which, far from fledging their growing critical 
awareness, students are restrained by dogmatic, formulaic 
exercises and forbidden to explore regions where the danger 
to themselves is miniscule but is rather a threat to the
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expertise of their keepers. The decision upheld the 
rationality of school officials' claims to exercise their 
expert prerogatives against what critical educators have 
recognized as the necessary possibility of students' 
acquiring the communicative competence to define even a 
small part of the agenda in their own immediate environment 
on the fundamental grounds of First Amendment rights of 
speech, expression, and the press.
The schools and the press are among the most visible
institutions to have come under the thrall of the
rationality that grew along with the new despotism, and
hence among the advantageous places to observe its effects
and thus to examine its entailed interests. Under the aegis
of the dominant rationality that Habermas (1571) and others
have described as the least desirable, least elevated, least
7
emancipatory under the rubric of general human interests, 
the instrumentalist/technocratic view of the purposes of 
education has been dominant in the discourse of schooling 
since the earliest days of this century, not excepting even 
the purest Deweyean version of Progressivism, as Robarts and 
Bickel (1987) have shown; the dominance of which may have 
been materially responsible for the very ills that recent 
school reform proposals have been advertized to address. In 




In Therborn, 1980, p. 357. The author is a dogmatic, 
doctrinnaire Marxist, dismissing the Social Democrats as 
"revisionist" and the Frankfurt school as "revisionist... 
[and] anti-scientific" (p. 386). Marcuse fairs a little
better, but his reasoning is "[ujnfortunately...inverted in 
relation to reality" (p. 387).
2
The seditious libel statute, the Alien and Sedition Acts 
was not struck for the U.S. Code until very recently, when 
it was declared unconstitutional in the case of Hew York 
Tinas Sullivan. (1964). 376 U.S. 254, 34 S.Ct. 710, 11
L .E d .2D. 686 ( 1964 ) .
3
"Berkeley in Principles...regretted that Newton had 
thought of space, time and motion as absolute....[and thus] 
independent...of divine support....When Newton...agreed to 
prepare a second a second edition he tried to appease his 
critics. He assured Leibniz...that he did not assume a force 
acting at a distance through empty space....To further meet 
religious objections he appended to the second edition a 
general scholium on the role of God in his system...”
(Durant & Durant, 1963, p. 542).
4
The attitude is captured in Jefferson's aphorism (cited 
in Chapter One), about the perils of ignorance to a people 
who cherish freedom, and there remain traces of this 




In my Just -journalism; Toward an. institutional ethics of_ 
the press" (Ronopak, 1985), I show that information and by 
extens ion knowledge t hat is requ i red for the individual to 
realistically appraise her own life-chances is a public good 
that requires being excluded from the market, by virtue of 
its very p u b 1icity.
6
See (e.g.) Forester, 1985. This is an exceptional 
collection of essays which recapitulate virtually all the 
Frankf u rt School t hemes and the elaborat ions and 
disjunctures that Habermas brought to the study of critical 
theory. The essays, by the likes of Dieter Misgeld, Trent 
Schroyer, Ben Agger, and Daniel Hallin, focus on the 
praxis that is immanent in Habermas's work; the book also 
includes a chapter by Habermas himself, on the praxis of 
architecture in the modern and postmodern age.
7
See, (e.g.) Habermas, 1971. Knowledge and Human Interest 
lays out the three domains of human interest in a hierarchy 
of t he i r human potent i al: technical, practical, and 
emancipatory. Held, 1980, discusses these topics and 
analyzes their import from a valuable perspective.
CHAPTER FOUR 
DISCOURSE, DISCIPLINE, AND HAZELWOOD
...On the one hand, there is the re-organisation 
of right that invests sovereignty, and on the 
other, the mechanics of coercive forces whose 
exercise takes a disciplinary form.... [P]ower is 
exercised simultaneously through this right and 
these techniques a n d ... these techniques and these 
discourses, to which the discipline gives rise 
invade the area of right so that the procedures 
of normalisation come to be ever more constantly 
engaged in colonisation of the law. (Foucault, 
1983, p. 107)
We o ught...to be suspicious of the contention that 
a man who reads and writes does in fact make an 
informed choice in the performance of his various 
social duties. Intentionally or not, the result 
of mass [mechanical] 1iteracy... has been to train 
the citizen body only for social efficiency and 
obedience. (Pattison, 1962, p. 175)
Only on relatively rare occasions do the true interests 
immanent in the operations of technocratic rationality and 
instrumental logic become revealed to public view. This 
occurs when, as they sometimes do, irruptions obtrude at the
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K a r g i n s ,  i n t e r s e c t i o n s ,  an d i n t e r s t i c e s  of the d i s c u r s i v e
formations and practices by which that rationality is both
constituted, maintained, and naturalized. At these moments,
contradictions may appear that reveal the shape, substance,
and machineries of the iron cage that their hegemonic
discourses norma1ly conceal.
In the previous chapters of this study, I have
endeavored to examine in terms of theory the ways by which
the dimensions of the iron cage could be discerned: how the
influence of technocratism is made to appear to be the
natural state of affairs, how this influence militates
against individuals' recognizing its effects and taking
personal responsibility for their perceptions, and how it is
maintained in discourse. I have also argued that the pre-
emminent position occupied by technocratic rationality and
instrumental logic in the structuring of human conditions
and life-worlds is nowhere more evident to the critical eye
than in the taken-for-granted operations of contemporary
institutions of communication and education, the school and
the press. Thus, if one were to examine the seems of the
cage for evidence of rupture, those at which such evidence
could be most visible would be at the points of intersection
between the schools and the press. The January, 1980,
decision rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hazelwood
1
Schoo1 Pi strict v . Kuhlmeier provides such an instance.
Hazelwood: Facta, Functions and Fallacies 
The Hazelwood case and the majority opinion on it
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presents a unique opportunity to examine and interrogate the 
techno-managerial rationality as it operates to ensure its 
dominance in the hegemonic conflict for the power to define 
the world. Hazelwood offers a glimpse at the normally 
concealed relations by which the technocratic agenda is 
simultaneously framed, advanced, and reified in discourses. 
As will become apparent, the discourses in this case are 
those of both communication and education.
In the following chapter, I examine and discuss the 
decision in the matter of Hazelwood. First, I present the 
facts of the case, of which only some were considered by the 
three courts which ruled on the issue. Then, by way of 
contextualizing the issue, I review the results of the 
scholastic press's efforts to assert its rights under the 
First Amendment, in light of their value to the democratic 
concerns highlighted in the previous section. This first 
section describes some basic issues involved in the 
Hazelwood decision. In this section, I employ what Paul 
Lazarsfeld (1946) cogently termed an "administrative" 
reading of the contending discourses about censorship in the 
U.S. student press, whereby the discourse under study is 
permitted to stipulate the terms upon which it may validly 
be evaluated. Although this evaluation takes for granted 
that which the discourse might seek to conceal, it does 
adumbrate certain suggestive relations.
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In the next section, these discourses are related to an 
interpretation of Michel Foucault's (1972) development of 
the concept of "discursive formation." The concept is 
elaborated, and its evolution into a controlling, 
nornalizing power/ knowledge (pouvoir/savoir) relation is 
traced, along with the place of discipline in this 
conceptual matrix. This section situates the Hazelwood 
decision in the analytical stance that inforns a subsequent 
re-evaluation of the discourses. This section includes a 
(necessarily brief) excursus on Foucault's thought, certain 
insights from which inforn nuch of what I have to say, both 
in this context and in others in both preceding and 
succeeding chapters.
There then follows a section in which I exanine some 
examples of discourse about the Hazelwood decision within 
the professional journalistic community. Through an 
analysis of responses to the decision by mainstream U.S. 
newspapers, journalism association and trade (management and 
employee) house organs, and journalism reviews, I suggest 
that the decision has important and recognized implications 
not only for journalism education, but also for the wider 
spectrum of concerns with issues of civic, educational, and 
journalistic competences. The chapter concludes by 
situating these discourses in an overarching rhetoric of 
technical discip1inarity within the press and the schools.
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The Facts of the Case
Students enrolled in the Journalism II course at
Hazelwood East High School, a wealthy, conservative St. Louis
(MO.) suburb, wrote and edited the school newspaper, The
Spectrum. under the tutelage and supervision of the school's
journalism teacher/advisor. For an up-coming issue, students
on the staff had written articles o n , among other things,
student pregnancy in their school and on the effects upon
students of divorce. Prior to going to press with the issue,
the journalism teacher/advisor, following a practice which
had been instituted only after articles critical of school
system pay practices had appeared in a previous edition of
the paper (Visser, 1987), had submitted the page 'dummies''
for the paper to the principal.
Upon reviewing the paper, the principal objected to the
content of the divorce and pregnancy articles and, claimimg
there was insufficient time for reworking the material he
found objectionable, deleted the entire pages upon which
those stories appeared from the forthcoming edition.
Student journalists on the Spectrum claimed that their First
Amendment rights had been violated, and sued the principal,
the school, and the school district, seeking injunctive
relief, monetary damages, and declaration that First
Amendment rights had been violated by censorship. A U.S.
2
District Court upheld the censorship; the students appealed
3
and won a reversal in the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.
The school board then appealed the Circuit Court decision to
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the U.S. Suprene Court. The Suprene Court granted 
certiorari and, on January 13, 1988, announced that it
reversed the Appellate Court decision by a vote of 5-3. 
Written by Justice Byron White, the majority opinion on 
Hazelwood articulated three separate rationales for 
deferring to the school officials' discretion in suppressing 
students' expressions:
(1) Schools need not "tolerate speech that is 
inconsistent with [their] basic educational mission" (at 
564);
(2) Unless specifically authorized, a student 
newspaper p u b 1 ished as a curricular exercises "cannot be 
characterized as a forum for public expression" (at 564), 
and
(3) As publishers of such newspapers, schools nay 
exercise "editorial control over the style and content of 
student speech" when their actions are "reasonably re 1ated 
to legitimate pedagogical concerns" (at 565).
The decision has been deplored and hailed, respectively, 
either by student press advocates and educators interested in 
the protection of students' rights and in the furtherance of 
the pedagogical principle of teaching by example, or by 
school officials who saw in the decision the legitimation of 
management concerns over control of the schools. In any 
case, as will be shown in the foilowing section, the decision 
only rationalized practices of interference in student
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expression which have been on-going for decades.
Learning Voice Control
The scope and nature of First Anendment rights of
students has long been an area of acrimonious dispute in the
courts, in the student press, and in schools (Kristof,
1983). For the student press and its advocates and'
supporters, the highwater mark arguably was set in 1969.
That year, in Tinker y__ Des Moines Independent Schaai 
4
District. year, the Court protected students' freedom of 
expression in school to the extent that "speech" such as 
wearing a black armband in protest of the Vietnam war was 
tolerated to the extent that it did not materially interfere 
with "legitimate educational functions of the school." In a 
memorable phrase, Justice Fortas ruled that neither public 
school students nor teachers may be construed to "shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
5
the schoolhouse gate." With the Tinker standard, the Court
established a precedent that authorized students a measure
of autonomy from the proscriptive practices in public
schools, which Justice Fortas castigated for their potential
6
to become "enclaves of totalitarianism."
Yet even in the face of such a stern admonition, the 
standard set by Tinker, though flawed from the perspective 
of advocates of students' freedom of expression (Kristof, 
1983) manifested a spirit of tolerance which has been 
honored more in the breech than in the observance. A study
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conducted for the Robert F. Kennedy Journalism Foundation 
five years after Tinker still had occasion to report that an 
unabated progran of school censorship "has created a high 
school press that in most places is nothing more than a 
house organ" (Nelson, in Gillmor & Barron, 1984, p. 717) for 
school admin istrat ions' interests. Thus, while the vast 
Majority of incidents of censorship do not achieve the 
notoriety of Hazelwood. and so are not brought into broad 
p u b 1ic awareness, the practices represented in Hazelwood are 
neither particularly unique, nor isolated phenomena.
According to the aforementioned report for the Kennedy 
Foundation in 1974, and Tinker notwithstanding,
generations of both subtle and overt interference 
with the rights of student Media have fostered a 
cliMate wherein self-censorship, the result of 
years of unconstitutional adMinistration and 
faculty censorship, has created passivity aMong 
students and Made then cyn ical about the guaran tee 
of free press under the First AMendMent. 
(Nelson, in GillMor & Barron, 1984, p. 717)
With Hazelwood. the Court essentially legitimated, 
post f a c t o . managerial controls over students' speech 
that had been in force, or threatened with chil1ing effect, 
for many years. A 1981 survey of 500 randomly selected high 
schools in all 50 states conducted by a researcher at 
Harvard found that instances, threats, or fears of 
censorship were reported by more than 70 percent of
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r e s p o n d e n t s  C K r i s t o f ,  1983'). T h e  S t u d e n t  P r e s s  L a w  C e n t e r ,  
a p r i v a t e l y  s u p p o r t e d  W a s h i n g t o n  D,C. w a t c h d o g  g r o u p ,  has 
r e p o r t e d  that it is a p p r i s e d  of b e t w e e n  3 0 0 - 5 0 0  c a s e s  "of 
c e n s o r s h i p  or c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  s u s p e c t  p u n i s h m e n t  for 
p u b l i c a t i o n "  e a c h  y e a r  ( G i l l m o r  & B a r r o n ,  1984, p. 717). 
H a z e l w o o d  o p e n e d  the f l o o d g a t e s .  W i t h i n  the f i r s t  m o n t h s  
a f t e r  H a z e  1w o o d . a c c o r d i n g  to S P L C  e x e c u t i v e  d i r e c t o r  M a r k  
G o o d m a n  (in F r a s e r ,  1988), the C e n t e r  n o t e d  a " s i g n i f i c a n t  
i n c r e a s e  in the n u m b e r  of ( r e p o r t s  of) p r i n c i p a l s  d e m a n d i n g  
to r e v i e w  all c o p y  b e f o r e  g o i n g  to p r e s s "  (p. 8).
P r a c t i c e s  s u c h  as p r i o r  r e v i e w  c o m p o r t  w i t h  an 
o b s e r v a t i o n  m a d e  m o r e  tha n  3D y e a r s  ag o  by a t t o r n e y  and 
f r e e d o m - o f - s p e e c h  s c h o l a r  T h o m a s  I. E m e r s o n .  E m e r s o n  (in 
Z u c k m a n  & G a i n e s ,  1 977) r e c o g n i z e d  and i n v e i g h e d  a g a i n s t  the 
p e r n i c i o u s  n a t u r e  of u n l e a s h i n g  the p r o c e s s  of p r i o r  
r e s t r a i n t  by a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  fiat. He w a r n e d  t h a t  the e n t i r e  
p r o c e s s  is g e a r e d  t o w a r d  s u p p r e s s i o n  and that, o n c e  in 
p l a c e ,  the c e n s o r  w i l l  be i m p e l l e d  to f ind t h i n g s  to 
s u p p r e s s .
W h i l e  a p o l o g i s t s  for the d e c i s i o n  h a v e  a r g u e d  t h a t  the 
C o u r t  m e r e l y  r e t u r n e d  to s c h o o l  o f f i c i a l s  t h e i r  n a t u r a l  
c o n t r o l  o v e r  e d u c a t i o n  and r e s t o r e d  "a d e g r e e  of s a n i t y  to an 
a r e a  of law that had b e e n  t h r e a t e n e d  by lower c o u r t  lunacy' 
( K i l p a t r i c k ,  1988, p. A 2 7  ) . o t h e r s  w e r e  n o t  so s a n g u i n e .  
A c c o r d i n g  to N a t  H e n t o f f  (1988), a n o t e d  a d v o c a t e  of f r e e d o m  
of s p e e c h  and e x p r e s s i o n ,  the m a j o r i t y  o p i n i o n  in H a z e l w o o d
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accorded administrators (who are not necessarily nor even 
primarily concerned with education) virtually a free hand in 
stilling student voices that might discomfit the comfortable 
management of their institutions. In ruling that school 
authorities could, without violating students' First 
Amendment freedoms, control a broad range of students' 
public expressions --from student newspapers, through 
yearbooks, student plays, etc.-- as long as they were part 
of the curriculum, Hentoff observed that 'public school 
principals can now censor just about any student speech, 
written or oral, that is not officially approved" (p. A27 ) .
As we shall see in a subsequent section, it was not only 
student speech in the curricular context, but indeed a wide 
variety of speaking texts" such as textbooks, that would 
ultimately be subjected to this control.
In any case, with the Hazelwood decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court has substantially enlarged the powers of prior 
restraint which may be exercised by school administrators. In 
doing so, the majority dealt a serious blow to students' 
rights of expression, while ignoring the decades-old caveat 
that Donald Gillmor and Jerome Barron (1964) identified as 
"the foundational concept in this line of cases," which was 
articulated in an often cited 1943 decision prohibiting 
schools from requiring students to recite the Pledge of 
A 1 legiance:
That they are educating the young for citizenship
is reason for scrupulous protection of
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Constitutional freedons of the individual, if we
are not to strangle the free Bind at its source
a n d  t e a c h  y o u t h  to d i s c o u n t  i B p o r t a n t  p r i n c i p l e s
7
of our governrent as Bere platitudes.
(West Virginia y^Baxnette. 1943)
Yet, writing for the Hazelwood Bajority, Justice 
White's text at least tacitly concedes that the potential 
for "strangled Binds’ and discounting iBportant principles 
as platitudes were of less consequence than school 
officials' discretion in Baintaining the authority of the 
curriculuB to proscribe content on technical grounds, or 
reify ing a particular "educational b  iss ion of the schoo 1. "
He saw only two oppositional choices for school officials: 
either peraitting ‘"all student expressions ... regard less of 
how sexually explicit, racially intenperate or personally 
insulting," ex. the dissolving of all student speech 
activities, (at 572, fn.9).
The Dissenters
It was apparently just the danger of institutionalizing 
cyn ic ism and of teaching students by exaaple to discount 
iBportant deaocratic principles, to which Justice WilliaB 
Brennan's ringing dissent seeaed to allude. Brennan both 
opened and closed his dissent with a stinging rebuke of the 
sajority for the quality of the civics lesson that was being 
taught by the Court when it upheId the principal's right to 
"brutally’" censor students' articles, which the principal
1 5 6
had admitted to a reporter could show his adninistration in
a bad light to the local school board or "tarnish the
B
school's ... reputation" (Visser, 1987, p. 441).
Brennan's dissent is far tiore fulsonely annotated than
that of the najority opinion. Underlying his position,
perhaps, seens to be an appreciation that, in narrowing the
scope of Tinker to exclude the student press (along with
other examples of student public expressions), the Court
also was nullifying the inpact on student's rights to free
expression of a significant body of case and Constitutional
law that hitherto had protected students' First Anendnent
rights. Mindful perhaps of the tendency of dissents to
eventually supercede majority opinions (as Justice Hugo
Black's dissent in Tinker seens to have done in the case of
Hazelwood) . Brennan takes pains to insert into his dissent
the panoply of Constitutional and case law precedent which
the najority either ignored or explicitly deened irrelevant.
The bulk of those decisions had endeavored to close the
regulatory avenues available to school officials who, under
pretexts of protecting youthful sensibilities, or the
necessity to naintain discipline, sought to constrain
student expression by drawing overbroad meanings as to such
9
terns as "disruption," by imposing restrictions on 
10
pamphlets, e t c . , or by other assorted strategens. As 
Brennan notes, the Hazelwood majority opinion "aptly 
illustrates how readily school officials (and courts) can 
camoflage viewpoint discrimination as the 'mere' protection
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of students fron sensitive topics" (at 578).
Attorney and curriculum theorist Janes A. Whitson 
(1988) has pointed out that there is a flawed logic at work 
here. It is apparent in "the kind of fornalistie, all-or- 
nothing legal reasoning," which pernits "preoccupation with 
such issues as whether or not student newspapers neet sone 
doctrinal test...as public forums'" (p. 246). Whitson 
shows how this logic sinultaneously (a) nilitates against 
the developnent of the necessary conpetences to ascertain 
true interests in the discursive construction of social 
reality and (b) constrains discussion to choices that seen 
structurally to inhibit or preclude naking decisions or 
taking other actions which could both enhance students' 
understandings of democracy, and contribute to students' 
preparations to become active, conscientious, and/or willing 
contributors to democratic dialogue.
Whitson (1988) has argued that the "special 
characteristics of the school environment" (Hazelwood. at 
567) should militate for an entirely different position by 
schools, both teachers and administrators, on the gropings 
of students toward social and cultural competence. They 
should not be tolerated in their diverse expressions, they 
should be actively encouraged, both in the culture of the 
school and in the explicit practices of pedagogy. In his 
view, education is a process whereby "ideas and expressions 
are presented to challenge and enlarge students' capacities
1 5 6
for dealing critically and soundly with the full range of 
ideas" (p. 245). In contrast with other communicative 
situations, where ideas "are presented for the sake of 
getting then accepted, the classroom has certain 'special 
characteristics ... in which students are strategically 
confronted with a diverse array of conflicting ideas" (p.
245). Therefore, in his view, "for government to act as 
educator." necessarily entails that structural and 
existential provisions should be cade for a "wide latitude 
for free expression" (p. 245, enphasiB in original). "Far 
fron justifying special limitations" (p. 246), he argues 
that democratic values of tolerance should be recognized as 
comprising the special character of schooling, rather than a 
restrictive interpretation.
These considerations notwithstanding, a restrictive, 
controlling cast to schoolings' special characteristics, 
however, is consonant with the view that schools, and other 
social institutions as well, exist primarily as machineries 
serving the "functional" requirements of advanced 
corporatist states. Among these has traditionally been the 
need to be equ ipped with a labor force whose capac it ies to 
reason critically are truncated. In the next section, this 
study first discusses and then adopts a Foucauldian approach 
to the problem of discursive constraints on ways of 
understanding this logic of control. This approach suggests 
a way of discerning the relations that are in play in the 
particular situation represented by Hazelwood. as well as in
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which the nore general school/press relation nay be 
interpreted in light of the instrunental rationality which 
holds both institutions in thrall. That rationality is
exenplified in the section following the next, in which the
discourses of journalists "talking to themselves" in the 
professional/trade literature is exanined.
Discipline, Discourse, and Relations of Power
FoucauIt's analytic is especially apt in this context 
with respect to his views on the work disciplinary 
technology as an inportant instrunent for aaintaining
discursive orthodoxy. The analysis suggests that certain of
the journalistic texts represent a paradigm of a view of 
school/life relations that results in the denial and 
abandonment of certain attitudes about knowledge and power 
which should be fostered as both journalistic and 
educational communicative social competences. This analysis 
will attend to the relations of power portrayed in the 
rhetoric of “discipline'' which characterizes much of the 
current discourse among discursively ‘authorized" 
commun icators.
Foucault: Discursive Formations and Practices
The reality we think and talk about exists only in the 
manner and form by which we think and talk about it. 
Consequently, because we can talk about reality onlv in the 
manner and form by which we think and talk about it, our 
discourses define our conceptions of reality. In turn, the
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ways in which we think and talk about reality depend upon 
the overarching tooos and logos of a given age, its 
episteiie. which establishes for that age the perineters 
around the permissible.
This, I think, is a close approximation of what Foucault 
(1872) means by the concept "discursive formations" (p. 44). 
They are, essentially, styles of the organization of 
knowledge that operate automatically in a culture to define 
and shape the relations of knowledge and thought. They are 
"relations," not internal nor external to discourse:
They are, in a sense, at the limit...; they offer 
(discourse) objects of which it can speak; or..., 
they determine the group of relations that 
discourse must establish... These realtions 
characterize... discourse itself as a practice. 
( P .  46)
Moreover, they are "rules that enable (things) to form as 
objects of a discourse and thus constitute the conditions 
for their historical appearance" (p. 48). While conceding 
that discourses partake in the general operations of sign 
relations, Foucault argues that "what they do is more than 
use these signs to designate things. It is this more that 
renders them irreducible to language flangue} and to speech" 
(p. 49). In other words, such relations are the material 
forms taken by knowledge and thought.
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Exjqa. Discourse iji Power
Initially, according to Hubert Dreyfus and F a u 1 Rabinow 
(1983), Foucault was not interested in the pedestrian, the 
everyday practices by which people go about ordering their 
lives. Or rather, he was deflected fron such concerns by 
his insight into the pervasive nature of discourse. He 
becane concerned --almost obsessed, so nuch so that he 
posited the end of the human subject and its replacenent 
with rule-governed, autonomous discourse (Foss, Foss, &
Trapp, 1985)-- with "serious speech acts: what experts say 
when they are speaking as experts" (p. xxiv). With what 
i 1locutionary authority is a speech act imbued when it is 
spoken by an “expert?"
For Foucault (1972), what experts say is informed by 
and authorized by their expertise, which is an example of a 
discursive practice. Expertise implies a delineating, 
defining discourse in which an expert can have and maintain 
discursive perquisites. The expert partakes of discourse 
practices in order to selectively include or exclude 
knowledge: to "constitute a domain of objects, in relation
to which one can affirm or deny true or false propositions"
(p. 234); that is, the knowledge of which knowledge abides 
in and by the rules of the discourse. Their expertise, in 
turn, as well as their ability to hfi. experts, is a function 
of the increased technologizing of social practices that 
permit --even require-- the power relations entailed in 
specialization. It is certainly an oversimplification of
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the years and rigors spent in the tracing down of the 
artifacts of this transition in social relations; but I 
would hazard, nevertheless, that it was his appreciation of 
this line of inp1ication which led Foucau11 to abandon his 
project of providing a general theory of discursive 
practices. Or better, this former project becaue subsumed in 
favor of his latter-day project of interpretive analytics, 
"the history of the present" (in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1963, p .
116). In this way, as Foucault's thinking and writing 
progressed from archeology into genealogy, he cane to 
recognize and to describe the material reality of the forns 
implicated by the nultitude relations of knowledge/power.
The Voiceless Words the Insane
Prior to these revelations, however, Foucault (1973) 
had begun to investigate the social phenomenon of madness, 
and its place in the evolution of the d iscou rse of 
discipline. Madness, for him, was a paradigm case of the 
discursive construction of a category of human act ion that 
was comprised in a hitherto unknown domain and realized, for 
the first time, in the application of the label.
Psychiatry, the medicament of the soul, came to represent 
for Foucault the "tyranny of reason' over madness'" 
(Sheridan, 1980, p. 12). The speech of people labeled as 
mad was automatically discounted in the society in which 
they dwelt, and it was the very act of this exclusion that 
made reason voluble.
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We shall have reason to return to the topic of nadness 
presently. For now, what is important is that Foucault 
identified this nala ise as a condition from which arose a 
discipline, an expert ise, that owed its existence to its 
ability to thenatize an Other whose presence challenged the 
reason of the Subject. From this recognition grew his 
concept ion of power as biotic; that is, as a uniquely 
energized constituent of all social relations, an inhabitant 
of all social and political practices "from top down and 
also from the bottom up" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1963, p. 185).
A central feature of this latterly arising project is its 
focus on the "micropractices" of social orderliness, of 
organization: the seemingly ineluctable processes by which 
every(- )thing and every(-)body is socially colonized; that 
is, characterized, individualized, moralized, normalized, 
routinized, taxonomized and totalized, according to 
political and disciplinary technologies, the tools of 
b i o(t i c )-power.
Disciplinary Technology in the Discourses of. Hazelwood
It is largely as a result of this facet of his ouevre 
that a Foucau11 ian approach is f ound to be part icularly 
suited to this discussion. Both the discourses of the Court 
in rendering as well as in dissenting from the Hazelwood 
decision, and the discourses instantiated in the articles and 
commentaries of the journalists discussing the case are 
characterized by that crucial expertise. As I will show, 
these discourses are rooted in a rhetoric of discipline a n d ,
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to sone extent, domination or, at least, control as it is 
related to the dis-eased condition of its subject/object.
The Ubiquitous T h e y . In a Foucauldian analytic, raw 
domination is not the motive force in these discourses, 
however, because domination is not the essence of power. 
Those who manipulate power, who play games and shuffle for 
position, who aspire to dominance are, in Foucault's (1979) 
analysis, the first dominees. The real, but hidden, 
"political technologies" must take hold, must colonize the 
the local life-world before they can extend themselves to 
colonize others. There is no ubiquitous they: rather, the 
they is Power is not an institution and not a structure;
neither is it a strength we are endowed with; it is the name 
that one attributes to a complex strategic relationship in a 
particular society (in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 187).
One of the central attributes of that complex relationship 
is d isc ip1ine.
Discipline, Foucault (1979) argues, specifically 
disciplinary technology, emerged as a major concern 
synchronically with the rise of the "dubious" (i.e., human 
or social) sciences, as power began to require productive 
yet docile bodies as useful forces. Its contemporary 
manifestations, he claims, could not have been accomplished 
without the interdictions of those enterprises: their 
disconstruction of the body as an individual concern and its 
relocation in the regime of the division of labor, the
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napping of its functions, and the need to perfect its 
efficient functioning. The process acconpanied the 
discovery of the self as subject. Discipline, with its 
enphasis on bodies, is then essentially corporeal, but it 
existentially assunes --paradoxically, given its project to 
produce docile, even willing, subjects/objects as cannon 
fodder for the advance of its technological rationality-- 
the repeal of the Cartesian rift between nind and body.
The B o d y . the S e l f . Allen Megill (1885) in Prophets of 
Extremity. an intense and telescopic examination of the 
continuum of the phenomena of modernism from Nietzsche and 
Heidegger, through Foucault and Derrida, notes that 
Foucault's first appropriation of the body to his discourse 
occurs in a discussion of Nietzsche, "where he defines it as 
the 'inscribed surface of events (traced by language and 
d issolved by ideas), the locus of a d issoc iated Self 
(adopting the illusion of substantial unity), and a volume 
in perpetual disintegration" (p. 253). This presents us 
with an account that resounds with echoes of tabula r a s a . 
the Lockean description of the mind. Indeed, by Foucault's 
(1979) own account, disicpline could not have succeeded 
otherwise. Hind and body had to be disciplined, in order to 
accomodate the technologica1 ends entailed ipso facto in the 
burgeoning "order of things" within the regime of the human 
sciences. The carceral perspective need not be limited to 
the officially quarantined, sanctioned deviance of the 
criminal (an artificial category, at best). He need examine
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only the rationality of the "national security state" to 
discover the carceral mentality in e xtremis. applied to a 
whole population.
Discipline, then, is both a function and a prerequisite 
of power. But it nay be instilled only upon subjects who are 
willing to accede to it. For this to occur, subjects nust be 
persuaded of its rationality. The rationality of discipline 
resides in developed iatrics and theraputics of the modern 
age --here we recall the distinction drawn between reason and 
un-reason. That is, the promise of therapy, if not of out­
right cure, for deviance from a putative norm.
Foucault (1979) maintains that this persuasion, too, 
has been the function of the social sciences, and has found 
its extension in the public and private institutions whose 
responsibility discipline has become: the military, prisons, 
schools, courts, hospitals, etc. In this schema, for 
example, immaturity may be conceived of as an illness, like 
madness, of which childhood, like unreason, is a symptom. 
Children may be cured, but only by willing submission to the 
system that characterizes them as defective or deficient; 
that is, by submission to the appropriate disciplinary 
technologies embedded, in this case not in the asylum, but 
in the schools.
Looking back, then, to the discourses employed by the 




a position to see that what we are dealing with is a "power" 
struggle between two divergent disciplinary technologies.
Both Justice White and Justice Brennan are in agreenent that 
"discipline" is necessary in order to acconplish the "valid 
educational purpose" of the school, which we now understand 
to be the preparation of bodies and minds: for the 
marketplace (White) or for civil society (Brennan). What they 
are unable to agree upon is not the relative merits of 
student press freedom; rather, it is upon the best means to 
accomplish the ends of power. Thus, it can be seen that it 
was not in their logic that they disagreed, for the telos
underlying their discourses was essentially the same. Both
sought to preserve and to propogate order and the submission 
of "deviants" to the institutional inperatives--that is, the 
disciplinary and political technology--of the school.
Foucault reminds us that power itself may not be 
appropriated, only the technologies of discipline and 
politics. As Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) explain, "power is 
not a commodity, a position, a prize, or a plot" (p. 185).
Rather, Foucault (1983) defines it as
a mode of action upon the actions of others....[it
is] the total structure of actions brought to bear 
upon possible actions; it incites, it induces, it 
seduces, it makes more easy or more difficult; in 
the extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely; it 
is neverthe less always a way of act ing upon an 
acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of
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their acting or being capable of action, (p. 220)
Applied to the Hazelwood decision, a Foueauldian 
interpretation night suggest that the Court's diaagreenent 
is over the degree to which the disciplinary technology of 
the schools can be anended and still preserve the power 
relations that the school enbodies. In this light, Brennan's 
point nay be the nore cynical: his dissent can be seen to 
imply that an institution such as the school can tolerate a 
certain (the extant) anount of student speech, and therefore 
is far less vulnerable. Student speech nay be considered 
the speech of irrationality; thus it is unthreatening for 
its very location in that realn. Brennan's discourse masks 
his agreenent with the essential contentions of the majority 
opinion on the need for discipline and for the perpetuation 
of order.
Justice White, on this reading, appears to have had 
appreciably less confidence in the power relations 
instantiated in the schools. His majority opinion not only 
reflects that relative lack of confidence, but also 
illustrates the extent to which his discourse has been 
colonized by the disciplinary technology upon which power 
expands. For White, the deviance of students, the "illness" 
of their immaturity, is contagious; the school --the 
instrument of their therapy-- required at the least a device 
to disclaim its participation in the social manifestations 
of its failure to "normalize" those entrusted to it for
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their cure. Such a disclaimer would surely have sufficed. 
However, the institution endorsing the power relation --the 
Court-- recognized that a disclainer would threaten the 
seening authority claimed by the schools for the cure that 
the schools, as an instance of disciplinary technology, were 
responsible for fostering. It decided that the maintenance 
of power relations required for the school the ability to 
obviate any possible threat to the appearance that schools 
were anything less than the best appliances for the 
administration of normalization procedures to their inmates.
For courts to adjudicate such conflicts in the schools 
is tantamount to having the foxes deciding when and under 
what circumstances --but not whether, as that is presumed-- 
it is permissible for dogs to invade the hen house. It 
might appear unseemly. Thus Justice White in effect washed 
his hands of the matter. He suggested that the proper 
domain in which such disagreements should be resolved was 
the local or state political arena. For White (though he 
does not say so in so many words) and the rest of the 
majority, the purpose in rendering the decision at all was 
once and for all to remove the issue from the domain of the 
courts and to locate any further contention within the realm 
of the politically accountable control over the claims of 
technocratic expertise by administrators, grammarians, and 
other documented experts to determine the proper 
"educational mission of the schools."
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They Know Mot What They Qa.. In this case, I think, we 
cannot say of White and the others who joined his opinion 
that, in the way Foucault has characterized nuch local 
action within an historical apparatus: they "know what they 
do; they frequently know why they do what they do; but what 
they don't know is what what they do does" (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1983, p. 187). In fact, the question of "what what 
they do does" is the very locus of their disagreement. What 
they did, in fact, was to further blur the distinctions 
between the worlds of private and public knowledge which, as 
I showed in Chapter Three, is one of the central strategies 
of the domination of discourse by the technocratic ideology.
The Suprene Cou r t 's dec is ion in Hazelwood. ruling in 
favor of adninistrators' and other school officials' 
authority to censor students'public speech, can be seen to 
rest partially but importantly on the grounds that such 
expressions are not the students' own expressions; rather, 
the expressions in a sense belong to the institution because 
they arise from curricular activities (student newspapers in 
the instant case, but also yearbooks, dramatic or musical 
presentations, etc.). The ostensible dispute in the 
Hazelwood case was over whether or not students below the 
college/university level enjoyed First Amendment rights 
which protected their public expressions from unreasonable 
interference by school officials. For the Supreme Court, 
censorship, or more properly prior restraint on expression, 
was only an issue in so far as the debate involved the issue
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of by and for w h o m , and for what purposes, it was 
permissible; it was not a question of whether it was 
allowable. Significantly, the words "censor" and 
"censorship" do not appear in the majority opinion; the 
issue is treated euphemistically: "Schools need not 
tolerate..." In the next section, we will see that much the 
same situations are present (as well as where the 
disagreements are) in the rhetoric of the journalistic 
commentaries on the decision.
"That's Life, Kids": The Press in the "Real" World
The Court in Haze 1wood relied upon particular 
discursive constructions of assumptions and conceptions 
about the nature both of schools' "basic educational 
mission" (at 565) and, in this case, of "legal, moral, and 
ethical restrictions... (of) responsible journalism" (at 
568). The following section takes up the latter issue 
first, as a means to understand how the school's basic 
educational mission is being imposed upon it by concerns 
which are fundamentally extrinsic to rational purposes of 
schooling. In arriving at their decision in Hazelwood. the 
Court majority relied to a significant extent on the 
convent ions and practices of commerc ia1 j ourna1 i sm, 
especially the presumption of press objectivity and the 
right of publishers to "exercise editorial control" and 
limit the expressions of the reporters and editors who work 
for them.
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The decision narks a profound change of direction for 
student journalists. Just how profound already has been the 
subject of nuch concent and speculation. Directly the 
decision was announced, a spate of articles, colunns, and 
letters-to-the-editor appeared in journalise reviews and 
"house organs" --the nainstrean association publications-- 
of the professional journalise connunity.
They Were Expendable
What they neant to do when, in January, 1988, the 
juridical Titans on the Court launched the Hazelwood decision 
onto the storey seas of the discursive environeent of free 
expression, and whether or not they knew what they did did, 
is a natter open to interpretation. Fron one perspective, 
the decision could be seen as something like setting a sea- 
anchor to stabilize a single, store-tossed institution on 
whose decks certain kinds of expression were loose cannons 
endangering the welfare of crew and passengers (e.g.. Day & 
Butler, 1968). Fron another perspective, however, the 
decision represents a seiseic shifting under the whole fluid 
cedium of Aeerican custoe, discourse, and tradition upon 
which floats, like a flotilla of cockleshells, the First 
Aeendeent and the varieties of expression it guarantees.
That shifting and the ensuing waves cast sone scalier, but 
nonetheless vital vessels in the fleet, onto the shoals of 
technical censorship, overturning sone and threatening to 
swamp still others. Impelled by the surge, waves of affect
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even now roil the tidal basin of the immediate circumstances 
of the case and, battering at the containments of the 
specific situation, threaten to erode the foundations of a 
whole edifice of communicative freedoms.
How the decision is judged depends on the rationality in 
which the facts and effects of the decision are situated. To 
return to the nautical metaphor, the situation is akin to an 
Admiralty court upholding a ship's captain's authority to 
invoke any punishment as a deterrent to mutiny. In the terms 
of the prevailing manageria1/technica1 rationality, the 
decision merely returned control of a single vessel --or 
class of vessels-- to the duly constituted authorities and 
strengthened their hands in dealing with future 
insurrections. To others, it trod roughly on a series of 
agreements that had permitted a sometimes clumsy but in the 
long run beneficial sharing of freedom and responsibility, 
not only to navigate a particular ship but also to
contribute to plotting the course for the whole fleet. In
any case, the decision caused a stirring in the never
tranquil, often turbulent (though seldom violent), deep but
narrow channels, within which an increasingly constrained 
and fretful American managerial culture seeks to contain the 
ocean of acceptable commun icat ive even t s .
These channels are normally patrolled with proprietary 
interest by private, commercial media which are usually 
quick to send up flares when they detect the first hints of 
government intrusions into their domains. However,
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incredibly, the Supreme Court action in the case caused 
barely a ripple of discontent aboard the private yachts and 
corporate fleets of the Alterican press. Mastheads, which in 
the past have issued forth with flags flying and editorial 
guns booning when their own closely watched freedoms had 
been inpinged upon to a far snaller degree, remained moored 
complacently inside sheltered anchorages. Only the most 
sensitive of sailors experience nal de mer in the marina.
This is, perhaps, not to be wondered at. For, from 
among all the possible tenets of journalism that the Court 
have upheld and out of all the rhetorics of freedom and 
right that it could have chosen to celebrate, it was the 
publisher's perquisites that the Court implicitly relied 
upon: ‘[A] school may in its capacity as publisher of a
school newspaper...'’ (Hazelwood. at 570). Not surprisingly, 
it was upon those that the most of the media focused upon in 
their commentaries. As that most acerbic and insightful 
commentator/journalist A.J. Liebling (1975) noted with heavy 
irony some years ago, there is freedom of the press, mainly 
for those who own one. It is this construction of freedom 
of the press that is one of the major issues which has to be 
considered in assessing the impact of the Hazelwood Court's 
decision. And not only freedom, but also Liebling s 
particular formulation of it. Indeed, a substantial number 
of newspaper editorials that praised the decision did so on 
grounds that echoed both Liebling's ironic critique and
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Foucault's (1979) formulation of the pervasive application
of disciplinary technology in the service of power. I turn
now fron the Court's discourse to that of the press to
exanine the contradictions that the actions of Kathy
Kuhlneier and her colleagues revealed in their efforts to be
accorded their First Anendnent rights.
D isc ip l in e  in Journalistic Discourse
A rhetoric for discipline and subnission characterizes
nuch of the journalistic connentary on Hazelwood which
appeared in the editorials of the daily, nainstrean press on
12
the heels of its announcenent. Interestingly, however, in 
journalism reviews and in nainstrean trade journals of the 
profession, there was considerably less unanimity. For the 
contrast they provide, I examine samples of both discourses 
below, with the editorials from the daily press first.
Capitulation in. the Mainstream. Numerous editorials, 
particularly in the so-called elite press (Merrill &
Fischer, I960), echoed and with some slight qualifications 
supported the position of the Court, upholding submission 
both to discipline and the reification of the journalistic 
discursive formations that naturalize the power relationship 
of the publisher vis a vis the reporter.
The Chicago Tribune:
First Amendment rights to expression without 
censorship never extended to editor-publisher 
relationships.... Editors who can't agree with 
publishers have to find a new job or become
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publishers thenselves. (in "A correct ruling,"
1988, p. 15)
The Detroit Hews:
It is a decision in favor of editing--a process
that goes on in real newspapers in the real world
today.... What kind of lesson would (students) have
learned? That reporters aren't responsible to their
publishers?" (in Fitzgerald, 1988, p. 11)
The Eugene (OR) Register-Guard:
Student journalists nay feel this deneans then...
[but] the First Anendnent has never given reporters
and editors the legal right to put things in the
paper that their publishers did not wish to print.
(in Fitzgerald, 1988, p. 11)
According to an editorial in the Gary (Ind.) Post-
Tribune . the decision was basically one about "who has the
power" (in Fitzgerald, 1988, p. 12). In the U.S., the
editorial consensus is that, both in the schools and in the
13
"real world," it is and should be the publisher. This 
thene is the reification of the power of the publisher, and 
the need for the schools to predispose students either to 
knuckle under to its authority or to becone, thenselves, 
those sane kinds of authorities: "(T)he editorials, in
general, seen to say, That's life, k ids’" (Fitzgerald,
1988, p. 11).
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Fron the previous discussion of Foucault's fornulations 
of the power/knowledge relation, however, we now can see that 
the issue nay be rewritten as "whon the power has," and have 
a position fron which that r e f o m u l a t i o n  can be interpreted. 
Fron his interpretation of the action of power as action 
against the action of others, we can see that the decision of 
the Suprene Court in Hazelwood. and newspapers' responses to 
that decision, conport with Foucault's insight.
In this is an exanple of how disciplinary technologies
are enployed toward the necessity of power that its subjects
be both docile and productive. Hence, the nost connon thene
reported by editorial writers was that of the "real world":
if adult, connercial journalists do not have carte blanche
for the expression of their opinions, but instead have to
subnit to the will of their publishers, then there is no
reason to that student journalists should expect such
freedon, and no reason for authorities to suggest that the
14
power of the p u b 1isher is anything but absolute.
Conventional W isdon. That thene was present in 
connentaries and feature articles in journalisn trade 
publications, as well. However, it shared the stage, in the 
case of the najor nanagenent journals, with the ideology of 
"balance" and "objectivity." In the publication directed 
toward newsroon personnel, it was conpletely overshadowed by 
outrage. The journals of the najor organizations for 
nanagenent-leve1 newspersons --the Anerican Society of 
Newspaper Editors' The Bulletin, and the Anerican Newspaper
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Publishers' presetine-- as well as the "independent' Editor 
4  Publisher. were either equivocal or apparently studiously 
neutral. The three, anong then, reach virtually every 
newsroon, publisher's office, journalisn departnent and 
najor library in the country, and represent thenselves as 
the voices of "responsible’' journalisn. I exanine K&P first 
beacuse its coverage was the nost interesting and, on sone 
levels, the nost provocative.
Independently Speaking. E & P ' s editor, George Garneau 
(1988), wrote the first-week story in approved, paradignatic 
"objective" style, citing acceptable spokespersons for both 
(acceptable, that is, Brennan's and White's) points of view. 
E & P ' s second- week lead story was also "'balanced," a survey 
of newspaper editorials on the decision. Yet it was 
possible to discern that the editor's synpathies lay with 
the students. In the first week lead story headline, "A 
"First Anendnent disaster'," for exanple, the editors 
enployed the rhetorical device of aponnenonsvsis In her 
valuable but too often overlooked book on the seniotics of 
headlines, The Inverted Pvranid. Roberta Kevelson (1977) 
shows that the device is connonly used by newspapers to 
signify their position by letting it be spoken "fron soneone 
else's Mouth, soneone usually well-known as a visible (or 
vis-a-vis headlines, a deleted-subject and invisible) 
authority" (p. 3).
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There is additional evidence that E & P 's staff was not 
in accord with the opinion of the Court in the placerent and 
selection both of the sub-head ("Journalisn groups and nedia 
attorneys decry this week's High Court// ruling a 1lowing 
high school officials to censor a student newspaper"), and 
of the outtake which was featured in, and broke up the page 
for, Garneau's (1988) piece: " I n  effect, it says you can 
learn about the First// Arendrent in school but you can't 
practice it. You can// only practice it when you get out of
school,' Schnidt said" (p. 11).
It is interesting to recall also the sardonic "That's
life, kids" with which Fitzgerald (1988, p. 11) surrarized
the attitudes he discovered in a survey of 10 large and
nediun-sized retropolitan dailies editiorials on which he
15
reported in E & P 's second week coverage of the story.
Although one ray see Garneau's (1988) apparent lack of
synpathy for the decision in its first-week coverage as
being balanced in the second week by Fitzgerald's (1988) 
piece in which he recorded the alrost unanirous support for 
the opinion arong daily newspaper editorials, Fitzgerald 
underrined the editorial rhetoric with his quip, and Garneau 
seered irplicitly to side with the students, a fact nade 
apparent from a between-the-lines reading of the 
corpositiona1 elements of the story. Without taking an 
explicit editorial stand, the ragazine seered to support the 
decision's opponents while also appearing to balance its 
coverage. All things considered, including E & P 's esteered
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position in the journalisn community, the treatnent was 
surprising.
Manaflenent Journals. Neither the editors' nor the 
publishers' association publications took an editorial 
stand; rather, both covered the decision with articles.
Their oxen were not gored. The issue, however, was 
apparently of sonewhat greater interest to the ASNE than to 
the ANPA, if content, play, and placenent reflect anything 
about interest.
ANPA's oresstine gave its analysis about two-thirds of 
a page near the back of the book in a regular section 
devoted to juridical natters ("Supreme Court," 1988). The 
story's lead * graf merely reported the decision; its second, 
third, fourth, and fifth paragraphs suggested the 
possibility of new business opportunities which night arise 
from the decision, particularly in the area of publishing 
student newspapers. In this the coverage mirrored the 
instrunental logic of corporate technocracy. Coming from 
the publishers' trade magazine, the attitude implied was not 
unexpected, but did seem a trifle crass.
On the other hand, The B u 1let in of the ASNE devoted the 
first 10 pages of its February issue to presenting differing 
views of the importance of the decision. The spread included 
six major pieces, beginning with a long, signed analysis by 
two attorneys who had submitted an amicus curiae brief on 
behalf of the students for the ASNE and three other
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associations (Schmidt & Wiggins, 1860).
Of interest as an indicator of the editorial sympathies 
of the Bullet in staff is the fact that the Schmidt who co­
authored the piece is the sane one who was quoted in the E&P 
first week story. These authors deened the central issues 
inplicated in the decision to be essentially unresolved.
These they might have characterized, with Foucault, as 
questions about "what what was done did": whether "the case 
will have a pronounced detrimental effect on the education 
expereince available to student journalists" (p. 6), and 
"will the Hazelwood opinion encourage broader school 
administrator's censorship of student publications?" (p. 7),
Neither question is answered directly; but as we shall see 
in a subsequent section, both have become germane not only 
to incipient student journalists, but also to all students.
When censorship becomes a technical process aligned with 
the curriculum, no texts are safe from the predations of the 
guard i an s .
The ASNE spread followed this with outtakes from Op-Ed 
and editorial commentaries from the Washington Post, and the 
hew York Times, which generally support the decision. Next 
were a couple of show-and-te11 items by a journalism advisor 
(Valentine, 1988) and two students --one a journalist-- 
("Two students react to the decision," 1988) whose high 
school newspaper in Auburn, WA, has a policy of consulting 
with local editors on matters of potential controversy.
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The spread also featured a piece by Ivan Gluckman 
(1988), general counsel for the National Association of 
Secondary School Principals. In it, he (a) launches veiled 
ad hominem attacks on the "professional civil libertarians 
and student rights activists" (p. 10, emphasis added) who
championed the students' cause, (b) reiterates the "real 
world" discourse and principal-as-pub1isher argument, (c) 
claims that reporters have a greater stake in the dispute 
than "the general public" (p. 10), and (d) restates the
cu rr icular and persona1/pub1 ic speech arguments. He 
concludes with a paean to the reasonableness of school 
administrators who, he says, already realize that "student 
publications...interesting to their intended readers... 
means that some topics student journalists will want to 
cover may not be the ones principals would most like to see 
featured in student publications." He tenders reassurances 
that principals who, in the "rare c a s e . ..(do) intervene to 
assure that (school boards') standards are not violated," 
will do so for the highest motives, only under duress, and 
with due j ourna1istic profess iona1 ism (p. 11).
This piece was situated fifth among the six major slots 
in the "Cover Story" h ole. The last slot was occupied by a 
report-cum-opinion piece by one of the students whose 
stories were censored --but who was not one of the three 
students who brought the case. Andrea Callow's (1988) is 
the only major piece in which the notion of submission does 
not appear. Callow, by then a senior in journalism at
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University of Missouri, encourages students to continue 
fighting by proclaining with (understandable) youthful 
hyperbole that ”[o]n January 13, 1986, high school 
journalisn was changed --forever" by the Court's granting 
school adnin istrators "the deadly power to censor" (p. 12).
Hers is the last word, and has sone force in that position; 
inasnuch as she describes herself as a future teacher, she 
holds out a pronise for a continuing struggle.
Sone Reviews 'Lake & Stand
The two nationally circulated journalisn, university- 
affiliated reviews, The Colunbia Journalisn Review (C J R ) and 
Washington Journalisn Review (W J R . at University of 
Maryland), and the organ of the Society of Professional 
Journalists/ Signa Delta Chi (SPJ/SDX), The Q u i l l . all 
devoted sone coverage to the Hazelwood decision. The Qu i11 
and the CJR seen to have been the nore outraged, with 
SPJ/SDX publication leading the way.
The Q u i l l . The Qu i11 devoted a full-page in February, 
three full-pages with art in the front of the book, and 
nearly another full-page in the back in March, a Letters 
colunn and a full-page (troglyditic, for balance one 
supposes) opinion piece in April, and a colunn by the 
Society's general counsel in May. With the exception of the 
opinion piece in April, certainly, there was little that 
snacked of subnission to disciplinary authority in the 
colunns appearing innediately after the decision cane down.
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The publication offered nore than vituperation, 
though there was a fair quotient of that, too; to sone 
extent, they cane proffered sone possible solutions. For 
exanple, Dan Dorfman (1988), a forner Quill editor who until 
recently presided over a nonthly spread of 1-3 pages of 
nedia criticisn in the nagazine, was in print already in the 
February issue. There he inveighed against both the captive 
student press --editors at Hazelwood told NBC News the 
decision would not affect then because "we don't do anything 
controversial"-- and excoriated the decision's potential for 
"nonstrous perversions of education and serious injustices 
to principled students" (p. 12). He then offers a nodest,
constructive proposal:
[I]n every comunity, nedia corporations, unions of 
nedia workers, and chapters of professional 
organizations such as SFJ/SPX should establish a 
fund fron which student journalists can draw on 
short notice to print censored publications. The 
fund would be adninistered by a local nedia lawyer 
who could review the Material for libel and 
obscenity problens. And the students could then 
take the independently published naterial and sell 
or distribute it at school. This nuch at least is 
still protected by the First Anendnent: School
authorities may not interfere with non-disruptive 
distribution of independent publications, (p. 12)
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Dorfman goes on to rehearse Professor Emerson's 
admonition about the irresistable attractions of their 
license to censors:
What is permitted will certainly be practiced by 
authoritarian school administrators. It is not
hard to envision the kinds of cases that will 
arise. A student drama c l u b . ..preparing a
production of West Side Storv will be ordered to 
bowdlerize it. .Members of a school-sponsored
marching band will flunk. for playing Where
hfl.Y.g All the Flowers Gone in a . . . Veterans' Day
pa r a d e . .. Anyone who thinks (this) far-fetched has 
been out of high school much too long." (p. 12)
Dorfman could not forsee, nor was it within his purview
to attend to, the mischief that might ensue from the broad
powers that the Court had affirmed for school administrators
and school boards: powers which have already been invoked,
and upheld on appeal, by a Florida school board to expunge
versions of Aristophanes' Lvsistrata and Chaucer's The
16
M i H e r 's Tale from a high school humanities class, and by
a California principal to confiscate and suppress an entire
Apr i1 Fool's Day ed i t ion which he found "of fensive and
17
possibly libelous."
C J R . The Columbia Journalism Review ("Open season,"
1988) also played the story with a commentary in its first 
post-decision issue. It led its "Comment" section with a 
full-page, unsigned opinion/analysis piece that not only
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recapitulated the case syilabus, and castigated the 
prevailing opinion. The piece also reconstructed the 
precedents which the Hazelwood Court had overlooked or 
overturned in order to arrive at a decision that rebuked 
students' claims to more rights than was their due "on more 
grounds than had occurred to the original censor" (p. 18).
The story chided the Hew York Times and the Washington Post 
which, it noted, "have been most engaged in past First 
Amendment cases" (p. 18), for "accept(ing) Justice White's
fiction that a newspaper can be merely a classroom exercise" 
(p. 18). According to the C J R . the case
may have started f rom an adm inistrator's 
thoughtlessness, but it has now concluded in a new 
Supreme Court doctrine. very much in tune with 
recent assumptions that greater control ni what 
students ££Ad. and say equals a better education■ 
Behind these assumptions lies a fear that student 
freedoms lead only to recklessness and obscenity. 
To those who believe this, the best reply lies in 
a decision rendered in 1977 by a federal district 
court. . .but ignored by White and his colleagues: 
'The state cannot constitutionally restrict 
anyones' First Amendment rights, including those 
of students, because of mere apprehension of what 
they might do with them. (p. 18; emphasis added)
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The CJR editorial reveals a sensitivity to issues of 
pedagogy that is almost totally absent fron any of the 
other journalism industry publications reviewed for this 
study. As the highlighted portion of the citation above 
demonstrates, the writer of the piece is attuned to and wary 
of recent (over the last five years) educational reform 
proposals and the agendas they support.
W J R . The other of the nationally recogn ized press 
reviews, the University of Maryland's Washington Press 
Review. presents a much more equivocal picture than do 
either The Q u i 11 or C J R . The featured piece, flagged in 
bold faced type in the table of contents, in the March WJR 
is a column by Lyle Denniston, Supreme Court correspondent 
for the Baltimore S u n . Denniston s (1888) story is much 
more in the fashion of the ANPA/ASNE approach: balanced, 
‘'objective," and bland. Denniston notes that a "golden era" 
of student press freedom has passed, and that "students' 
only hope (is) recruiting the grown-ups in the regular press 
as their allies" (p. 12). Unlike Dorfman's column in The
Qu i1 1 . Denniston offers no plan to implement, however.
Rather, he is content to recount what the decision means to 
high school journalists, after a tortuous (but no more so 
than the instant case) retelling of the waxing and waning of 
the "golden age."
The piece finishes with a wait-and-see attitude about 
the case, noting blandly that school officials may either 
censor or not, but they c a n . without further fear of
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reproach, if they want to. "In one manner of speaking," 
Denniston (1888) writes,
the court...has simply handed editorial control 
back to the managers...uItimately the principal and 
the school board....They could declare a school 
publication to be an 'open forum'....Or officials 
may go to the opposite extreme... with freedom 
1 imited entirely to what the principal is willing 
to allow. Kuhlme ier makes it constitutionally
easy, and permissible to do the latter, (p. 12)
One waits in vain for the other shoe to drop, for the 
"but..." to appear, for a caveat addressed to journalists, 
or for a sense that the writer appreciates the magnitude of 
the dec is ion or of its potent ia1 for abuse to infuse his 
discourse. This is, after all, (a) a column and therefore 
under the conventions of journalism a space in which the
expression of an opinion is permitted and (b) a column by
one of the press's watchdogs, a beat reporter who covers the 
institution and theoretically should have both special 
knowledge and authority to speak critically. But he never 
does. The closest Denniston (1988) comes to a critique is 
in the second-to-last paragraph:
If school officials opt for the strict-controls
approach, the court stressed, the First Amendment
will not stand in their way. Thus, censorship may
be imposed even if a student publication does not
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actually disrupt anything else at the school, 
breaks no laws or violates no one's rights. Until 
the Haze 1wood ruling, a publication that did none 
of those things had First Amendment protection.
<P. 12)
More telling of the W J R ' s position in the debate is a 
piece on the previous pages of the same issue under the 
interesting headline "Censor Relaxes at Hazelwood" (Bertelson, 
1968 ). In this signed story, running about a page in t o t o . 
free-lancer Christine Bertelson reports, apparently deadpan, 
that :
1. "The most controversial subject to cross [principal] 
Reynolds' desk has been whether to allow the yearbook to run 
a picture of a student apparently baring his derriere." [It 
was a costume, so the principal let it go.]
2. " ‘Now that we know where we are there is no
guesswork, ' [Reynolds] said. . . .If I can support my decision 
with reason, logic and common sense, 1 will win in the courts 
every t i m e .
3. "For the last few years, the school lunch menus have
made more interesting reading than Tile. Spectrum . . ,'The paper
has been a little dull--no very dull,' says Cheryl Stoller, 
the journalism t e a c h e r . ...'Maybe because I was looking over 
their shoulders it had a chilling effect and they steered 
clear of con t r o v e r s y , ' Reynolds muses."
4. T h e  c o - e d i t o r ,  w h o  " a g r e e s  w i t h  the S u p r e m e  C o u r t  
d e c i s i o n . .. t h i n k s  a s t u d e n t  n e w s p a p e r  s h o u l d  d e v o t e  its
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coverage to sports, academics, movie reviews and other issues 
of direct concern to students. We decided to stay away from 
the presidential race this year. . .We are bored of hearing 
abou t it.'"
5. Reynolds "approved" of an editorial cartoon that 
reads: "Attention, All Students! Please Check All Rights at
the Front Office. Thank You."
6. "Reynolds says he does not have a policy of prior 
review of all articles. He leaves that up to Stoller."
7. "Stoller is not interested in creating controversy... 
‘I don't see anything wrong with writing about football and 
dances. I am here to develop their writing skills. [Having 
students] writing in complete sentences sounds wonderful to 
me . (p p . 10-11)
It is difficult to tell from the prose whether there is 
any irony intended by the presentation of the Bertel son ' s 
piece. However, the headline ("Censor Relaxes at Hazelwood 
High"), along with its context in the moment of its 
presentation, and the general tone of the piece all suggest 
it was written straight. It is possible, nonetheless, to 
read the headline two ways: either that the censor has
relaxed his controls, or that he was tense with uncertainty 
that his high-handedness would be approved but is now 
vindicated and therefore relaxed enough about it that he can 
afford a little self-deprecating humor. In either case, the 
headline (perhaps unintentionally) implies one official's
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perception of the state and status for the high school
press. That it is not unique, and that it is inherently
dangerous to both the aspirations of students and the entire
institution of the free press as an agent for democracy are
issues I discuss in the next section of this study.
Hazelwood. the School, and the Press
Judicial interpretation of the First Amendment has
increasingly over the last 75 years acknowledged sone
limitations on freedom of expression. The press may be held
culpable and liable for the malicious reporting of
falsehoods, for example, or for violating community
standards against obscenity; and there is the standard of
the "clear and present danger." The scholastic press, which
was the focus of the HazeIwood decision, has been held to an
even stricter standard, one which by which it was enj o ined
not to materially disrupt the other activities of the
school, in addition to requirements not to violate laws or
18
infringe on others' rights.
Hew T e s t s . Special Circumstances^ and Higher Standards: Some 
Implications
The Hazelwood Court also, however, upheld the authority 
of administrators and other school officials to censor or 
suppress student publications and other expressive media 
even if the publication did none of those things. Justice 
White's opinion allows (and perhaps might be read even to 
require) censorship/suppression and punishment of student 
expression under three additional conditions: if/when school
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officials judged either (a) that the content of the public 
expression was unsuitable for (even only some) students, or 
(b) that its presentation was technically deficient, or (c) 
that its effect would be to cast the school in an appearance 
of endorsing controversial opinions or positions. There is, 
however, no test adumbrated for the severity of official 
punishments that night be neted out for violations of these 
standards. That is left entirely to the discretion of the 
principal/publisher. In the "real" world, a reporter or an 
editor who resigns or is disnissed over a disagreenent with 
a publisher has only to pack up and n o v e . That option is 
not viable for nost students, and the scope of the 
punishnents available to the principal/publisher is of 
potentially far greater inpact on a young journalist than on 
an adult veteran with a good clip file and a way with words.
In a society that bestows its largesse on the basis of 
credentials, there is little question that the schools 
already have it within their authority to fundanentally 
affect the lives of students in danaging ways. Quite 
clearly, then, the criteria for decisions regard ing and 
suppressing certain student expressions as inappropriate or 
unsuitable for certain audiences nay be irremediably 
arbitrary and potentially dangerously capricious. When 
coupled with the implicit power of the schools to sunnarily 
punish --with failing grades, denial of credentials, 
detention, suspension, and/or expulsion-- either
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unintentional lapses or purposeful challenges, the carceral 
and coersive quality of the decision is such that Foucault 
would recognize it as a further exercise of disciplinary 
technology in the service of power against action.
Justice Brennan, in his Hazelwood dissent, pointed to 
the "Orwellian" dimension of school administrations who 
might come to believe themselves as judicially sanctioned 
"thought police," empowered to assume the "guardianship of 
the public mind" (at 576-580). Yet even Brennan's dissent 
to an extent glorifies the actions of school censors who, as 
Steven Visser (1987) reported in The Nation some months 
prior to the announcement of the decision, may undertake 
their "responsibility" to suppress speech for utterly venal 
and self-interested reasons having nothing whatever to do 
with either the curriculum or with the legitimate 
educational mission of the school.
As for the second test, of technical deficiency in 
grammar, or research skills, or other presumptively 
objective criteria, even Justice Brennan concurred in that 
reasoning, noting that official intervention in the 
publication of material that was deficient in those regards 
is justified "because to reward such expression would 
materially disrupt' the newspaper's curricular purpose" (at 
578). Surely, candidacy for protection of speech or 
expression by the First Amendment is illegitimately withheld 
on grounds of defiencies in grammar, spelling, or other such 
technical errors. Yet such is the pervasiveness and the
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strength of the technocratic rationality in education, at 
least, that Justice Brennan's otherwise wise and liberal 
discourse is seduced by it, and he can advocate just such a 
course.
However discouraging the rhetoric and recondite the 
logic of the two prior tests may be, the third test for the 
permissib1itiy of school censorship is the more frightening, 
for instantiates and naturalizes the ideology of control 
under the aegis of "imprimatur.'' School this reading is a 
unique social institution to be in the position of having to 
be held positively respons ible for anything it does not 
explicitly oppose or suppress. Rather, it is constructed 
that way by those who impute to the institution the 
authority to approve knowledge. That is the only legitimate 
reason for then reifying the imprimatur which the school is 
seen to confer on the knowledge in which it deals. In that 
case, it makes sense to confer upon the schoo1 such a role, 
for it presupposes the legitimizing function --as well as the 
delegitimizing authority-- of officials who stipulate what 
knowledge is valuable, even though value is presumed to be a 
meaningless category where knowledge is concerned. Such a 
position makes sense from the point of view of institutions 
which recognize only exchange-value and devalue use-value, 
i.e., a market driven institution, and those in which the 
knowledge and appreciation of human freedoms is either 
systematically obscured or ignored. Schools may fit in both
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of these categories, "real world" or imagined.
Antagonistic Administrators, Ignorant Advisers; The Real 
World oZ the Scholastic Press
For the scholastic press, this is the world of
conflicting values which find expression at the polls during 
school bond elections. As creatures much dependent upon such 
express ions, adm inistrators are concerned primarily t hat 
the only images presented by their schools are positive. If 
this means that the school paper be a newspaper in name 
only, and in reality be nothing more than the public 
relations o rg an of t he adm in i strat ion, t hen that is what i t 
shall b e . "Says John Fredrick, co-editor of the Spectrum.
[ReynoIds] d o e s n 't want more negative publicity for himse1f 
and the district (Bertelson, 1988, p. 11; emphasis added).
As noted previously, this situation is not unique to
Hazelwood East High. Even prior to the Hazelwood decision, 
the Student Press Law Center (SPLC) had reported being 
apprised of 300-500 cases annually of "censorship or 
constitutionally suspect punishment for publication" (Gillmor 
& Barron, 1984, p. 717.) Within the first months after 
Hazelwood. according to SPLC executive director Hark Goodman, 
the Center had already noted a "significant increase in the 
number of (reports of) principals demanding to review all 
copy before going to press" (in Fraser, 1988, p. 12).
Such an increase is consonant with the results of both 
a recently reported national survey of high school principals 
and journalism advisers attitudes and knowledge on the
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subject of control of the student press (Click & Ropenhaver, 
1988), and another of similar scope conducted earlier in the 
decade (Kristof, 1983). The studies revealed that there 
already existed a strong predisposition among school 
officials --and among a surprising number of school 
newspaper advisers as well-- to stifle student expression in 
favor of school discipline. Inasmuch as I have already 
referred to the 1983 study, I shall here concentrate on the 
more recent one.
The latter research, conducted by William Click and 
Lillian Ropenhaver (1988) found that "while most .,. 
principals and newspaper advisers believe in the importance 
of a free press, they also believe that maintaining 
discipline is more important" (p, 48). Discipline is 
maintained, according to from 20 to 30 percent of 
principals, when "articles critical of the school board, 
local politicans, teachers, and administrators" are banned 
from school papers (p. 49). Other "harmful" stories would be 
prohibited by "more than two-thirds of the principals. . . 
even if they are not libelous, obscene or disruptive" (p.
51). A smaller, but still a surprising large , number of 
advisers were found to be in agreement with principals: 10-
22 percent in the first case (p. 48), and more than one- 
third" (p. 51) in the second. The researchers hypothesized
that "advisers should understand the principles of press 
freedom and ethics (and) would tend to differ significantly
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from principals in defending and ensuring student press 
freedom" (p. 51). That "the degree of difference between 
the two is not very strong" they attribute to the fact that 
"many (advisers) are unqualified or marginally qualified in 
journalism and are alone in their schools" (p. 51).
The data for this study were collected in 1984-85, well 
in advance of the Hazelwood decision. But rather than 
calling the issue into question, this factor indicates the 
depth and duration of the ant ipathy with which the project of 
scholastic journalism is regarded in the schools. Student 
press rights had, until Hazelwood. been protected under the 
umbrella of T i n k e r . Since T i n k e r . however, school officials 
have continued to seek, and have since the advent of the 
Reagan Court been increasingly successful in finding, 
pretexts for controlling and limiting students' expression. 
Judging from the reactions of officials to the Hazelwood 
case, the decision may have been just the prescription 
administrators had been waiting for ("Civics," 1988; see 
also Fraser, 1988). The opinion seems to have legitimated 
the antipathy --or at least disquiet-- that school officials 
had long felt toward the student press.
Given that, as Click and Ropenhaver (1988) reported, 
the quality of school journalism advisers leaves much to be 
desired and that, as Visser (1987) points out, the 
precarious position of even the best of them in politically 
highly charged situations is often inimical to their bucking 
higher authority, if students cannot look to be supported in
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their schools by advisers "unqualified or marginally 
qualified in journalism," we might suppose at least that 
students should be able to look for and expect to find 
support in the professional press communities. As I have 
indicated above, however, this has not been the case, for 
reasons which are implicated in the very logics by which the 
Justices were able to rationalize their decision.
The P .S . 21 C o l o n y . The overall effect and the logic
of the Hazelwood decision might be better described and
understood at a remove from the school, where the
contradictions arising from the contrast of wisdom with
expediency is in sharper relief. Consider the following
hypothetical case: The Court upholds the authority of a
certain class of certifiably expert, Government-employed
administrators, managers, and supervisors to interfere at
will in the public expressions of a disorganized, albeit
transient, nevertheless numerous minority of citizens.
Moreover, the opinion permits those experts to suppress, on
a myriad of technical grounds --"for example, ungrammatical,
poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or
prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for [certain]
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audiences" -- the public discussion of ideas, opinions, and 
thoughts that the experts deem unsuitable for those citizens 
to consider. The range of expression affected includes 
artistic, creative, cultural, informational, performative, 
political, rhetorical, sexual, and social speech made public
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in any Governrent-sponsored forun--including art exhibits, 
books, broadcasts, newspapers, and the theater--where those 
citizens are under the supervision of the aforerentioned 
experts. Such suppression ray be irposed on the rere 
suspicion that sore unspecified upset right occur, and is 
not susceptible to any challenge by those whose speech is 
censored or suppressed.
Posed this way, it is difficult to iragine the opinion 
to have been issued with respect to otherwise valued 
citizens in any kind of a derocracy. This is an edict for 
ranaging a penal colony, sore bizarre and treacherous Gulag, 
perhaps, or Nurse Ratchitt's ward. It ray have been an 
understanding sirilar to this one which inspired one high 
school journalist to rerark in the pages of The B u 1letin 
of the Arerican Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) that 
"This sounds strikingly sirilar to the way the Soviet press 
is set up" (Two students..., 1988, p. 7). Indeed, the 
Soviet press is arguably no less liberal. In an analysis 
entitled "Press freedor in the Corrunist world," Colurbia 
University Journalisr School professor Donald Shanor (1983) 
rakes the following point;
The concept of press freedor in the Corrunist 
world is. . .what the governrent agrees to grant to 
citizens in order to achieve certain ends. 
Despite high-sounding phrases...freedor of the 
press, of asserbly, and of expression are not 
rights that citizens enjoy but lirited priveleges
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that regimes sonetines pernit to further their own 
g o a l s . (p . 327 )
Here we night recall Justice Fortas' adnonition to 
school officials about eschewing the totalitartian potential 
of the institution, and Nelson's (1974) conclusions in 
Captive Voices. Shanor's description of the Soviet press 
far nore closely resenbles the future for the post-Haze1wood 
scholastic press in Anerica than it does a press, or even a 
curricular exercise, in a society which ostensibly honors 
the values --freedons of assenbly, the press, and 
expression-- which Shanor inplies the "Communist world" 
alone lakes a mockery of, or abrogates in the furtherance of 
their own g o a l s .
According to Louis Day and John Butler (1988), the 
majority opinion of Justice White relied upon a particular 
tradition of assumptions and conceptions which touch the 
nature both of schools and the press. The schools' "basic 
educational nission" (at 565), in Day's and Butler's reading 
of the opinion, is located in the traditional, "cultural 
transmission" theory of the curriculum. The majority 
opinion upholding "cultural transmission" as the purpose for 
the curriculum is an instrumentalist, positivist model, as 
much at home in bureaucratic socialism as in technocratic 
capitalism. This model conceives of education and 
socialization as isomorphic and homologous. It constructs 
education as a process of socialization which aims at
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indoctrinating students to invariant social and noral 
verities toward ends that are predetermined and predefined.
Although this curricular dogma frames much of the logic 
employed by the Court in arriving at the Hazelwood decision, 
William Stanley (196 5), in an exhaustive examination of the 
traditions of social education curricula, has shown that 
there is by no means a consensus among social educators 
about the appropriateness of the model. Nevertheless, the 
Court's adoption of cultural transmission as the preferred 
'mission' of the schools reifies the least democratic 
possible vision of schooling. As I shall attempt to show in 
the next part of this paper, it has implications for the 
press as w e 11.
The Post-Hazelwood Scholastic
In the words of Robert Knight (1988), an academic 
journalist assaying the possible repercussions of the 
decision, the Court simply "returned control of school 
publications” (p. 42) to school officials. Justice White 
recognized an explicit homology between school officials and 
the publishers of non-school publications. However, as 
Knight also noted, the opinion presents a danger: future
scholastic journalists may not receive the educational 
experiences and preparation necessary to foster in them the 
requisite critical consciousness and faculties for the 
crucial roles that society demands of the press. And not 
only future journalists are likely to be affected: "All
public school students might be deprived of real
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understanding of the role of the press in a free society"
(P. 42).
Although no particular theory of the press is expressly 
or aff i rnat ively art iculated in the op in ion, such a theory 
is captured in Justice White's approving citation the 
"lessons to be learned" as they were art iculated in the 
Hazelwood High School Journalisn II curriculum guide: 
enphasizing the "developnent of journa1istic skills under 
deadline pressure," along with "responsibility and 
acceptance of criticism for articles of opinion," White 
equates such attitudes and skills with "legal, moral, and 
ethical restrictions imposed on journalists..." (at 569).
The only reference to the First Amendment freedom of the 
press is in the negative: "...rights of students in the
public schools 'are not coextensive with the rights of 
adults in other settings,..." (at 567). This wouId appear 
to be a s ign ificant part of the “lesson s the activity was 
designed to impart.
That lesson is at odds with the precedent expressed in 
T i n k e r . in which Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, 
strongly urged
Students may not be regarded as closed-circuit
recipients of only that which the state wishes to
commun icate. They may not be con fined to the
expression of ... sentiments that are officially
approved. In the absence of a specific showing of
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constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their 
speech, students are entitled to freedom of 
expression of their views, (at 507)
Justice Brennan's sentiments in his dissent from ‘the 
obscure tangle of excuses" (at 576) employed by the majority 
to justify permitting schools more authority in controlling 
student expression reverberate with apprehension. Even the 
fact that such expression might be perceived, as in this 
case, to be schoo1-sponsored expression, Brennan argued that 
this was in effect a subterfuge that was flimsy grounds for 
permitting "content discrimination." Sanctioning such 
content discrimination, he argued, conceals "official 
censorship designed to shield the audience or dissociate the 
sponsor from the expression" (Hazelwood at 578). He 
castigates the purblindness of his colleagues to the 
possibility the "(c )ensorship so motivated might well serve 
(although [it] cannot legitimately serve) some other school 
purpose" (at 578). But it in no way furthers the curricular 
function of even a school newspaper, "unless one believes 
that the purpose of the school newspaper is to teach 
students that the press ought never report bad news, express 
unpopular views, or print a thought that might upset its 
sponsors" (at 584; emphasis in the original).
Implicitly, the same end is held out as the purpose 
of journalism as is described for the curriculum. The press 
is conceived as the private, proprietary instrument of the 
publisher to be employed in whatever way she deems fit, only
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constrained by market forces in the "real world." By its 
action in the Hazelwood case, the Court has also made, 
inplicity, the same claim about the commercial press, at 
least insofar as its future practitioners are concerned. The 
"chilling effect" certainly will not be lost upon nor 
misinterpreted by student journalists. It is the lesson of 
the constant tension between freedom and power.
Summary
As we have seen, the Hazelwood decision affords an 
opportunity to examine the currently dominant conceptions of 
the fields of journalism and pedagogy where their parallel 
discursive formations and social practices, intersect and 
overlap within the public view. Most often, as we have 
seen, they maintain a scrupulous public distance while 
engaging in a kind of covert commensa1 i sm. However, in 
January, 1988, the U.S. Supreme Court provided such an 
instance in the case of Hazelwood: a moment when the 
intersection of the state's interests in and for two of its 
principal actors in an hegemonic struggle becomes visible 
and available for analysis.
In an opinion which well may gravely affect the 
education of prospective journalists, and not incidentally 
the education of other students as well, the Court held that 
scholastic journalists' First Amendment rights had not been 
violated by the censorship of certain articles in a high 
school newspaper in effect because, as students, they did
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not have those rights to begin with (at 570); and even if 
they had had then, the schools were entitled to abrogate 
then in the cause of the technocratic concept ion of the 
curr iculun.
Justice White, in the majority opinion, deferred to 
school officials' curricular authority to exercise 
"editorial control over style and content of student speech 
in schoo1-sponsored expressive activities as long as their 
actions are reasonably related to legitinate pedagogical 
concerns’" (at 571). The doninant issue, for Justice White, 
and for Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, O'Connor, and Stevens 
who joined hin, was that the school newspaper, prior to any 
other const ruetion of its identity, was part of the 
curriculum, over which "educators are entitled to exercise 
greater control...to assure that participants learn whatever 
lessons the activity was designed to teach, . (at 575).
In the articles that were expunged, students were doing 
no more than expressing their views, on the perils and 
problems of teen-age pregnancy and on the ir percept ions of 
the causes and effects of broken homes. In Hazelwood, the 
argument of the majority sought to disguise viewpoint 
discrimination behind a screen of newly fledged "valid 
reasons." The student journalists were not and will not be 
the last ones to learn that lesson.
Apparently the "lessons" the majority opinion of the 
Court thought important had been learned well in advance of 
the opinion. By accounts such as Dorfman's (1988), and
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Bertelson's (1988), Hazelwood East High has been a pretty 
quiet place of late. NBC News had a crew at the school the 
day the decision was announced. The Spectrun's current 
editors placidly told NBC, and NBC told the nation, "we 
don't do anything controversial (Dorfman, 1988, p. 12).
As I have shown, in the immediate a f t e m a t h  of Hazelwood 
there was evidence of substantial ambivalence anong working 
journalists --or at least in their papers-- to the plight of 
student journalists. Reaction to the decision by 
journalists working in academe and in the professional press 
was equivocal, at best (Konopak, 1988). As reported in 
Ed itor & Publisher. the weekly periodical widely regarded as 
the bible of the industry, "High school papers aren't 
getting a lot of support from their elders in the newspaper 
industry" (Fitzgerald, 1988, p. 11). E & F ' s lead article in 
the second issue after the decision came down reported the 
editorial positions of ID "randomly selected" medium -to- 
large dailies. Of the 10, only one, the Miami H e r a l d . 
unequivocally criticized the decision.
There were a number of recurrent themes apparent in 
newspaper editorials of the period immediately following the 
announcement of the decision. Primary among them was this:
If professional, commercial journalists must submit to the 
will of their publishers, why should students be held to 
have more rights than they. This theme was played out in 
editorials in cities as diverse and divergent as Salem, OR,
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Detroit, Chicago, St. Louis, Buffalo, and Bergen, N J .
Underlying this theme is the relation of the editorial 
writer with the publisher, and this, I believe, implicates 
the professional socialization of journalists from the 
earliest days of their exposure to their craft directly in 
the educational con t e x t .
The embattled position of the scholastic press has 
recently been highlighted by publicity and media attention 
focused on the Supreme Court's decision in the Hazelwood case, 
and stands in serious danger of being made officially what it 
had been long accused of being: house organ for school
administrations. This possibility --some (e.g., Dorfman,
1988) would say inevitability-- raises serious and troub1ing 
issues for both communications and curriculum theorists: Are 
schools and the press really benevolent agents in the 
process of creation and perpetuation of a vital, truly 
participatory democracy? Or do they function to impose 
social control for the benefit of the ruling elites (Cook, 
1985)? Is the press, under the influence of the relentless 
"good news" approach of, for example, USA T o d a y . tending 
toward a purely public relations--some, such as Michael 
Parenti (1986) would say ideological and propagandistic-- 
approach to news which pacifies rather than stimulates 
thought? Are the schools?
In a society which, like ours, relies so heavily upon 
both the press and the schools for the creation of an 
informed and involved populace for the maintenance of its
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democratic institutions, as well as for the creation of the 
knowledge of the problems and issues that are seen to beset 
those institutions (Edelman, I960), these are crucial 
issues. The way in which the Hazelwood Court's decision can 
be read as a response to the question of what it is for 
which we rely upon journalists and the press--even though it 
was not explicitly stated--suggests a disheartening 
prospect. But it presents an opportunity for both journalism 
and curriculum theory to explore and examine the theoretical 
justifications of the conventional wisdom on the role and 
place of education in society, the purposes for which the 
curriculum is constructed, the role of journalism as a
social and an educational heuristic, and the relations among
those three questions.
It is in response to these issues that an invest igat ion 
and a critique of the theories of culture and society, 
education, and communication either relied upon or
implicated in the Court's decision, as well as those in the
dissenting opinion proffered by Justice Brennan was called 
for and undertaken in this chapter. Regardless of the 
substantive First Amendment positions iterated in these 
opinions, it is clear from their disagreement that there are 
at least two competing hypotheses relating to the 
competences required of citizens in interpreting and acting 
upon the information supplied by the press, and to the very 
role of the press itself. The one, represented by White's
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opinion, expresses a positivist, technicalist, instrunental 
view. The other, Brennan's view, although it resides in 
essentially the sane discourse, the sane epistene. rebuts 
sone of the suppositions the najority relied upon, but 
upholds others.
It seens likely that these two discourses do not 
exhaust the possibilities for theorizing the relation 
between journalisn as social conpetence, the schools and the 
curriculun as avenues for the attainnent of that conpetence, 
and the ain of creating a just, liberal Anerican denocracy.
This project proposes to counterpoise a conception of 
education, and to elaborate a conception of the journalistic 
project, as processes which pernit persons to transcend 
their socialization and to attain civic and societal 
conpetence.
The Hazelwood opinion presents a difficult dilenna for 
educators and jounalists alike, one that is linked to the 
notion of a social responsibility of the press and the 
curriculun of the schools. Social responsibility is not a 
topic with unique relevancy only the the press. To the 
extent that we adnit the authority of the school in 
socializing the young, it is in, of, and toward to sone 
notion of social responsibility that educators are directing 
then. The curriculun, in effect, is the statenent of the 
principles by which social responsibility is to be both 
fostered and understood.
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In an ethical sense that transcends the limitations of 
both the discursive and social practices of the technical 
interests of the don inan t parad igm, the exigent social 
responsibility of both curriculun of the school and the 
press are at issue in the Hazelwood decision. Rather, they
are for the monent no longer at issue. In the sense that
Foucault neant in querying whether people under the 
influence of the espiteme of their age really know "what 
what they do does," we nay ask if the Court really knew 
"what what it said did." I have argued that it did. By its 
decision, the najority of the Court unanbiguously (and 
rather nore ambitiously than was perhaps necessary) in 
effect ruled that the school --represented by its official 
authorities; not, importantly, by its teachers or its 
students but rather by its administrators-- was entitled to 
suppress certain ideas if those ideas were felt to have the 
possibility of interfering with the "legitimate educational
mission of the school." As the Florida and California
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cases cited earlier show, that is how the decision is being 
interpreted, with the consequence that the freedom of all 
students to read, speak, and learn about important social 
knowledge is being impeded.
Freedom --for whom it is appropriate, who shall
exercise or limit it, who has or lacks it, who shall decide
what it means-- is a central concern in the discourses of 
many of the journalistic commentators. Power for Foucault 
( 1983), however, is not the antithesis of freedom; it is the
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necessary pre-condition which makes the exercise of power 
compelling. The two are tied together in a relation of 
mutual definition. Power cannot wrest freedom away. Freedom 
cannot be lost; it must be surrendered. The machineries by 
which surrender is made attractive are the political and 
disciplinary technologies. For Foucault, rather, the 
antipodal modality of freedom is discipline. Thus it has 
been the relation of submission to discipline in the power/ 
knowledge nexus that was examined here. In the next and 
final chapter, I pursue the implications of this realization 
and proffer some suggesti ons couched in terms of the pub lie 
sphere and social responsibility as an alternative discourse 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
INVENTING THE COUNTER-PUBLIC SPHERE: THE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY OF JOURNALISM AND PEDAGOGY
Human existence cannot be silent, nor can it be 
nourished by false words, but only by true words, 
with which men transform the world. To exist, 
humanly, is to name the world, to change it.... 
But while to say the true word --which is work, 
which is praxis--is to transform the world, saying 
that word is not the privilege of some few men, 
but the right of every man. ( F r e ir e, 1972, p. 72)
Every school child in America has learned about the 
purchase of Manhattan Island from the Indians by the clever 
colonists. A piece of property that would, upon the 
eventual triumph of the colonists over the natives, come to 
be of inestimable worth, was bought for some bolts of cloth, 
a few blankets, and some shiny trinkets. Children learn how 
the clever colonists got what they recognized as some 
incredibly valuable property at the price of some trifles. 
They are taught that the transaction typifies much of the 
future relations between the colonists and the Indians. The 
transaction was unequal; that is part of its allure for 
third graders, the age of the children when they are first 
presented with the story as knowledge to be learned as a
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part of their heritage.
A Lesson in Knowledge and Liberty
Of course the transaction was unequal. The indigenous 
population, coining into contact for the first tine with a 
system that placed an unfamiliar value on something the 
’’owners" either did not know they owned or had long taken 
for granted, gladly ceded away to purchasers their ownership 
of the island, and walked away happily wrapped in warmth, 
fingering their bolts of cloth and laughing at the pretty 
trinkets. That the Europeans had not offered guns or 
ploughs or other things that were of real value to them, for 
which the island would have been a more equal exchange is 
usefully ignored.
In this story, children are posited as having a natural 
affinity for, and an identification with the buyers, the 
clever colonists. It would be a long time (if ever) before 
those cohorts of third graders might learn to appreciate the 
consequences of that sale to the sellers, before they would 
learn that the blankets were infected with diseases against 
which the natives had no immunities, for example; diseases 
that would decimate their population within a generation or 
two. Third graders are innocent of the knowledge that the 
Indians would not understand what the exchange had meant 
until they tried to utilize the island in their accustomed 
way and were prevented from it. They would not know or be 
expected to understand that the Indians would not learn the
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true cost to themselves of transaction until they needed 
what they had traded away. That is the lesson of the 
purchase of Hanhattan, but school children are not taught 
the real import of the sale.
Nor would they typically be taught the import of the 
lesson on their own lives. That lesson is typically left to 
the school of hard knocks, or perhaps undergraduate courses, 
depending on the resources available to the individual. And 
even it they were taught it, if their elementary teacher 
were creative, or concerned, that lesson might be taught in 
a manner and a vocabulary that stressed the abstract 
aspects. But usually, it must be supposed, these concerns 
would be irrlelvant if the students' subjectivities were 
associated with their noble ancestors, were encouraged to 
think of themselves as clever colonists, not as Indians,
Roads Taken and Hot Taken: Summary and Speculation 
This study winds toward its conclusion by beginning 
with the proposition that has been perhaps implicit in much 
of what has gone before: In more of our relations than we
know, we are individually all Indians with respect to the 
knowledge we create, the liberties we possess, and the 
values we hold. Our culture is now engaged in --some,
Lyotard (1985) for example, would say it has almost 
completed-- the transformation of knowledge (and certainly 
already information; see Schiller, 1987) into commodities, 
like rice, clothes, cars, and bombs. The unadulterated 
economic model has postulated that cost-benefit analyses
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already dominate our political practices and color our views 
of our freedoms and their value (Parenti, 1977). We settle 
for rights, narrowly construed by the tenor of whatever 
court is called upon to interpret them in relation to laws. 
Submerged in this calculus, we are in danger of forgetting 
something important: Rights are what is left over after the
commerce in knowledge, liberty, and values has begun.
Rights are also ephemeral things, the products of those 
who would dominate. They are, so to speak, at best the 
pretty trinkets --at worst, the blankets-- from 
transactions between individuals and the state. The 
producers in these transactions, individuals, negotiate away 
their freedom to decide for themselves the constitution of 
reality, the ability to act upon it, and the power to assess 
its meaning and, form its meaning, its value. The terms are 
no longer open, the power to designate which commodities 
have an exchange value and to decide the value of those 
commodities having already accrued to the purchaser, the 
state. This is what Foucault (1970, 1972) meant with
respect to the relation of the power of discourse and the 
knowldege of power (1975, 1979, 1984). This may be
illustrated with another example.
The H ord and the A c t . Rev is i t e d . I argued in Chapters 
Two and Four, that there were relations between the kinds of 
knowledge expressed in the two infinitive configurations of 
the constitutive nature of language/speech: "to inform" and
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to enjoin.' I suggested that the recognition of this 
diversity had led to two distinct research programs, and 
that in consequence, much had been learned about the 
capacity of language to influence individuals' and groups' 
perceptions of the reality they inhabited. These 
developments had begun to take shape in Europe in the late 
stages of the Enlightenment but had found perhaps their 
ultimate expression in the (still unproven) Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis, which was developed during the early decades of 
this century (Hoijer, 1974).
Now, there seems to be a rough contemporaneity between 
the resurrection in consciousness of the constitutive agency 
of language, both with respect to meaning and with respect 
to action, with the onset of the bulk of First Amendment 
legal activity --almost all of which has been directed at 
defining and prescribing limitations upon permissible 
language and speech (Gillmor & Barron, 1984). Jurist and 
legal scholar Alexander Bickel (1975) notes, in one of his 
later observations on the history and the future of the 
First Amendment, that increased legal activity around the 
meaning and limits of the First Amendment began in earnest 
within the last three-quarters of a century.
That is roughly coincident with the emergence of 
theories of language which assign a determinative role to 
the vocabulary and grammar of speech (Hoijer, 1974, 
Mandelbaum, 1949; Whorf, 1952), and those theories of 
language that extend to speech the capacities and the
221
responsibilities of action (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969,
1975; Wittgenstein, 1953) which attribute to 'speech" the 
dimensions of action: consequentia1ity, effect, and 
intention. That is, during the period when the full import 
of the range possibilities of implied by evidence of the 
role of language in formulating existential conditions and 
the role of speech as action reached the public sphere of 
discourse, language and speech became public sites of 
hegemonic struggle in the U.S.
Bickel ( 197 5) avers that "an easy and uncontested 
freedom of speech and the press prevailed through most of 
the 19th Century" (p. 64). Oh, a few "abolitionists were 
sometimes dealt harshly with in the South and in some parts 
of the North and Border states (p. 64). But there was an
overall "consensus and freedom" (p. 65). However, that easy 
uncontested freedom underwent a fairly abrupt turnaround 
late in the 19th and in the early decades of the 20th 
Centuries. Bickel says (p. 65) that a rising tide social
unrest provoked by "[t ]he movement for industrial justice 
[which] disturbed the concensus gave rise to" state 
legislatures' attempts to harness what would, in my scheme, 
be called enjunctive speech.
Bickel (1975) does not --perhaps cannot-- explain why, 
if newly tumultuous social conditions made the legal 
activity necessary, the opinions in the decisions that were 
rendered enunciated the doctrines that they did. Those, by
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and large (an especially early) were rendered on the side of 
constraining language and restricting speech (e.g., Gillnor 
& Barron, 1984). The answers reside in the Foucauldian 
analytic, and the Haberuasian one as well --in the relations 
of imperatives of power and its instrument technocracy as I 
have attempted to show in this document. The implications 
of this revelation of what had hitherto been a private 
struggle --or at least, one carried on below the surface of 
public discourse-- are (or should be) of importance to both 
communicators and educators concerned with the emancipation 
of their discourses, their students, their readers.
The M a r k e t . Redivivus. The market for knowledge, 
liberty and such is, then, a priori a buyers' market, in 
which the purchaser knows more about the product than the 
producer. The transaction occurs in a market wherein, by 
the time that the commerce has begun, a basic inequality 
has been constructed between the two parties in the 
negotiation which always favors the purchaser. The relation 
is classically colonial and is, I believe, what the critical 
theorists cited in the previous chapter (e.g., Habermas, 
1984; Hallin, 1985; Misgeld, 1985) have in mind when they 
use the term colonization to signify the increasing 
domination of the every-day forms of living by the 
imperatives of technocratically driven rationalisms which 
serve to naturalize the predations of the 'private" sphere 
on both the public and the intimate spheres upon which it 
feeds in order to survive.
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Social Ecology cl Technocracy
In fact, the ecological Metaphor is apt. Technocratic 
rationalisn advances itself by means of such categories as 
progress, development, civilization, etc. (Foucault, 1970, 
1975), These constructs are amplified by what might be 
called the myth of specialization, by which human energy and 
technolog ica 1 prowess is seen as the antidote to excess ive 
exploitation: there is no need for concern about the
deterioration, the thing that made us great will come up 
with the answers to save us now. Don't worry, be happy.
However, by any criteria with which "human science" 
(Foucault, 1970) would regard or attempt to measure non­
human speciation, humans must begin to consider themselves 
unsuccessful. A biological-scientifically successful animal 
species in its natural environment consumes its sustenance 
from a limited segment of the ecology in which it resides. 
Humans have learned to be all-consuming. An animal species 
that over-consumes the resources of its sustenance undergoes 
population control. It breeds fewer replacements, its 
predators multiply as its resource-fu11-ness increases. As 
it diminishes in an environment, the species consumes less; 
there are fewer consumers, until its own sustaining 
resources restore themselves. The numbers of its predators 
therefore diminish, unless the species utterly exhausts its 
own sustaining resources. Then it extincts.
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The most specialized living beings are those which rely 
on the narrowest range of resources for their sustenance. 
Because humans are all-consuming, it is therefore not only a 
self-serving misnomer but also a dangerous misconception to 
regard them as the most specialized animals. Wild things 
live as long as a butterfly lives...long enough, as novelist 
Tom Robbins (1974) put it in his wildly funny, but also 
prescient and troubling novel, Another Roads ide At tract i on.
Humanity has sought ways to escape this natural 
imperative. Under the aegis of technocracy, humans have 
arrogated to themselves the power to declare: Howsoever long 
that may be, it isn't long enough. We seem so far with 
apparent impunity to have been the only species that could 
consciously-- that is, un-naturally-- desire an extended 
life-span for its individual members and to accomplish it: 
could know what could happen before it happened. Humans 
have harnessed the power to engulf everything, including 
their natural predators, into the ambit of their sustaining 
resources. They have also created ways of passing on that 
power to their offspr ing.
Communication and Education. Again
The primary way is, in both cases, knowledge.
Knowledge is the source and the guage of humanity's 
historical success. But it is also the fate that abides: 
knowledge is humanity's inescapable destiny. In the power 
of knowledge resides the knowledge of power. Humans know, 
can say it before it happens, what happens to species which
2 2 5
exhaust their resources.
Our power reveals its price in the very knowledge they 
use to harness it. Consuming everything, they have the 
planetarily unheard of potential to exhaust everything. The 
species which knows that it extends its own life-span, and 
does so by learning to be omnivorous, owes itself --though 
itself least of all-- at least the responsibility of the 
survival of the resources it consumes. This is its social 
respons ib ility; this mus t be t he knowledge t hat informs 
every educator and every communicator on every occasion of 
social communication and education.
Naming of Parta, Badux
In previous chapters of this study, I have drawn 
attention to various dimensions of the relations between 
communication and education generally, and between 
journalism and pedagogy in particular, in the context of the 
requirement for active citizen participation in democratic 
society. These relations were thought to be important in 
light of three purposes for which this project was undertaken:
1. To recuperate the rhetoric and the morality of 
journalistic social responsibility theory as the 
grounds for rerationalizing education as 
preparation by citizens for participation in an 
institutional "public sphere,"
2. To historically locate and describe a model 
from which a heuristically and communicatively
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compelling version of that institution could be 
constructed, and
3. To suggest that journalists and teachers could 
define their professional praxis in terns of their 
contributions to the (re )ensctment of that n o d e l . 
To these ends, this study enployed five chapters, drawing 
fron the literatures of connunication (especially theories 
of journalism), education (especially curriculum theory), 
along with history, sociology, and philosophy. I review 
these efforts here.
Chapter T w o . In this chapter, Two, following on socio­
linguist Basil Bernstein's (1974) injunction to investigate 
those natters that appeared to be obvious, I traced out the 
development of two skeins of thought about the effects, 
functions, and purposes, of the language/speech relation. I 
noted that, in essential accordance with Michael Stubbs's 
observation that languages may inform and enjoin but never 
do neither nor either exclusively, there were two divergent 
but not mutually exclusive patterns in the social fabric of 
which language is, at all events, a fundamental part.
Further on in Chapter Two, this study examined the 
"obvious" and the taken-for-granted conjunctures where the 
projects of communication and education both overlapped and 
diverged in the existential communities of teachers and 
journalists, showing that they shared more in common than 
perhaps they realized. I also described the functional and
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structural parallelisms that inhabit the discourses by which 
the two enterprises are defined, and highlighted the places 
at which their institutional discursive practices diverged 
fron their publicly proclaimed and accepted rhetorics.
Following up an assertion I made in Chapter One, I examined 
the assumptions that undergird the hallowed requirement for 
an informed and active citizenry, and found it sound though 
its instantiation in public discourse was threatened.
Chapter T h r e e . One of the key elements for the 
establishment and maintenance of emancipatory democracy to 
which I referred with considerable emphasis and frequency in 
the opening chapter of this study was the necessity of 
defining such democratic praxis in terms of an enterprise 
situated and enacted in the public sphere. In Chapter Three 
I advanced an interpretation of the histories of journalism 
(in particular) and education and the conditions under which 
they developed toward modernity. Noting the technological 
and theological roots of the two processes from the 
Reformation through the advent of modernity in the 
Enlightenment, I argued that the conditions which spawned 
the emancipatory telos of modernity also contained the seeds 
of its contradiction in technocracy. I grounded the basis 
for the conception of the public sphere in this period, and 
examined the recent critical theoretical literature in which 
the concept figures prominently (e.g., Eagleton, 1984;
Forester, 1965; Habermas, 1971, 1973, 1974, 1984, 1987;
Hallin, 1985; Hisgeld, 1985). The concept of the public
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sphere has been a casualty of the irruption in the past 
Century of technical rationality and instrumental logic as 
they have come to dominate public discourse. A symptom of 
this domination is the fascination with and almost exclusive 
emphas is in the press as well as in the schools on the 
strategies and tactics of political arrangements rather than 
on the effects of policies on individuals, communities and 
the general public weal (Hallin, 1885).
Then, pursuant to the objects of this project outlined 
a b ove, I exam in ed the discourse on the subject of social 
responsibility. In particular, I responded to its critics 
(e.g., Altschull, 1984; Merrill, 1974), and proposed it as 
an antidote to the technocratic determinism that I found 
manifested in the con temporary theories and practices of 
journalism and pedagogy. I finally recapitulated the 
critical theorists' discussions of technocratic rationality 
as it affects the schools and the press.
Chanter Four . In this part of the study, I described 
Haze 1wood decision as an example of that threat. After 
first reviewing and examining critically the discourse of 
the case, and outlining the brief tradition of more 
tolerance for student speech which it rescinded, I briefly 
introduced the analytic described by Foucault (1970, 1972,
1973, 1975, 1979) by which he sought to comprehend and to
understand the operations of discourses generally, the 
discourses of human science particularly, and the
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fundamental position occupied by those practices and 
formations in the and t h e  power/ knowledge (p q u voir/savoir) 
relation.
The discussion of the Hazelwood opinion also served to 
illuminate how technically circumscribed skills imported 
from another domain (i.e., the news business) may be used to 
justify impeding students' (or others') impulses to 
appropriate and publicly represent certain of their own 
experiences and knowledges in the context of schooling. To 
the extent that th^ Haze1wood decision referred, and thus in 
an important way deferred, to the professional conventions 
and practices of commercial journalism, as well as to the 
cu 1tura1-transmission view of the aims, goals, and purposes 
of education in arriving at its decision, the Supreme Court 
relied on what Habermas among others has called technocratic 
consciousness. This view was demonstrated in an extended 
analysis of a body of documentary evidence which had 
appeared in the mainstream press, the press professional and 
trade association publications, and the "respectable” 
critical literature of the journalism establishment in the 
immediate aftermath of the announcement of the decision.
This documentary analysis supported the Foucauldian 
interpretation of the decision by showing how technically 
constituted barriers may be erected to effect anti- and/or 
counter-democratic, managerial ends of control, discipline, 
and dominance. Allegations of technical insufficiencies 
such as grammatical errors, or alleged failures to comply
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with or reflect constraints transplanted to the school 
milieu from outside the school (even the threat to unmask 
Santa Claus!) served to disguise these st rategi c moves 
behind a discourse contrasting a liberty with an alleged 
functional necessity and finding for the alleged necessity.
In summary, in Chapter Four, I suggested that the aims 
and goals of American teachers and journalists, while 
similar insofar as they were cognates of the same process 
(Chapter Two), seem to be largely constrained by 
instrumental reason and control - o r i e n t e d , technocratic 
rationality I argued that these discursive formations 
militate against the democratic interests of empowering 
citizens either to compete with the hegemonic discourses of 
established disciplinary technologies or to found counter 
hegemonic discourses based on citizens legitimate 
interpretations of their own life-experiences.
Social Responsibility for Journalists and Teachers
In previous chapters, I took up a discussion of the 
decline of the public sphere and the concomm itant increase 
in interest in the intimate (a matter which, though not 
taken up directly by Foucault, is implicated in his 
discussions of the rise of the human sciences as instruments 
of domination in the knowledge/power relation). In this 
chapter, I bring these themes to a close (as much and/or as 
little as that may be accomplished). To this point I have 
attempted to argue that the re-invention of a public sphere.
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or at least the conditions in which a public sphere could 
prosper, is the proper focus and necessary locus for a 
theory of social responsibility that the theory has hitherto 
been accused of lacking.
I have alsn argued that, in the project of engendering 
those conditions (at a nininun) or in the out-right creation 
of it, teachers and journalists are natural allies whose 
affinities lie in their commitment to the language/speech 
relation as I have thematized it by deploying the 
informative/enjunctive relation. And I have argued that the 
natural field for their cooperation is in a re-invented 
public sphere whose perimeters challenge the invidious 
blurring, indeed the almost total obliteration, of the 
distinctions among the intimate, the private and the public, 
by which technocratic colonization not only of the life- 
world, but of the life-word goes forward unchecked. It only 
remains to me to attempt a suggestive path along which those 
perimeters may be marked.
As this one last excursus into the historical 
conditions of journalism and education will show, we need 
not search in the structures institutions themselves for the 
trail. This involves the interesting but by now perhaps 
not unexpected congruence and simultaneously a dyssynchrony 
in the historical development of the American press and the 
American school, which is an important adjunct to the 
plethora of contemporary similarities highlighted in Chapter
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Two of this study. Their historical congruence involves 
their debts, contributions, and responses to the tempers of 
the times. The dyssynchrony involves the interests 
controlling them.
T he Pre_S5 and the School ia America
It may be recalled from the previous chapter that the
transition from the Reformation to the Enlightenment found a
number of religious sects fleeing from the secularism that
their leaders perceived to be attending the arising of the
reforms that the Enlightenment signailed. It is common
knowledge that by the end of the third decade of the 17th 
1
Century, many dissenters had emigrated to the New World.
They brought with them their books (Bibles and tracts) and
not a few printers, and their almost universal literacy.
These were, after all, quintessentially people of the
Reformation: they had their schools; they read and
interpreted the Word for themselves.
Although they were literate, the first religious
colonists seem to have been imbued with a distrust of the
worldliness that a thirst for news implied (Stephens,
2
1968), and they brooked very little in the way of 
interference with their avowed aim of establishing "the City 
of God." Schooling was a practical matter --practical 
meaning learning the Bible and reading tracts by the 
Mathers, or latterly ’cnc.-han Edwards. In colonial times 
schools "served an elite group of elite male s t udents...to 
prepare [them] for...political and religious leadership"
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(Armstrong & Savage, 1983). America's first college. 
Harvard, was established in 1636, 16 years after the 
founding of the Plymouth Colony, and witness to the 
seriousness with which the colonials took education. Further 
evidence is provided by the Hassachussetts education, 
enacted in 1642 and 1647, which scholars have said to be the 
’foundation stones" of American public education in general 
(Johanningmeier, I960). Nevertheless, these schools were
held firmly in hand by the churches, their elders, and the 
religiously attuned communities in which they were situated.
CoIon ia1 P a p e r s . Such newspapers as there were at the 
time (at least those which were permitted to publish 
regularly and openly), served the same clientele. But it 
was not until 17D4 that “a publication meeting all the 
qualifications of a true newspaper" (Emery St Emery, 1984, p. 
23) first appeared, its editor-pub1isher was one John 
Campbell, a "postmaster appointed by the Crown" (p. 21).
When Campbell fell from political favor and was replaced, he 
"refused to relinquish his The News Letter" (p. 39). So hia
3
replacement, William Brooker, started his own, Xil£ Gazette.
Although by the beginning of the 18th Century the 
colonies were much advanced above the primitive conditions 
of the previous 80 or so years, there was still not the 
cosmopolitanism that prevailed in the cities such as London 
and Paris. As a result, neither the cosmopolite critics nor 
the gathering places to support them were part of the
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American scene. In addition, if there were a native
European culture in the colonies, it was religious. The
Puritans in England had closed the theaters, after all, and
it was a Puritan culture that obtained in a majority of the
4
colonial cities, such as they were. During this period, 
both the press and the schools owed much to both the church 
and the state. The next significant period for the purposes 
of this study is the Revolution and its immediate aftermath, 
the Jeffersonian period.
The Revolution. I have already attended to Jefferson's
tribute to the free press and to his opinions of the value
5
of education. Newspapers, of course played a major role in 
popularizing the cause of revolution in Colonial times. 
Samuel Adams and the Radical Patriots had begun to foment 
the revolutionary spirit in handbills, broadsides, and in 
partisan newspapers beginning as early as 1764. Thomas 
Paine's Crisis papers and his Common Sense were circulated 
among the rebels as broadsides; Paul Revere's first 
contributions to the revolt were made in his capacity as an 
engraver of i 1 lustrative--often caustically derisive-- 
plates for the revolutionary press. Within a few days of 
its promulgation in Philadelphia, the Declaration of 
Independence was a staple of conversation throughout the 
Colonies, thanks to its rapid dissemination by the press; 
its effects were felt as far away as France by the same 
means (Emery & Emery, 1984).
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In the milieu of the late 18th Century, after the
ferment of the Revolution to which the press had contributed
so much, James Hadison and the other architects of the
Constitution could be forgiven their confidence (and for
some, their trepidation) that there was and would continue
to be a need for a robust and contentious press, and that a
sufficiently --or a dauntingly and dangerously-- wide
variety of different opinions and facts should be brought
6
before the public eye to be assessed and discussed. Many
7
were, themselves, journalists, and all had witnessed the 
power of the press in instigat ing and prosecut ing the 
rebellion that had lifted from them the yoke of subjugation 
to England. Significantly, then, when creating the charter 
of the Republic, these men included a provision for 
satisfying the first requirement, for (externally) unimpeded 
public channels of information. At least on a surface level, 
the First Amendment seemed to anticipate the first 
requirement: for adequate channels by which requisite
information could reach the presumably discerning and 
discriminating populace. It guarantees a "negative" freedom 
of the press, the freedom from the most intrusive forms of
governmental intervention: "Congress shall make no law . .
8
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press;
Common SchooIs. Common Papers. The next significant 
period finds the press enjoying its franchise, and the 
schools coming out from under the wing of the church and 
into the protective embranc of their local communities. The
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rise of the connon school novenent paralleled nore closely 
the advent of a further journalistic innovation: the "penny 
press," According to press historian John Tebbel (1976), 
history of the modern newspaper begins "fojn a May morning 
in 1833, when the New York Herald" first appeared on the 
streets" (p. 180). James Gordon Bennett's enterprise was
launched scarcely two years before Horace Mann's appointment 
as Secretary of the Massachussetts Board of Education.
Mann's appointment in 1837 antedates by only four years the 
Horace Greeley's founding of the New York Tr ibune.
Mann ' s c onmon school and Greeley's newspaper for the 
common people illustrate the (ideal) synonymy of the 
relation of the press and the school to the interests of the 
societies they serve. Mann in 1849 would write that "[njever 
will wisdom preside in the halls of legislation. . .until 
Common Schools create...a more far-seeing intelligence" (in 
C r e m i n , 1961, p. 9) in order to persuade businessmen to
support his ideas, while in Lowell, Mass. --"the city of 
spindles"-- the women in the mills were using their literacy 
as a means to organize. At the same time Greeley gave 
regular columns to the doings of Henry Clay and allotted 
space for Arthur Brisbane --the "American prophet of 
Fourierism," which was an early critique of capitalism. All 
this was to change in the aftermath of the Civil War.
A Turn ing P o i n t . The victory of the North's 
technological industrialism over the South's agrarianism had
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ensured that continued industrial expansion would be 
underwritten and hence directed by the requirements and 
resources of nercantile/investment capital. The success of 
industrial capital required the construction and employment 
of a vast nachinery of production, in which the role of 
labor was redefined from its pre-industria1 conception. The 
land could be worked by slaves: their ability to interfere 
in production was severely limited by the fact that they 
were, themselves, the machineries on which production 
depended, and were subject to direct, coercive/1etha1 
supervision which was implicit in the slave relationship.
On the other hand, in a factory the expensive machinery 
representing significant capital expenditure was in the care 
of laborers whose relations with management supervisors were 
more equal --though hardly coequal-- because laborers were 
not themselves the property of management, subject to any 
disposition it suited managers to exercise. The term 
sabotage arises from the practice by disaffected laborers of 
tossing a wooden shoe (a sabot) into the works and 
interrupting production.
Hodern Schools. Modern Press. Herbert Altschull (1884) 
has made the point that the press is always going to 
function as an agent of power; that is equally true of the 
school. As Foucault (1972) commented, "[e]very educational 
system is a political means of maintaining or modifying the 
appropriation of discourse, with the knowledge and the 
powers it carries with it1' (p. 227). In the United States,
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though they operate in ostensibly different spheres, they 
are both institutionally agents of the status quo. When 
there was a spirit of liberalise at large, both the schools 
and the press cooperated (indeed were the leading vehicles) 
in its dispersal through the populace; likewise in more 
repressive tines, both institutions have had leading roles 
in propogating then.
The connon school and the penny press were products of 
expansive tines. But after the Civil War, and particularly 
in the period of the 1870s-80s, when America first widely 
experienced the effects of the business cycle to which the 
government was more and more closely tied, the tide had 
turned. Greeley's premonitions about the invidious side of 
capitalism were beginning to materialize (Emery & Enery, 
1984). Industrial pollution, political corruption, 
urban decay in slums for the labor force needed to man the 
machines, civil strife and riots, violent protests and 
equally violent reprisals-- all the contradictions implicit 
in capitalism, but which had been masked while the system 
was still in its infancy, began to appear, and be felt 
throughout the system.
Thus, when historians of the American press and the 
American schools have been able to situate to within a 
single generation the concatenation of exigent situation and 
technology that presaged the development of American mass 
communication and mass education, they have been pointing to
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precisely the same sort of sea-change that affected the 
press alone in the E n 1ightement. But there were no such 
institutions in place in American society --of course, to 
the extent that American society has always been a bourgeois 
one, there was no space for the emerging class to contend 
for, and there was none of the diffusion of wealth among 
labor when it made its try, in the 1870s, '80s and '90s.
By then the bourgeois were the ruling class, and had
appropriated all the mechanisms of the Enlightenment to
their own. Significantly it was in this period that the
press began to erect its barrier of objectivity, also,
though it did not achieve its present status until after
World War I, and the onset of the age of press agentry. But
by then the schools, and in particular school administrators
(who were the first class of experts recognized in the
system of schooling; see Johnson, 1984) were also firmly in
the grasp of the technocratic, managerial mindset, and were
readily and enthusiastically complying with the managerial/




This last point is particularly important in the 
aftermath of the Hazelwood decision. Restricting the 
freedom of the scholastic press to express unpopular 
conditions has implications for the whole fabric of civic 
and social relations. Teachers and journalists should take 
whatever opportunity presents itself to discuss it publicly
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with students. The Supreme Court justices who contributed 
opinions (White for the majority, Brennan dissenting) both 
hoped the decision would provide a "civics lesson." I have 
tried to show that the lessons taught to, and --as Bertelson 
(1988) perhaps unwittingly, and Dorfman (1988) with more 
outrage, demonstrate -- also the lessons learned by, student 
journalists and their advisor at Hazelwood East High School 
had as much to do with the political relations among 
communication, education, and knowledge, and the roles of 
business and management in stipulating those relations, as 
they had with the explicit civics lesson that the Court 
sought to confer with respect to the responsibilities of 
civic participation and professional training. Or, rather, 
students learned that the standards of civic competence upon 
which the Court would rely for its interpretation of those 
responsibilities are isomorphic and homologous with those 
other interests.
Taken as a gauge of a preferred view of relations among 
schools, the press, knowledge, expression, and the 
competence necessary for effective citizenship, I have argued 
that the majority opinion of the Court expresses a rebuke to 
and a repudiation of a conception of schooling for necessary 
capacities of democratic action, knowledge, and learning for 
student journalists, or any student, which transgresses the 
narrow, technical view of education. By such stratagems, 
students and other learners are taught important lessons:
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(a) that they are not the proprietors of even their own 
knowledge, and (b) that their ability and capacity to speak 
that knowledge publicly and with a sense of authority 
depends on the imprimatur of an institutional voice.
But, of course, it was not the students inmediately 
involved in the dispute at Hazelwood East High who were the 
objects of the lesson; rather, it was the next cohort, and 
the next, and the next, for whon the lesson of the Court was 
intended. In a sense, the object of the lesson was anyone 
who relies on the press for their infornation about the 
world. By stipulating the authority of institutional 
proprietors to control the flow of news, to decide upon what 
constitutes the necessary information, and to authorize its 
dissemination, the Court was contributing to the vitiation, 
at the basic level of structural integrity, of the 
plausibility of the claim of journalists or educators to 
present a version of reality upon which actions could 
practicably be initiated, and to the ultimate disparagement 
of public reports of public affairs.
I argued above, in Chapter Three, that we have lost (or 
been bereft of) the distinctions among intimate, private and 
public as useful categories of individual experience.
Perhaps the sole remaining vestige of a public sphere 
remains in the public character of the schools. How the 
schools themselves are the subjects of an integrated and 
systematic program instigated by the technocrats to coopt 
the last vestiges of the public weal into the fold of the
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marketplace. The voucher system, for example, may be seen 
as the first battleground of the young campaign. The 
schools alone, perhaps, may hold the key to the 
reconceptualization of the social geography in such a way 
that individuals may once again assert their own 
responsibility for public discourse and policy. It is 
toward this end that schools' assertion of social 
responsibility as the moral imperative for rebuilding the 
public sphere must be directed.
This project is probably not possible if it is simply 
an attempt to modify the existing institutions of society, 
in this case the press and the schools. For one thing, the 
colonization of the life-world by technocracy has advanced 
under a rubric of privatization that both disparages and 
(covertly) usurps the mediating potential of existing public 
discursive formations. The press as it is currently 
configured is an inhospitable domain for truly public 
relations among citizens. It is part of the order of 
technocratic rationality which is involved in consuming the 
state for its own ends. In doing so, it contributes to the 
perception that the state is 1 too big" and "too intrusive" 
and "too powerful" in order to purchase it more cheaply from 
its rightful owners, citizens of the democracy.
Reformers have frequently trumpeted a particularly 
obnoxious casuistry: "If you're not part of the solution,
you're part of the problem." It is my belief (and I trust I
24 3
have shown) that, while the institutions of the school and 
the press are part of the problem, they are also part of the 
solution. Another part of the solution is the people who 
compose (literally, in their practices/words, and literally 
in their participation) those institutions. It lies with 
teachers, in elementary, middle and high schools, and in 
teacher and journalism education programs to implement their 
parts, and to assume control of the discourses that comprise 
their disciplines. In that way, they can affect their 
institutions. The big question is how they might accomplish 
this, in view of the pervading presence of the dominating 
power and authority that attend the technocratic system that 
controls them, often without their even being aware of it.
The answer may reside in the theories of social 
responsibility to a new conception of the public sphere. In 
its classical formulation, the public sphere was composed of 
people (albeit usually, but not not always men) who were 
possessed of certain amounts of leisure time, had common 
educational experiences, had common institutions available 
to them, and were inspired by the inequalities which they 
saw all around them to criticize. While neither teachers 
nor journalists are usually blessed with the even adequate
for credential1ing a substantial body of common educational 
experience in common educational experiences.
for Future Action
10
amounts of leisure, there is as a result of the impetus
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Common Educational E x p e r i e n c e s . This experiential 
similarity could be enlarged, both in the classroom (in 
college and university professional preparation curricual) 
and out of it. As Click and Kopenhaver (1988) have shown, a 
large number of teachers are woefully ill-informed on the 
meaning of freedom of the press. Pre-service teachers 
should be encouraged to take even a rudimentary journalism 
course as an elective in their p r o g r a m s . Nor are 
journalists usually any more f ami liar with the professional 
responsibilities the teachers confront; ergo, they should be 
encou raged to take a basic course in educational f oundat i on s 
or principles and practices of educat ion by their journalism 
school advisors.
Teachers as S o u r c e s . Although their individual press
units may be technocratically driven, individual journalists
have traditionally firmly upheld their private (or is it
intimate) canons of questioning authority, embarassing the
haughty (somebody has to do it), and giving voice to the
voiceless. This latter point has even achieved a certain
currency in journalism (most frequently journalism ethics
amd introductory mass media) texts since the social riots
that accompanied the Equal Bights movement of the 1960s and
many good journalists were caught with their pens down on
the real stories in the ghettos (e.g., Klaidman & Beauchamp,
11
1988; Rivers & Hathews, 1988; Rodman, 1984).
Both journalists and teachers are all too frequently 
exposed to the seamier sides of life. And it is a truism
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that seany stakes good copy. Therefore, teachers night then 
put themselves in the positions of being sources of news for 
newspeople. This could have an additional benefit in that, 
often, journalists and their sources become friendly, and so 
the relations of an extra-curricular kind night develop 
especially if the connon educational exper iences are 
developed and each is capable of recognizing in the other 
soneone who shares the sane concerns while pursuing 
different careers.
Journalists as R e s o u r c e s . Journalists love to tell war 
stories. And their jobs give then an almost unlimited 
opportunity for accumulating material. Teachers should be 
encouraged to invite journalists to participate in their 
classrooms. The majority would be flattered beyond words at 
such an invitation. It could be couched in terms that would 
avoid the sti 1 t e d , manag ing-ed itor approach, and encourage 
the visiting journalist to divulge the more arcane lore of 
the newsroom. For as much as they enjoy war stories, they 
enjoy (as a rule) telling the news behind the news, and how 
the news actually gets onto the tlelvision, or into the 
papers. Their perspectives could shed a light on the 
mechanics of the business, as well as on the day-to-day 
processes of news-gathering.
Implications for Further Study -
In its tone, I have argued, the Hazelwood opinion 
maintained the presentation of balancing. Students' actions
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were characterized as dysfunctional desires, not as needs, 
or as requirenents for citizens-in-the-making to learn to 
enact their liberties, nerely as desires. Their claim to 
the right to express and highlight their own existential 
interpretations of issues of immediate, practical importance 
was weighed in a calculus which privileged the requirenents 
of the exercise of power. As nere desires, students' wants 
were seen to be insufficient against the counter-balancing 
influences of (a) the "basic educational nission of the 
school", (b) the authority of the curriculum, and (c) the 
imprimatur of the school. These are technocratic 
disciplinary technologies which thwart students preparation 
to participate in democracy.
The contest for the power to define reality, then, is 
what is finally at issue in the adjudication of complaints 
about infringement upon the First Amendment. It will be a 
significant factor in any effort to re-invent a truly publis 
sphere. Thus the implications of this study take two forms: 
practical and theoretical. They entail both the the ways 
we think about and the ways we attempt to enact the purposes 
of the school and the press.
There are certain beliefs and practices of journalism 
which, although to some extent necessarily idealized, I 
believe may have relevance to teaching practice; 
correspondingly, there is and is still developing a body of 
belief and practice regarding pedagogy that may have equal 
pertinence for those journalists seeking to found a praxis
247
in a pedagogical motif. The things that journalism does 
best, such as watch-dogging the powerful, embarrassing the 
haughty, and giving voice to the unempowered are qualities 
that teachers might well be schooled to impart to the young 
people who are placed in their charge. Under such 
conditions, it may therefore be possible to reconceive and 
ultimately reconstitute both schools and the press as agents 
for fostering an ethical, communitarian individual 
subjectivity. This, in turn, would engender active, 
personal, subjective responsibility for the facts and 
opinions about corporate and/or governmental activities 
(they are ever more and more synonymous) with which both 
institutions are intimately concerned, and likewise the 
critical faculties to be employed in evaluating and judging 
those activities.
This problem has implications with respect to the 
professional competence of both journalists and teachers.
The competence entailed in the necessarily adversarial role 
of the press in a participatory democracy is not only 
desirable but also essential to the education of teachers, 
and may thus provide grounds for a pedagogy based an 
emancipatory vision implicated, but seldom realized, in 
journalistic theory and praxis. This approach to pedagogy 
would require a rethinking of the role of the school, the 
teacher, and journalism's place in the curriculum. These 
considerations are beyond the scope of the present inquiry.
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but I announce then here to foreshadow the implications that 
the re-invention of the public sphere under the rationale of 
social responsibility night hold.
Teachers and journalists must nake a connon community
against further depredations. This community might be
comprised of members of all three groups conspiring together
to publish newspapers. The First Amendment was written
during times when the available technology was, though
different in kind from that which exists today, not so much
different in its scope and capabilities. In the 1800s,
almost any mechanic could build a letter press, any jeweler
a box of type. Today there are computers which are
substantially more portable than a letterpress, and the
programs to run them are also used in modern, state-of-the-
13
art news departments. Future investigations stemming from 
this study could explore the possibilities that are inherent 
in the technolog ica1 (in the sense I used it in Chapter Two) 
capabilities of students, teachers, and journalists. I can 
see nothing wrong with a nation of reporters raising their 




A printer named Benjamin Harris attempted to start a 
paper in Massachussetts in 1690. It published one edition 
before it was banned and Harris unceremoniously shipped back 
to England. Harris had the temerity to publish news of 
a murder which disturbed the equanimity of the Puritans and 
caused his stock(s) to fall (Stephens, 1988). In 1689, a 
report from Rev. Increase Mather was published and widely 
circulated, but it too ran to only one number, though it did 
contain news of the good Reverend's efforts to obtain more 
aid from the Crown (Emery & Emery, 1984). Little is known 
about the newspapers in the Virginia; schools there were of 
little import since children were scarce there, and their 
value as laborers was greater than their value as future 
"leaders' (Johanningmeier, 1980).
2
This was nearly 50 years before most of the convivial 
company, whose the coffee-, chocolate-, and public houses, 
"literary" newspapers, cultural criticism, and general 
raconteur"- ism betokened the advent of an identifiable 
public sphere in Britain, had drawn their first breath, much 
less sniffed their first snuff or swigged their first brew 
--practices the Puritans would have found offensive in any 
case .
3
Simultaneously, then, there was begun the policy (though 
de facto in this case) of public subsidy of the news. Both 
men, along with their five subsequent replacements, availed
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themselves of their positions to distribute their papers at 
favorable rates and thus to subdue competition (Emery &
E me r y , 1984)
4
The Enlightenment influences were felt much more strongly 
in the South, in Virginia especially, which was the home of 
Washington, Jefferson, Madison and the other luminaries who 
are responsible for most of the Enlightenment rhetoric in 
the documents of the founding of the Republic. Even so, 
these were for the most part sober, serious men who, if they 
disported themselves at all, did so at home among the 
s laves.
5
See Chapter 1 of this study; see also Lee, 1966;
Johanningmeler, 1980, esp . Chapter 5, on schooling in and
after the Revolution; Cremin, 1976, treats with the matter 
in a cursory fashion.
6
In the writings of Thomas Jefferson are contained both 
extremes. His widely cited letter (Lee, 1966; see also this 
study, Chapter 1) to a friend exhibits his confidence:
..Given the choice between a government without newspapers 
and newspapers without government, I should gladly chose the 
latter," However, later, having experienced the vicissitudes 
of the Presidency under the watchful, even baleful, eye of 
the press, and having been subjected to its barbs, he 
laments his earlier "liberalism" with regard to the 
benefits, and recants his admiration.
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A p a r t i a l  list w o u l d  i n c l u d e  the " p u p p e t  m a s t e r "  S a m u e 1 
Ad a m s ,  w h o  is c r e d i t e d  w i t h  a l m o s t  s i n g l e h a n d e d l y  f o m e n t i n g  
the R e v o l u t i o n ,  M a d i s o n ,  A l e x a n d e r  H a m i l t o n ,  B e n  j a m  in 
F r a n k l i n ,  f u t u r e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  J u s t i c e  J o h n  Jay, J e f f e r s o n ,
and T o m  Paine.
e
T h e r e  is, h o w e v e r ,  for a v a r i e t y  of r e a s o n s  no c o e v a l ,  
c o e x t e n s i v e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o v i s i o n  to s a t i s f y  t h e  s e c o n d  
c o n d i t i o n ,  for the s o c i a l  d i s p e r s i o n  of d i s c e r n m e n t  and 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .  O v e r  time, h o w e v e r ,  t h e r e  a l s o  c a m e  to be 
d e v e l o p e d  a j u r i d i c a l  m a n d a t e  for c o m p u l s o r y ,  free, and 
e q u a l  p u b l i c  e d u c a t i o n  w h i c h  w o u l d  a n s w e r  the l a t t e r  m a t t e r .  
T h e o r e t i c a l l y ,  the p r e s s  s u p p l i e s  the w h e r e w i t h a l - - f a c t s  and 
op in i o n s - - f r o m  w h i c h  " i n f e r r e n c e s  a r e  to b e  d r a w n ,  w h i l e  
the s c h o o l s  s u p p l y  t h e  tools, and the t r a i n i n g  in t h e i r  use, 
f or " d i s c r i m i n a t i o n "  a m o n g  f a c t s  and o p i n i o n s  r e l e v a n t  in 
m a k i n g  the c r i t i c a l  p o l i t i c a l  c h o i c e s .  T h r o u g h  the 
d e v e l o p m e n t  of t h i s  s y s t e m ,  a s y m b i o s i s  w a s  f o r g e d  b e t w e e n  
t he p r e s s  and the s c h o o l s ,  a s y n e r g i s m  tha t  s e e m s  
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  to be e x p l o i t e d  and d e n i e d  b y  e l e m e n t s  of 
b o t h  p a r t i e s  to the a r r a n g e m e n t .
9
See a l s o  T u c h m a n , 1976, fo r  a v a l u a b l e  s t u d y  on the f a c a d e
of o b j e c t i v i t y  in the p r e s s ;  and (e.g. ) Sh o r t ,  1984, for the 
c o n s e q u e n c e s  of c o m p e t e n c y  t r a i n i n g  in the s c h o o l s ,
10
In a t i m e  w h e n  b o t h  s c h o o l s  and p r e s s  u n i t s  a r e  f i r m l y  
u n d e r  the t h r a l l  of b u s i n e s s  i n t e r e s t s  in the b o t t o m  line.
t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  is l i k e l y  to d e t e r i o r a t e  b e f o r e  (if e v e r )  it 
g e t s  b e t t e r .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  it is no t  an i n s o l u b l e  p r o b l e m ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  if n e t w o r k s  are e s t a b l i s h e d  d u r i n g  p r o f e s s i o n a l  
t r a i n i n g  p r o g r a m s .
1 1
If the i s s u e  of f i n d i n g  t lie non o b v i o u s  has not. 
p e n e t r a t e d  as d e e p l y  as it m i g h t  in c l a s s r o o m s ,  it 
a b s o l u t e l y  p e r m e a t e s  m a n y  n e w s r o o m s ,  a d d i n g  to the 
s u b s t a n t i a l  w o r k l o a d s  m a n y  ,iournalists a l r e a d y  l a b o r  under.
i h
Sin of' the o n s e t  of the R e a g a n  r e g i m e ,  i n t e r e s t i n g l y ,  t. he 
m e d i a  t h e m s e l v e s  h a v e  o f f e r e d  a low i n f l u e n c e  m o d e l  of t h e i r  
i n f l u e n c e .  In a r e c e n t  b ill M o y e r s  hour on FJBS ( O c t o b e r  3, 
198b). b o t h  P e t e r  J e n n i n g s  and N B C  r e p o r t e r  L e s l i e  S t a h l  
p o r t r a y e d  t h e m s e l v e s  as u n w i t t i n g  d u p e s ,  p o w e r l e s s  in the 
f a c e  of t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  of t h e i r  m e d i u m  and the m e d i a  
m a n i p u l a t i o n  w i z a r d r y  of the l i k e s  of R o g e r  A i l e s  and 
M i c h a e l  D e a v e r  to d o  a n y t h i n g  b u t  r e p r o d u c e  ( a l b e i t  p e r h a p s  
g l u m l y  and d u m b - f o u n d e d  1 y ) the p r e c i s e  i m a g e s  t h e y  w o u l d  
h a v e  liked to c r i t i c i z e .
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*t *1., Petitioner*
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C ath y  K U H L M E IE R  et a).
No. K -8 3 6 .
A rgued  Oct. 13, 1987.
D ecided Jan . 13. 1988.
S ta ff  m em ber* o f high school new&pa- 
p er filed F irs t A m endm ent action seeking 
injunctive relief, m oney dam ages and decla­
ration th a t  F irs t A m endm ent r ig h ts  w ere 
violated by censorsh ip  o f certa in  artic les 
The U nited  S ta te s  D istric t C ourt for the 
E as te rn  D istric t o f M issouri, Jo h n  F. N an 
gle. C hief Ju d g e , denied injunctive relief, 
596 F .Supp 1422, and held th a t s tu d e n ts ' 
F irs t A m endm ent rig h ts  w ere no t violated, 
607 F.Supp. 1450. S tu d en ts  appealed The 
C ourt o f  A ppeals, H eaney. C ircuit Ju dge , 
re v e n e d , 795 F.2d 1368. D efendan ts peti 
tioned fo r w rit of certio rari. T he Suprem e 
C ourt, Ju s tic e  W hite, held t h a t  0 )  high 
school paper th a t w as published by s tu ­
den ts in journalism  class did not qualify  as 
"public fo ru m ,"  so th a t school officials re- 
tained r ig h t to  im pose reasonab le  re s tr ic ­
tions on s tu d e n t speech in paper, and (2) 
high school principal’s decision to  excise 
tw o p ag es from  s tu d e n t new spaper, on 
g round th a t  a rtic les unfairly  im pinged on 
privacy rig h ts  o f p reg n an t s tu d e n ts  and 
o thers, did no t violate s tu d e n ts ' speech 
rig h ts
Ju d g m e n t o f C ourt of A ppeals re ­
versed.
Ju s tic e  B rennan , d issen ted  and filed 
opinion, in which Ju stice  M arshall and J u s ­
tice B lackm on joined
I. C o n s t i tu t io n a l  Law *=»90.1<t.4>
S tu d en ts  in public schools do not shed 
constitu tional r ig h ts  to freedom  o f speech
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or expression a t schoolhouse gate . U.S 
C,A. Const.Am end. 1.
2. C on st itu t ion a l  Law  *=90.1(1 .4)
School need not to le ra te  s tuden t 
speech th a t is inconsistent w ith its basic 
educational mission, even though  g o v ern ­
ment could not censor sim ilar speech o u t­
side school. U.S C.A C onst Amend. 1
3. C on st itu t ion a l Law  90.1(1 .41
School facility may be deem ed “ public 
forum ," for purpose o f F irs t A m endm ent, 
only if school au thorities have, by policy or 
practice, o[iened facility for indiscrim inate 
use by g enera l public o r by som e segm en t 
of public, such as s tu d en t o rganisations. 
U.S.C.A. C onst.A m end 1.
Sec p u b lica tio n  W o rd s  and  P h rases  
fo r o th e r  ju d ic ia l co n s tru c tio n s  and  
d efin itio n s.
4. C on st itu t ion a l  Law  *=90.1(1 .4)
S ch o o ls  *=169
High school new spaper th a t w as pub­
lished by journalism  s tu d en ts  could not be 
characterized as “public fo rum ," so th a t 
school officials re ta ined  righ t to impose 
reasonable restric tions on speech th a t w ent 
into new spaper, w here s tu d en ts  publishing 
new spaper received g rad es  and academ ic 
credit for th e ir  perform ance, and jo u rn a l­
ism teacher re ta ined  final au tho rity  with 
respect to alm ost every  aspect of produc­
tion and publication. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend 1.
5. C on st itu t ion a l Law *=90.1(1.4)
E ducato rs are  en titled  to exercise 
g rea te r  control over school-sponsored s tu ­
dent expression than  over s tu d e n ts ’ perso n ­
al speech, in o rder to a ssu re  th a t partic i­
pants learn  w hatever lessons expressive  ac­
tivity is designed to  teach, th a t read ers  or 
listeners a re  not exposed to  m ateria l which 
may be inappropria te  for their level o f m a tu ­
rity, and th a t  views of individual speaker 
are not erroneously  a ttr ib u ted  to  school. 
U.S.C.A. C onst.A m end. 1.
6. S ch o o ls  *=169
School m ust be able to se t high s ta n ­
dards for s tu d en t speech th a t is dissem inat-
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ed under its auspice and m ay re fu se  to 
d issem inate  speech th a t does no t m eet 
tho se  s tan d ard s. U.S.C.A. C onst.A m end. 1.
7. S ch o o ls  *= 169  1
School m ust be able to  tak e  into ac 
count the em otional m atu rity  o f intended 
audience, in deciding w h e th e r to  d issem i­
nate  school-sponsored s tu d e n t speech on 
potentially  sensitive topics. U.S.C.A. 
C onst.A m end. 1.
6. S c h o o ls  *=169
School may re fu se  to  sponso r s tu d en t 
sp e e c h 'w h ic h  m ight reasonably  be p e r­
ceived to  advocate conduct inconsistent 
w ith shared  values o f civilized social order, 
or which associa tes school w ith any posi­
tion o ther th an  neu tra lity  on m atte rs  of 
political controversy  U.S.C.A. Const.
Am end 1.
9. C o n st itu t io n a l  Law *=90.1(1 .4)  .
E ducato rs do not o ffend  F irs t A m end­
m ent by exercising  editorial control over 
sty le  and  con ten t o f s tu d e n t speech in 
school-sponsored expressive activities, as 
long as th e ir actions are  reasonably  related 
to  leg itim ate  pedagogical concerns. U.S C. 
A C onst.A m end. 1.
10. C o n st itu t io n a l  Law *=90.1(1 .4)
It is only when decision to  censor 
school-sponsored publication, theatrica l pro­
duction, or o th e r vehicle o f s tu d e n t ex p res­
sion has no valid educational purpose th a t 
judicial in tervention  is requ ired  to p ro tec t 
s tu d e n ts ’ free  speech rig h ts . U.S.C.A. 
C onst Amend, 1.
11. C o n st itu t io n a l  Law *=90.1(1 .4)  
S c h o o ls  *=169
H igh school principal's decision to  ex ­
cise tw o pages from  stu d en t new spaper, on 
ground  >hat artic les located on pages u n ­
fairly  im pinged on privacy rig h ts  of p re g ­
n an t s tu d en ts  and o thers, did not impermis- 
E,bly in te rfe re  w ith s tu d e n ts ’ free  speech 
rig h ts , w here s tu d en ts  published paper as 
p a r t  of high school curricu lum , and princi­
pal reasonab ly  believed th a t  artic les could 
no t have been modified in tim e to  perm it
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publication of paper before  school te rm  had 
ended U.S C.A C onst.A m end 1.
S ylla b u s ‘
R espondents, fo rm er high school s tu ­
den ts  who w ere s ta f f  m em bers of the 
school s new spaper, filed su it in F ederal 
D istric t C ourt a g a in s t pe titioners, the 
school d istric t and school officials, alleg ing  
th a t  resp o n d en ts’ F irst A m endm ent rig h ts  
w ere violated by the  deletion from  a certa in  
issue o f the  paper o f two pages th a t includ­
ed an article describ ing school s tu d e n ts ’ 
experiences w ith pregnancy  and ano ther 
a rtic le  d iscussing the  im pact o f divorce on 
s tu d e n ts  a t  the  Bchool. T he new spaper 
w as w ritten  and edited  by a journalism  
class, as  p a rt o f the  school’s curriculum . 
P u rsu a n t to  the school’s practice, the  teach ­
e r in ch arg e  o f th e  paper subm itted  page 
proofs to the  school’s principal who object­
ed to  the pregnancy  sto ry  because the 
p re g n a n t s tu d en ts , a lthough  not nam ed, 
m igh t be identified from  the tex t, and be­
cause  he believed th a t  the a rtic le ’s re fe r ­
ences to  sexual activ ity  and b irth  control 
w ere inappropria te  for some o f th e  y o ung­
e r  s tu d en ts . T he principal objected to  the 
divorce article because the  p ag e  proofs he 
w as furnished identified by nam e (deleted 
by the  teacher from  the  final version) a 
s tu d e n t who com plained o f her fa th e r’s 
conduct, and the principal believed th a t  the 
s tu d e n t’s p aren ts  should  have been given 
an opportunity  to  respond to  the  rem ark s 
o r to consen t to  th e ir  publication. Believ­
ing th a t th ere  w as no tim e to  m ake neces­
sa ry  changes in the  artic les if the  paper 
w as to  be issued before  the  end 'o f  the 
achool year, the principal directed  th a t  the 
p ag es on which they  appeared  be w ithheld 
from  publication even though  o ther, unob­
jectionable artic les w ere included on such 
pages. The D istric t C ourt held th a t  no 
F irs t A m endm ent violation had occurred. 
The C o u rt o f A ppeals reversed.
* The *yll*bus constitu tes no pari of the opinion 
of the Court but has been prepared by the Re 
porter of Decisions for the convenience of the
Held: R esponden ts ' F irs t A m endm ent 
rig h ts  w ere not violated. Pp. 567-572
(a) F irs t A m endm ent rig h ts  o f s tu ­
den ts  in the  public schools a re  no t au to m at­
ically coextensive w ith the  rig h ts  of adu lts 
in o th e r se ttin g s , and m ust be applied in 
light of the  special ch a rac teristics o f iht- 
school environm ent. A school need not 
to le ra te  s tu d e n t speech th a t  is inconsistent 
w ith its basic educational m ission, even 
th o u g h  the  governm ent could not censor 
Bimilar speech outside the  school. Pp 
567-568.
(b) The school new spaper here cannot 
be ch aracterized  as a forum  for public ex­
pression. School facilities m ay be deem ed 
to  be public fo rum s only if school au th o n  
ties have by policy or by practice opened 
the  facilities fo r indiscrim inate use by the 
g en era l public, o r by som e seg m en t o f the 
public, such as s tu d en t o rgan iza tions If 
the  facilities have instead been reserved  for 
o th e r in tended purposes, com m unicative or 
o therw ise , then  no public fo rum  has been 
c rea ted , and  school officials may impost- 
reasonab le  re stric tions on the  speech of 
s tu d e n ts , teachers, and o th e r m em bers of 
the  school com m unity. The Bchool officials 
in th is  case did no t deviate from  their poll 
cy th a t  the  n ew sp ap er's  production w as to 
be p a r t  o f the  educational curriculum  and a 
re g u la r  c lassroom  activity under the jour 
nalism  te a c h e r’s control as to  a lm ost every 
asp ec t of publication. The officials did not 
evince any in ten t to  open the  p a p e r’s pagt-s 
to  indiscrim inate use by its s tu d en t report 
era and ed ito rs , o r by the  s tu d e n t body 
genera lly . A ccordingly, school officials 
w ere  en titled  to  reg u la te  the paper's  con 
te n ts  in any reasonab le  m anner. Pp 567- 
569.
(c) The s ta n d a rd  fo r determ ining  when  
a school m ay punish s tu d e n t expression 
th a t  happens to  occur on school prem ises i1- 
no t the  s ta n d a rd  for determ in ing  w he n  a 
school may re fu se  to lend its  name and 
reso u rces to  the  dissem ination o f student
reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Cn
200 V S  321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, SO L td
499.
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expression. Tinker  v. Dee Motnes In d e­
p en d en t C o m m u n ity  Schoot Dist., 393 
U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731, 
distinguished. E ducato rs do not o ffend  the 
F irs t A m endm ent by exercising ed itorial 
contro l over the sty le  and content o f s tu ­
den t speech in school-sponsored expressive 
activ ities so long as th e ir  actions are  r e a ­
sonably re la ted  to  leg itim ate  pedagogical 
concerns. Pp, 569-571
(dj The school principal acted reaso n ­
ably in this case in requ iring  the deletion of 
the  p regnancy  article, the  divorce artic le , 
and  the o ther artic les th a t w ere to  appear 
on the  sam e pages of the new spaper Pp. 
571-572.
795 F  2d 1368 (CAS 1986), reversed .
W H ITE, J ., delivered the opinion o f the 
C ourt, in which REH N Q U IST, C.J., and  
STEV EN S, O 'CONNOR, and SCALIA, J J ., 
joined. B REN N A N , J ., filed a d issen ting  
opinion. in which M ARSHALL and 
BLACKM UN, J J  , joined
R obert P Baine, J r ., Clayton, Mo., for 
petitioners
Leslie D. Edw ards, St. Ixiuis, Mo., for 
responden ts
Ju s tic e  W H ITE delivered the opinion 
of the  C ourt,
This case concerns the ex ten t to  which 
educato rs may exercise editorial control 
over the contents of a high school n ew sp a­
per p rodured  as p a r t of the school’s jo u r ­
nalism  curriculum .
I
P etitioners are the Hazelwood School 
D istrict in St. Louis County, M issouri: v ari­
ous school officials; R obert E ugene R eyn­
olds, the  principal o f  Hazelwood E ast H igh 
School, and H ow ard E m erson, a teach er in 
the school d istrict. R espondents are  th ree  
fo rm er Hazelwood E ast s tu d en ts  who w ere 
s ta f f  m em bers o f Spectrum , the school 
new spaper. They contend th a t achool o ffi­
cials violated th e ir F irs t A m endm ent rig h ts
565
by deleting tw o pages of a rtic les from the
May 13, 1983, issue  of Spectrum .
Spectrum  w as w ritten  and edited  by the 
Jou rna lism  II c lass a t H azelw ood E ast. 
The new spaper w as published every  th ree  
w eeks o r so during  the 1982-1983 achool 
year. More than  4,500 copies o f the new s­
paper w ere d istribu ted  during  th a t  y ea r to 
B tudents, school personnel, and m em bers of 
the  com m unity.
The Board of E ducation allocated funds 
from  its annual budget for the  prin ting  of 
S pectrum  T hese funds w ere supp lem en t­
ed by proceeds from  sales o f the  new spa 
per. The p rin ting  expenses during  the 
1982-1983 school y ear to ta led  $4,668.50, 
revenue from  sales was $1,166.84 The 
o th e r costs associated  w ith the  new spa­
p e r—such as supplies, tex tbooks, and a 
portion of the journalism  te a c h e r 's  Balary— 
w ere borne en tire ly  by the  Board.
The Jou rnalism  I] course w as ta u g h t by 
R obert S tergos fo r m ost of the 1982-1983 
academ ic year. S te rgos le ft Hazelwood 
E a s t to  take a  job in p rivate  industry  on 
April 29, 1983, w hen the May 13 edition of 
Spectrum  was n earin g  com pletion, and peti 
tioner Em erson took his place as new spa­
per adviser for the  rem aining w eeks of the  
term
The practice a t Hazelwood E ast during  
the  spring  1983 sem este r w as for the jo u r­
nalism  teacher to  subm it p ag e  proofs o f 
each Spectrum  issue  to Principal Reynolds 
for his review prior to publication. On 
May 10, E m erson delivered the  proofs of 
the  May 13 edition to  Reynolds, who object­
ed to  tw o of the articles scheduled to ap­
p ear in th a t edition. One o f the  stories 
described th ree  Hazelwood E a s t s tu d e n ts ’ 
experiences w ith pregnancy; the  o ther d is­
cussed the im pact of divorce on stu d en ts  a t 
the school.
Reynolds w as concerned th a t, a lthough 
the  pregnancy sto ry  used fa lse  nam es " to  
keep the identity  o f these  g irls a secre t,"  
the  p reg n an t s tu d en ts  still m igh t be identi­
fiable from  the  tex t. He a lso  believed th a t 
the artic le 's  re fe rences to  sexual activity
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nnr) birth  control w ere inappropriate  for 
some of the younger s tu d en ts  a t the  school. 
In addition, Reynolds w as concerned th a t a 
s tu d e n t identified by nam e in the  divorce 
story  hud com plained th a t h e r fa th e r  
"w a sn ’t spending enough tim e w ith my 
mom. my s is te r  and I" p rior to  the divorce.
was alw ays o u t o f tow n on business or 
out lute playing card s  w ith the g u y s ,"  and 
alw ays a rg u ed  abou t ev ery th in g " w ith 
her m other. App to  Pet. for C ert. 33. 
Reynolds believed th a t the s tu d e n t 's  p a r­
en ts  should have been given an  opportun ity  
to respond to these  rem ark s o r to  consent 
to the ir publication. He was un aw are  th a t 
Fm erson  had deleted  the  s tu d e n t's  nam e 
from  the  final version of the artic le .
Reynolds believed th a t  there  w as no time 
to m ake the n ecessary  changes in the sto ­
ries before  the scheduled p re ss  ru n  and 
th a t the new spaper would no t ap p ear be­
fore the end of the  school y ear if p rin ting  
w ere delayed to  any s ign ifican t ex ten t. He 
concluded th a t his :,nly options u n d er the 
circum stances w ere to  publish a four-page 
new spaper instead of th e  p lanned six-page 
new spaper, elim inating the tw o  pages on 
which the offending  s to ries appeared , or to 
p u b lish  no new spaper a t  all. Accordingly, 
he directed E m erson to  w ithhold from  pub­
lication the tw o p ag es contain ing  the  s to ­
ries on pregnancy and divorce.1 He in­
form ed his superio rs  of the  decision, and 
they concurred.
R espondents su b seq u en tly  com m enced 
(his a c t i o n  in the U nited S ta te s  D istrict 
C o u r t  for the E as te rn  D istric t o f M issouri 
seek ing  a declaration  th a t th e ir  F irs t 
A m endm ent rig h ts  had been violated, in­
junctive relief, and m onetary  dam ages. 
A f t e r  a bench trial, the  D istric t C ourt de­
n i e d  an injunction, hohling th a t  no F irs t 
A m e n d m e n t  violation had occurred . 607 
F S u p p  I l ’>0 ( L983).
The D istrict C ourt concluded th a t school 
o f f i c i a l s  may im pose re s tra in ts  on s tu d e n ts ’
I. The two page* deleted From the new spaper 
.iK'> contained articles on tren ase  m arria fe , 
runaw ays, and juvenile delinquents, at welt as a 
general article on teenage pregnancy. Reynolds
speech in activ ities th a t a re  " ’an in teg ra l 
p a rt o f the  school’s educational function’ " 
— including the publication of a school- 
sponsored  new spaper by a journalism  class 
—so long as th e ir  decision has ” 'a su b s ta n ­
tial and reasonab le  basis .’ ” I d , a t 1466 
(quoting Fnuca ». Andmi, 463 F.Supp. 
1043, 1052 (ED N Y  1979)). The cou rt found 
th a t Principal R eynolds’ concern th a t the  
p reg n an t s tu d e n ts ' anonym ity  would be 
lost and  the ir privacy invaded w as “ leg it­
im ate and reaso n ab le ,” given “ the sm all 
num ber o f p reg n an t s tu d en ts  a t Hazelwood 
E a s t and severa l identify ing charac teristics 
th a t  w ere disclosed in the  article ” 607
F.Supp., a t  1466 The co u rt held th a t 
R eynolds’ action was also  ju stified  " to  
avoid the im pression th a t  [the achool] en ­
do rses the  sexual norm s of the  su b jec ts"  
and to shield younger s tu d en ts  from  expo­
su re  to unsu itab le  m aterial. Ibid. The 
deletion of the  article on divorce w as seen 
by the  c o u rt as  a  reasonable  response to 
the invasion of privacy concerns raised  by 
the nam ed s tu d e n t’s rem ark s B ecause the 
artic le  did not indicate th a t the s tu d e n t’s 
p aren ts  had been o ffered  an  opportun ity  to 
respond to  her allegations, said the court, 
there  was cause for "serious doubt th a t  the 
a rtic le  com plied with th e  ru les of fa irness 
which a re  s tan d a rd  in the  field o f  jo u rn a l­
ism and which w ere covered in the  te x t­
book used  in the  Jou rnalism  II c lass ."  Id , 
a t  1467. F u rtherm ore , the  court concluded 
th a t Reynolds w as justified  in deleting  tw o 
full pages o f  the  new spaper, instead  of 
deleting  only the  pregnancy  and  divorce 
sto ries o r requ iring  th a t those s to ries be 
modified to  ad d ress  his concerns, based on 
his "reaso n ab le  belief th a t he had to  make 
an im m ediate decision and th a t  th ere  was 
no tim e to  m ake m odifications to the a r t i ­
cles in question  " Id., a t  1466
T he C ourt of Appeals for the  E ighth 
C ircuit reversed , 795 F.2d 1368 (1986) 
The co u rt held a t o u tse t th a t  S pectrum  was
testified that he had no objection lo these arn
cles and  that they w ere dclticU only becauye
they appeared on the sam e | u | o  a t  the w o
objectionable articles.
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not only "a  p a rt o f the  achool adopted 
cu rricu lum ," id., a t  1373, but also  a public 
forum , because the  new spaper w as " in ten d ­
ed to  be and operated  as a  conduit for 
stu d en t view point.1’ Id., a t 1372. The 
cou rt then concluded th a t S p ec tru m ’s s ta ­
tu s  as a public forum  precluded school o ffi­
cials from  censoring its co n ten ts except 
w hen " ‘necessary  to  avoid m ateria l and 
su b stan tia l in terference  w ith school w ork 
or discipline . . .  o r the  rig h ts  of o th e rs .' " 
Id  , a t  1374 (quoting T in ker  v. Des M oines 
In d ep en d en t C o m m u n ity  School Dist., 
393 U.S. 503, 511, 89 S.Cl. 733, 739, 21 
L  Ed 2d 731 (1969}).
The C ourt of A ppeals found "no evidence 
in the  record th a t the  principal could have 
reasonably  fo recast th a t  the  censored  a r ti­
cles o r any m ateria ls  in the  censored  a r t i­
cles would have m ateria lly  d isrup ted  class- 
work o r given rise to  su b stan tia l d iso rder 
in the  school " 795 F.2d, a t  1375. School 
officials w ere en titled  to censor the  artic les 
on the g round  th a t they  invaded the rig h ts  
of o th ers , according to  the court, only if 
publication of the  a rtic les could have re­
su lted  in to r t  liability to  the school. The 
co u rt concluded th a t  no to r t  action for libel 
o r invasion of privacy could have been 
m aintained a g a in s t the  school by the  su b ­
jec ts  o f the  two artic les o r by the ir fami 
lies A ccordingly, the  cou rt held th a t 
school officials had violated responden ts ' 
F irs t A m endm ent rig h ts  by dele ting  the 
tw o pages o f the new spaper.
W e g ran ted  certio rari, 479 U .S . , 107
S Ct 926, 93 L.Ed.2d 978 W987), and we 
now reverse
II
111 S tuden ts in the  public schools do not 
"shed  th e ir  constitu tional rig h ts  to  freedom  
of speech o r expression a t  the schoolhou&e 
g a te ."  Tinker, supra, 393 U S., a t  506, 89 
S Ct., a t 736 They cannot be punished 
m erely for expressing  the ir personal views 
on the  school p rem ises—w h eth e r "in the 
cafe te ria , o r on the  playing field, o r on the 
cam pus during  the  au tho rised  ho u rs ,"  id ,  
a t  512-513, 89 S.Ct., a t  739-740— unless
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school au th o ritie s  have reaso n  to  believe 
th a t  such exp ression  will “ substan tia lly  in­
te r fe re  w ith the  work o f the  school or 
im pinge upon the  rig h ts  of o th e r  s tu d e n ts  " 
Id., a t  509, 89 S.Ct., a t 738.
(2] We have nonetheless recognized 
th a t  the  F irs t  A m endm ent rig h ts  of stu  
d en ts  in the  public BchoolB "a re  not au to ­
m atically  coextensive w ith  the  rig h ts  of 
ad u lts  in o th e r  se ttin g s ,"  Bethel School
D istric t No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. ------ ,
 , 106 S.Ct. 3159, 3164 , 92 L.Ed.2d 549
(1986), and m ust be "applied in ligh t of the 
special 'charac teristics o f the  school envi­
ronm en t."  Tinker, supra, 393 U.S., a t  506, 
89 S.Ct., a t  736, cf. New Jersey  v. T.L.O., 
469 U.S 325, 341-343, 105 S.Ct. 733, 743- 
744, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). A school need 
not to le ra te  s tu d e n t Bpeech th a t  is incon­
s is te n t w ith its "basic  educational m ission,"
F ra se r , supra , 478 U.S., a t  , 106 S.Ct.,
a t 3166, even th o u g h  the governm en t could 
no t censor sim ilar speech outside the 
school. A ccordingly, we held in Fraser 
th a t  a s tu d e n t could be disciplined for h av ­
ing  delivered a speech th a t w as "sexually  
explicit" b u t no t legally obscene a t an offi 
cial school assem bly, because the  school 
w as en titled  to  "d isassociate  i t s e l f  from  
the  speech in a m anner th a t  would dem on­
s tra te  to o th e rs  th a t such vu lgarity  is 
"w holly inconsisten t w ith the  ‘fundam enta l 
va lues ' of public school education ." Ibid. 
W e th u s recognised  th a t "[t]he  d e te rm in a­
tion of w hat m anner of speech in the c lass­
room o r in school assem bly  is inappropriate 
properly  re s ts  w ith the school board ," id,,
a t  , 106 S.Ct., a t  3165, ra th e r  than  w ith
the  federal co u rts  It is in this context 
th a t resp o n d en ts ' F irs t A m endm ent claim s 
m ust be considered.
A
[3] We deal firs t w ith the question 
w heth er Spectrum  may appropria tely  be 
ch aracterized  as  a forum  fo r public exp res­
sion The public schools do not possess all 
o f the  a ttr ib u te s  o f s tre e ts , parks, and o th ­
e r  trad itional public fo rum s th a t  "tim e ou t
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of mind, have been used for purposes of 
assem bly, com m unicating th o u g h ts  be­
tw een citizens, and discussing public q u es­
tions." Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515, 
59 S Ct. 954, 964, 83 L.Ed 1423 (1939) Cf 
W tdm ur  i). Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-268, 
.n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 269, 273, n. 5, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 
(1981). Hence, school facilities may be 
deem ed to be public forum s only if school 
au tho rities have "by policy o r by p ractice" 
opened those facilities " fo r  indiscrim inate 
use by the  genera l public," Perry E d u ­
cation Assn v. P erry Local E d u ca to rs’ 
Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 47, 103 S.Ct, 948, 956, 
74 L .Ed.2d 794 (1983), or by some segm ent 
of the  public, such as s tu d en t o rgan iza­
tions Id., a t 46, n. 7, 103 S.Ct., a t 955, n. 7 
(citing W idm ar  t\ V in c e n t). I f  the  facili­
ties have instead been reserved  for o ther 
intended purposes, "com m unicative or o th ­
erw ise," then  no public forum  has been 
c rea ted , and school officials may impose 
reasonable  restric tions on the speech of 
s tu d en ts , teachers, and o ther m em bers of 
the school com m unity. Ibid. "T he govern­
m ent does not c rea te  a public forum  by 
inaction or by perm itting  limited discourse, 
bu t only by in tentionally  opening a non- 
trad itional forum  for public discourse," 
C ornelius  t*. N A A C P  Legal Defense £  E d ­
ucational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788. 802, 
105 S.Ct 3439, 3449, 87 L .Ed.2d 567 (1985).
141 The policy of school officials tow ard  
Spectrum  w as reflected  in Hazelwood 
School Board Policy 348.51 and the  H azel­
wood E ast C urriculum  Guide. Board Poli­
cy 348.51 provided th a t  "[s]chool sponsored 
publications a re  developed w ithin the 
adopted curriculum  and its educational im­
plications in reg u la r classroom  activ ities." 
App. 22 The Hazelwood E ast C urriculum  
Guide described the  Jou rnalism  II course 
as a "lab o ra to ry  situa tion  in which the s tu  
den ts  publish the school new spaper apply­
ing skills they have learned in Journalism  
I." Id., a t  11. The lessons th a t w ere to  be 
learned from  the  Journalism  II course, ac ­
cord ing  to the C urriculum  Guide, included 
developm ent o f journalistic  skills under 
deadline p ressu re , " th e  legal, m oral, and
ethical restric tions imposed upon journal 
i l ls  w ithin the  school com m unity," and "re  
aponsibility and acceptance of criticism  for 
a rtic les of opinion." Ibid. Journalism  II 
w as ta u g h t by a  facu lty  m em ber during  
re g u la r  c lass hours. S tu d en ts  received 
g rad es and academ ic cred it for their per 
form ance in the  course.
School officials did not deviate in practice 
from  the ir policy th a t production o f Spec 
tru m  w as to  be p a rt of the  educational 
curriculum  and a " re g u la r  classroom  activ ­
i ty ] ."  The D istrict C ourt found th a t Rob­
e rt S tergos, the journalism  teach er during  
m ost o f  the  1982-1983 school year, "bo th  
had the  au tho rity  to  exercise and in fact 
exercised a  g re a t deal of control over Spec  
tru m ."  607 F.Supp., a t 1453. F or exam  
pie, S te rgos selected  the  ed ito rs of the  
new spaper, scheduled publication dates, de 
cided the num ber of pages fo r each issue, 
assigned  sto ry  ideas to class m em bers, ad 
vised s tu d e n ts  on the  developm ent of th e ir 
sto ries, review ed the use o f quotations, 
edited Btories, selected  and edited the  let 
te rs  to  the editor, and dealt w ith  the print 
ing com pany. M any of th ese  decisions 
w ere m ade w ithout consulta tion  with the 
Journalism  II studen ts. The D istric t C ourt 
th u s found it “clear th a t Mr. S te rgos was 
the  final au tho rity  w ith resp ec t to alm ost 
every  aspect o f the  production and publics 
tion o f Spectrum , including its con ten t."  
Ibid. M oreover, a f te r  each Spectrum  issue 
had been finally approved by S te rgos or his 
successor, the  issue still had to  be reviewed 
by Principal Reynolds prior to  publication 
R esponden ts’ assertion  th a t they  had be­
lieved th a t they could publish "practically 
an y th in g "  in Spectrum  w as th ere fo re  dis 
m issed by the  D istrict C ourt as simply "no t 
credible." Id., a t  1456. T hese fac tual find 
ings a re  am ply supported  by the  record, 
and w ere no t rejected as c learly  erroneous 
by the  C ourt o f Appeals.
The evidence relied upon by the  Court of 
A ppeals in finding Spectrum  to  be a public 
forum , see 795 F.2d, a t 1372-1373, is equ iv ­
ocal a t best. For exam ple, Board Policy 
348.51, which s ta ted  in p a r t  th a t  "[sjchool
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sponsored stu d en t publications will not re ­
s tr ic t free expression or diverae view points 
w ithin the ru les o f responsible jou rnalism ,” 
also s ta ted  th a t such publications w ere "de- 
veloped w ithin the  adopted curricu lum  and 
its educational im plications." App. 22. 
One m ight reasonably  in fe r from  the full 
tex t of Policy 348.51 th a t school officials 
re ta ined  ultim ate  control over w hat consti­
tu ted  "responsib le  jou rn a lism ” in a school- 
sponsored new spaper. A lthough the  S ta te ­
m ent o f Policy published in the  S eptem ber 
14, 1982, issue o f  S pectrum  declared  th a t 
“Spectrum , as a s tu d en t-p ress  publication, 
accepts all r ig h ts  implied by the  F irs t 
A m endm ent," th is  s ta tem en t, understood  in 
the  con tex t of th e  p a p e r’s role in the  
school's curricu lum , su g g e s ts  a t m ost th a t 
the adm in istra tion  will not in te rfe re  with 
the s tu d e n ts ’ exercise of those F irs t 
A m endm ent rig h ts  th a t a tten d  the publica­
tion of a school-sponsored new spaper. It 
does not re flec t an  in ten t to  expand those 
rig h ts  by converting  a cu rricu la r new spa­
per into a public fo rum ,1 Finally, th a t s tu  
den ts  w ere perm itted  to  exercise som e au ­
thority  over the con ten ts of Spectrum  w as 
fully consistent w ith  the  C urriculum  Guide 
objective of teaching  the  Journalism  II s tu ­
den ts  "leadersh ip  responsibilities as issue 
and  page ed ito rs."  App 11. A decision to 
teach leadership  skills in the contex t o f a 
classroom  activity hardly implies a decision 
to  relinquish school control over th a t activ i­
ty . In  sum , the evidence relied upon by the 
C ourt of A ppeals fails to d em o n stra te  the 
"c lear in ten t to  c rea te  a public fo ru m ,” 
C om eltus, 473 U.S., a t  802, 105 S.Ct., a t  
3449-3450, th a t ex isted  in cases in which 
we found public fo rum s to have been cre­
ated  See id., a t  802-803. 105 S.Ct., a t
2. The S tatem ent also cited Tinker v. Dei Moines 
Independent C om m unity School Dist., 393 U S 
303, 89 S C l 731, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969), for the 
proposition (hat "(ojnly speech that ’m aterially  
and substantially in terferes w ith the require  
merits of appropriate  d iscip line’ can be found 
unacceptable and  therefore be p rohibited ." 
App. 26. This po rtion  of the S tatem ent does 
not, of course, even accurately  reflect ou r hold 
ing in Tinker. Furtherm ore, the S tatem ent no­
w here expressly extended the Tinker s tandard  to
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3449-3450 (citing W idm ar  r. Vincent, 454 
U.S., a t  267, 102 S.Ct., a t  273; M adison  
School D istric t v. W isconsin E m p lo ym en t 
R ela tions C om m 'n, 429 U.S. 167, 174, n. 6, 
97 S.Ct. 421, 426, n. 6, 50 L .Ed 2d 376 
(1976); S o u th ea stern  Prom otions, Ltd. v. 
Conrad, 420 U.S 546, 550, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 
1245, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975)). School o ffi­
cials did no t evince e ither "by policy or by 
p rac tice ,"  P erry  E ducation  Assn., 460 
U.S., a t  47, 103 S.Ct., a t  956, any in ten t to 
open the pages o f Spectrum  to "indiscrim i­
n a te  u se ,” ibid., by its s tu d e n t rep o rte rs  
and ed itors, o r by the Btudent body g en e r­
ally Instead , th ey  "reserve[d] th e  forum  
fo r its intended purpos[e],” tdf., a t 46, 103 
S CL, a t  955, as a superv ised  learn ing  expe^ 
rience for journalism  stu d en ts . A ccording 
ly, school officials w ere en titled  to  reg u la te  
the  co n ten ts  o f Spectrum  in any reasonable 
m anner. Ibid. I t is this s tandard , ra th e r  
th an  our decision in T inker, th a t governs 
this case.
B
T he question  w hether the  F irs t Am end 
m en t requ ires a  school to  to le ra te  p a rticu ­
lar s tu d en t speech—the question  th a t we 
add ressed  in T inker—is d iffe ren t from  the  
question  w heth er th e  F irs t A m endm ent re ­
q u ires  a school affirm atively  to  prom ote 
p a rticu la r s tu d e n t speech. The fo rm er 
question  add resses ed u ca to rs’ ability to  si 
lence a  s tu d e n t’s personal expression  th a t 
happens to  occur on the  school prem ises 
The la tte r  question  concerns ed u ca to rs’ a u ­
th o rity  over school-sponsored publications, 
thea trica l productions, and o th e r expressive 
activ ities th a t s tu d en ts , p a ren ts, and m em ­
b ers of the public m ight reasonably  p e r­
ceive to b e a r the  im prim atu r o f the  school.
ihe new t and  feature articles contained in a 
school sponsored new spaper The dissent ap ­
parently  finds as a fact that the S tatem ent was 
published annually  in Spectrum ; however, the 
District Court w as unable to  conclude that the 
S tatem ent appeared  on m ore than  one occasion 
In any event, even if the S tatem ent says w hat 
the dissent believes that il says, the evidence 
that school officials never in tended to designate 
Spectrum  as a public fo rum  rem ains over 
w helm ing
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These activities may fairly  be characterized  
as p a rt o f the achool curriculum , w hether 
or not they occur in a trad itional elaasroom  
Betting, so long as they  a re  superv ised  by 
facu lty  m em bers and designed to  im part 
p a r t i c u la r  know ledge o r skills to  Btudent 
p a r t ic ip a n ts  and audiences.’
[5-81 E ducators are entitled  to exercise 
g re a te r  control over this second form  of 
Etudent expression to  a ssu re  th a t partici 
pan ts  learn  w hatever lessons the activity  is 
designed to teach, th a t readers o r listeners 
are  not exposed to  m ateria l that may be 
inappropria te  for the ir level of m aturity , 
and that the  views of the  individual speak 
er a re  not erroneously  a ttrib u ted  to  the 
school. Hence, a school may in its capacity 
as publisher o f a school new spaper o r p ro­
ducer o f a school play "d isassociate  itse lf,”
F ra se r , 478 U.S , a t ------ , 106 S Ct., at
3166, not only from  speech th a t would 
‘‘substan tia lly  in terfere  w ith [its] w ork . . . 
or im pinge upon the  rig h ts  o f o th e r stu 
d en ts ,"  Tinker, 393 U.S., a t 509, 89 S.Ct., 
a t  738, bu t also from  speech th a t is, for 
exam ple, ungram m atical, poorly w ritten , 
inadequately  researched , biased or p re ju ­
diced, v u lg a r or p rofane, or unsu itab le  for 
im m ature audiences.1 A school m ust be 
able to  se t high s tan d a rd s  fo r the  s tu d en t 
speech th a t is d issem inated  u n d er its aus 
pices—stan d a rd s  th a t  may be h igher than 
those dem anded by som e new spaper pub­
lishers o r thea trica l producers in the  ‘‘rea l” 
w orld—and may re fu se  to  dissem inate stu-
3. The distinction that w t draw  betw een speech 
ihat is sponsored by the school and  speech that 
is nol is fully consistent w ith Popish v. Board oj 
Curators, 410 U.S 6*7, 93 S.Ct. 1197, 35 L.Ed.2d 
618 (1973) (per curiam ), which involved an oFf 
cam pus "underground" new spaper that school 
officials merely had allow ed to  be sold on a 
state university cam pus.
4. The dissent perceives no  difference between 
the First A m endm ent analysis applied in Tinker 
and  that applied in Fraser We disagree The 
decision in Fraser rested on (he "vulgar," "lewd." 
and "plainly offensive" character of a speech 
delivered at an official school assem bly rather 
lhan  on any propensity  of the speech to  "m a.eri 
ally  disrupt) J classw ork o r involve) ] substantial 
disorder o r invasion of the rights of others ’1
d en t speech th a t  does ro t  m eet those stun 
dards In addition, a school m ust be atili 
to  tak e  into account the em otional m aturity 
o f  the  in tended audience in determ ining 
w heth er to d issem inate  s tu d e n t speech on 
potentially  sensitive  topics, which might 
range from  the  existence of S an ta  Claus m 
an  elem entary  school se ttin g  to the particn 
lars of teen ag e  sexual activity  in a high 
school se ttin g  A school m ust also retain 
the  au tho rity  to  re fu se  to  sponsor student 
speech th a t m ight reasonably  be perceived 
to advocate d ru g  o r alcohol use, irresponsi­
ble sex, or conduct o therw ise  inconsistent 
w ith " th e  sh a red  values o f a civilized social
o rd er,"  Fraser, supra, 478 U.S., a t  ,
106 S.Ct., a t 3165, or to a ssoc ia te  the school 
w ith any position o th e r th an  neu tra lity  on 
m a tte rs  of political controversy . O ther 
w ise, the  schools would be unduly con 
s tra in ed  from  fulfilling the ir role as *’a 
principal in stru m en t in aw aken ing  the child 
to  cu ltu ra l values, in p rep a rin g  him for 
la te r  p rofessional train ing, and in helping 
him to ad ju st norm ally to  his environm ent 
Brown v B oard  o f  E ducation , 347 U.S 
483, 493, 74 S.Ct. 686, 691, 98 L.Ed. 873 
(1954)
[9] A ccordingly, we conclude th a t the 
s ta n d a rd  a rticu la ted  in T inker  for deter 
m ining w hen a  school may punish student 
expression need no t also be the  standard  
for determ ining  when a school may refuse 
to  lend iU nam e and resou rces to the dis 
sem ination of Btudent expression .1 In
393 U.S., *l 513, 89 S.Cl , at 740 Indeed, the 
Fraser Court cited as "especially relevant a por 
non  of Justice B lacks dissenting opinion m 
Tinker "disclaim{ing] any purpose to  hold 
that the Federal C onstitution com pels the teat h 
ers. paren ts and elected school officials to  su; 
render contro l of the American public school 
system to public school students." 478 U.S , ai
 , 106 S CI., at 3166 (citing 393 U.S.. at 522
89 S.Ct., at 7*4). Of course. Justice Black s 
observations are equally relevant to the inslani 
case.
5. We therefore need nol decide w hether the 
Court of Appeals correctly construed Tinker as 
precluding school officials from  censoring tin 
dent speech to avoid "invasion of the righis of 
others," 393 U.S.. at 513. 89 S.Ct., at 740, except
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stead , we hold th a t educa to rs do no t offend 
the F irs t A m endm ent by exercising  ed ito ri­
al control over the  sty le  and con ten t of 
s tu d en t speech in school-sponsored expres 
sive activities so long as  th e ir  actions are  
reasonably  re la ted  to  legitim ate pedagogi­
cal concerns*
[10] Th is s tan d ard  is consisten t with 
ou r oft-expressed view th a t the education 
o f the  N atio n ’s youth  is prim arily the  re ­
sponsibility o f pa ren ts , teachers, and s ta te  
and  local school officials, and not of federal 
judges See, e.g.. B oard  o f  E duca tion  o f  
H en d n ck  H udson C entral School D ist t'. 
Rowley. 458 U.S. 176, 208, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 
3051, 73 L .Ed.2d 690 (1982); Wood v. 
Strickland , 420 U.S. 308, 326, 95 S.Ct. 992, 
1003, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975); E pperson t>. 
A rkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104, 89 S.Ct. 266, 
270, 21 L Ed 2d 228 (1968). I t  is only when 
the decision to  censor a school-sponsored 
publication, thea trica l production, or o ther 
vehicle o f s tu d en t expression  has no valid 
educational purpose th a t  the F irs t Amend 
m ent is so “ directly and sharp ly  impli 
cate[d],’’ ibid., as to  req u ire  judicial in te r­
vention to  p ro tect Btudents* constitu tional 
righ ts  7
III
[11] We also conclude th a t Principal 
Reynolds acted reasonably  in requ iring  the 
deletion from  the May 13 issue o f Spectrum  
o f the pregnancy article, the  divorce article,
w here thai speech could result in lort Liability to
the school
fc. We reject respondents' suggestion lhai school 
officials be perm itted to exercise prepublication 
control oser school sponsored publications only 
pursuant to specific w ritten regulations. To re 
quire such regulations in the context of a curri 
cular activity could unduly constrain  the ability 
of educators to educate. We need nol now 
decide w hether such regulations are required 
before school officials may censor publications 
not sponsored by the school that students seek 
to distribute on school grounds See Baughm an  
v. Freienmuth. 478 F.2d 1345 (CA4 1973); Sftarr 
tty  v. Northwest Independent School Dtst , Bexar 
Cty . Tex , 4*2 ¥ 2d 960 (CAS 1972), Eisner v. 
S tam ford  Board o f Education, 440 F.2d 803 
(CA2 1971)
and th e  rem aining artic les th a t  w ere to 
ap p ea r on the  sam e pages o f the  new spa 
per.
The initial p a rag rap h  o f th e  pregnancy  
artic le  declared th a t "(a]ll nam es have been 
changed  to keep th e  identity  o f  these  g irls 
a se c re t.” The principal concluded th a t the 
s tu d e n ts ' anonym ity was no l adequately  
p ro tected , how ever, given th e  o th e r iden 
tify in g  inform ation in the  artic le  and the 
sm all num ber o f  p reg n an t s tu d e n ts  a t the 
school. Indeed, a teach er a t the  school 
credibly testified  th a t  she could positively 
identify  a t  Je a s t one o f the  g irls  and possi 
bly all th ree . I t is likely th a t  many stu  
den ts  a t  Hazelwood E ast would have been 
a t  least as successfu l in identify ing the 
g irls. Reynolds th erefo re  could reasonably  
have feared  th a t  the  article violated w h a t­
ev er pledge o f anonym ity had been given to 
the p reg n an t s tu d en ts . In addition, he 
could reasonably  have been concerned th a t 
the  a rtic le  w as not su ffic ien tly  sensitive to 
the  privacy in te re s ts  of the  s tu d e n ts ' boy­
friends and p aren ts, who w ere discussed in 
the  a rtic le  bu t who w ere given no opportu- 
nity to consent to its publication o r to o ffe r 
a  response. The article did not contain 
graph ic  accounts o f sexual activity. The 
g irls  did com m ent in the artic le , however, 
concerning the ir sexual h istories and their 
use  o r nonuse o f b irth  control. I t  was not 
unreasonab le  for the  principal to have con­
cluded th a t such frank  talk w as inappropri­
a te  in a  school sponsored publication dis-
7. A num ber of low er federal court! have aim 
ilarly recognized lhai educato r!1 detritions with 
regard  to  the content or school-sponsored news 
papers, dram atic productions, and  o ther expres 
sive activities a re  entitled to  substantial defer 
ence See, e g , Nicholson v Board o f Education  
Torrance Unified School Dist., *82 F.2d 858 CCA9 
1982); Seyfned  v Watton. 6*8 F.2d 214 (CA3 
1981); Trachtman  v. Anker. 563 F.2d 512 (CA2 
1977), cert denied, 435 U.S 925, 98 S Cl 1491. 
55 L Ed 2d 519 (1978); Frasca v. Andrews, 463 
F.Supp, 1043 (EDNY 1979). We need not now 
decide w hether the sam e degree of deference is 
appropriate  w ith respect to school-sponsored ex­
pressive activilies at the college and  university 
level.
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stead , we hold th a t educator*  do no t offend  
the F irs t A m endm ent by exercising  ed itori­
al control over the  s ty le  snd  co n ten t of 
s tu d en t speech in school-sponsored ex p res­
sive activities so long as the ir actions a re  
reasonably  re la ted  to  legitim ate pedagogi­
cal concerns.*
|I 0 ]  This s ta n d a rd  is co n sis ten t w ith 
ou r oft-expressed  view th a t the  education  
of the N ation 's you th  is prim arily  th e  re­
s p o n s ib il i ty  o f pa ren ts , teach ers , and  s ta te  
and local school officials, and no t o f  federal 
judges. See, e.g.. B oard o f  E ducation  o f  
H tn d n e k  H udson C entra l School Dist. v. 
Rowley, 458 U.S 176, 208. 102 S .C t 3034, 
.1051, 73 L .Ed.2d 690 <1982); Wood r. 
S t n e k  land. 420 U.S. 308. 326, 95 S .C t 992. 
1003. 43 L E d .2d  214 (1975); E pperson  i>. 
d n to /W flj. 393 U.S. 97, 104 , 89 S .C t 266, 
270. 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968). I t  is only when 
the decision u> censor a  school-sponsored 
publication, th ea trica l production, o r o th e r 
veh icle of s tu d e n t expression  has no valid 
educational purpose th a t  the  F irs t A m end­
m en t is so "d irec tly  and  sh a rp ly  impli­
e s le[d]," ibid., as to  requ ire  judicial in te r­
vention to  p ro tec t s tu d e n ts ’ constitu tional 
rig h ts  7
III
[11] W e a lso  conclude th a t  Principal 
R eynolds acted  reasonab ly  in requ iring  the 
deletion from  the  May 13 issue o f Spectrum  
o f the  pregnancy  artic le , the  divorce article,
w here ih i l  speech could result In tort liability to
the school.
a  We reject respondents' suggestion that school 
officials be permitted to exercise prepub lies l ion 
contro l over school sponsored publications only 
pursuant to specific written regulation*. To re­
quire such regulations in the context o f a cu m  
cular a t t iviiy could unduly constrain the ability 
of educators to educate. We need not now 
decide whether such regulation* are required 
before school officials may censor publications 
not sponsored by the school that students seek 
to d istribute on school ground*. See Baughman 
• Ftrienmuth. 478 F 2d 1345 (CA4 1973). Shan 
ley v. S'orl finest Independent School Out., Bexar 
Cty.. Tex . 462 F.2d 960 (CAS I972h Eisner v. 
S tam ford  Board o f  Education, 440 F-2d BO) 
(CA2 1971)
and th e  rem ain ing  artic les th a t  w ere to 
ap p ea r on the sam e pages o f the  new spa­
per
T he initial p a rag rap h  o f th e  pregnancy  
a rtic le  declared  t h a t ' [aJit nam es have been 
changed  to  keep the  identity of these  g irls 
a se c re t.’’ T he principal concluded th a t the 
s tu d e n ts ' anonym ity  w as not adequately  
pro tec ted , how ever, given the  o ther iden­
tify in g  inform ation in the artic le  and the 
sm all num ber o f p reg n an t s tu d e n ts  a t the 
school. Indeed, a teacher a t the school 
credibly  testified  th a t she could positively 
identify  a t  leas t one of the g irls  a n d  possi­
bly all th ree . I t  is likely th a t m any s tu ­
den ts  a t  H azelw ood E ast would hsve been 
a t  le a s t as successfu l in identify ing the 
g irls. Reynolds th erefo re  could reasonably  
have feared  th a t  the  artic le  violated w h a t­
ev e r p ledge o f anonym ity had been given to 
the  p reg n an t stu d en ts . In addition, he 
could reasonab ly  have been concerned th a t 
the artic le  w as no t sufficien tly  sensitive to 
the  privacy in te re s ts  of the  s tu d e n ts ’ boy­
friends and  p a re n ts , who w ere discussed in 
the  artic le  b u t who w ere given no opportu ­
nity to  consent to  its publication o r to o ffe r 
a  response. The article did no t contain 
g raph ic  accoun ts o f sexual activity . The 
g irls  did com m ent in the  artic le , however, 
concern ing  th e ir  sexual h istories and th e ir 
use o r  nonuse o f b irth  control. I t w as not 
unreasonab le  fo r the  principal to  have con­
cluded th a t such  frank ta lk  w as inappropri­
a te  in a school-sponsored publication dis
7. 4 num ber of lower 'rd c ra l court i have sim
tlarly recognized that educator* dec m o m  with 
regard  lo  the content Af school ip on to red  new* 
pa per*, d ram atic  production*, and  o ther rx p m -  
sive act I vt lie* are entitled to  substantial defer 
ence. Sec, *.g., Nicholson v Board of Education  
Torrance Unified School D ot . 682 F 2d 858 (CA9 
1932); Sey fn ed  v. W r’ion, 668 F 2d .’ 14 (CA1 
1981); Trachtm an v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (CA2 
1977), cert, denied. 4J5 U S 925. 98 SC i 1491. 
55 L E t12d  519 (1975). Frasca r  A n d t-n s , 46) 
F-Supp. 104) (EDbfY 1979). We need not now 
decide w hether the *ame degree of deference n 
appropria te  w ith respect to school sponsored ex 
p reu iv c  artivine* at li e college jn d  u n n rn i iv  
led
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Justice  B R EN N A N , w ith whom 
Ju stice  M ARSHALL and Justice  
BLACKMUN join, d issenting.
When the young men and women of Ha 
zelwood E a s t High School reg is te red  for 
Journalism  II, they  expected  a civics les­
son. Spectrum , the  new spaper they  w ere 
to  publish, "w as not ju s t  a class exercise in 
which s tu d en ts  learned to  p repare  papers 
and hone w riting  skills, it w as a . . ,  forum  
estab lished  to  give s tu d en ts  an opportun ity  
to  express th e ir  views while gain ing  an 
appreciation o f th e ir  rig h ts  and responsibil 
ities under the  F irs t A m endm ent to  th e  
United S ta tes  C onstitu tion . . . . "  795 F.2d 
1368, 1373 (CA8 1986). "[A]t the  beginning 
o f each school yea r,"  id., a t  1372, the  s tu ­
den t jo u rn a lis ts  published a S ta tem en t of 
Policy—tacitly  approved each y ear by 
school au th o ritie s—announcing the ir expec­
tation  th a t “Spectrum , as a s tu d e n t p ress 
publication, accep ts alt righ ts  implied by 
the  F irs t A m en d m en t. . .  . Only speech 
tha t ‘m aterially  and  substan tia lly  in te rfe res  
w ith the  requ irem en ts of app rop ria te  disci­
pline' can be found unacceptable and th e re ­
fore prohibited ." App. 26 (quoting Tinker  
r  Des M oines Independen t C o m m u n ity  
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513, 89 S.Ct. 
733. 740. 21 L.Ed 2d 731 (1969)).1 The 
school board itse lf  affirm atively  g u a ra n ­
teed the s tu d en ts  of Jou rnalism  II an a tm o­
sphere  conducive to  fo ste rin g  such an  ap ­
preciation and exercising the full panoply 
o f rig h ts  associated  with a  free  s tu d en t 
p ress. "School sponsored s tu d en t publica­
tions," it vowed, "w ill not re s tr ic t free ex ­
pression  or diverse view points w ithin the 
ru les o f responsib le journalism ." App 22 
(Board Policy § 348.51).
This case arose  when the Hazelwood 
E ast adm inistra tion  breached its own prom  
ise, dashing its s tu d e n ts ’ expectations. The 
school principal, w ithou t prior consulta tion  
or explanation, excised six a rtic le s— com
1- The Court suggest* that the passage quoted in 
the text did nol ”exien[dl ihe Tinker standard  io 
the news and feature articles contained in a 
school sponsored new spaper" because Ihe pas 
aage did nol expressly m en I ion them  Ante, ai 
549, n 2 II is hard  lo  im agine why the C oun
573
prising  tw o full p a g e s—of the  May 13, 
1983, issue o f Spectrum . He did so  not 
because any o f the  artic les w ould “ m uten  
ally and su b stan tia lly  in te rfe re  w ith  the 
req u irem en ts  o f app rop ria te  discipline," 
b u t sim ply because he considered tw o of 
the  six "inappropria te , personal, sensitive, 
and unsu itab le" fo r s tu d en t consum ption 
795 F.2d, a t  1371
In my view the  principal broke m ore than 
ju s t  a prom ise. He violated the  F irs t 
A m endm ent’s prohibitions a g a in s t cen so r­
ship o f any s tu d e n t expression th a t  ne ither 
d is ru p ts  class w ork nor invades th e  rig h ts  
o f o th e rs , and ag a in s t any censorsh ip  th a t 
is no t narrow ly tailored to  serve its pur 
pose.
I
Public education serves vital national in­
te re s ts  in p rep arin g  the  N ation’s youth  for 
life in o u r increasingly  complex society and 
for the  du ties o f citizenship in o u r demo­
cra tic  Republic. See Broum  r. B oard o f  
E ducation , 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S.Ct. 686, 
691, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954). The public school 
conveys to  our young the inform ation and 
toots requ ired  no t m erely to  survive in, but 
to  co n tribu te  to, civilized society. I t also 
inculcates in tom orrow ’6 leaders the  " fu n ­
dam en ta l values necessary  to  the m ain te­
nance o f a dem ocratic political system  . . . ” 
A m bach  r. Noru'ick, 441 U.S. 68, 77, 99 
S .C t 1589, 1595, 60 L .Ed.2d 49 (1979) All 
the  while, the public educato r n u rtu re s  s tu ­
d e n ts ’ social and m oral developm ent by 
tran sm ittin g  to  them  an  official dogm a of 
" ‘com m unity v a lu e s ’ ” B oard  o f  E d u ­
cation  i’. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864, 102 S.Ct. 
2799, 2806. 73 L .Ed.2d 435 (1982) (plurality  
opinion) (citation om itted).
The public ed u ca to r’s task  is w eighty and 
delicate indeed It dem ands particu larized  
and suprem ely subjective choices am ong
(or anyone else) mighl expect a passage lhai 
applies categorically lo "a student press public* 
lion," com posed alm ost exclusively of "news 
and feature articles," lo m ention those catego 
n e s  expressly. U nderstandably, ne ither court 
below so lim ited ihe passage.
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diverse curricula, m oral values, and politi­
cs,) s tances to  teach or inculcate in s tu ­
dents. and am ong various m ethodologies 
fo r doing so. Accordingly, we have tra d i­
tionally reserved  the ‘‘daily operation  of 
achool sy stem s" to  the  S ta tes  and the ir 
local school boards. Epperson  r. A rka n  
ssls. 393 U.S. 97, 104, 89 S.Ct 266, 270 , 21 
L .Ed.2d 228 (1968), see B oard o f  E d u ­
cation  v. Pico, supra, 457 U.S., a t 863-864, 
102 S.Ct , a t 2806. We have not, however, 
hesita ted  to in tervene w here the ir decisions 
run afoul of the C onstitu tion See eg.,
Edu’ards  r. A guiltard , 482 U.S. ------ , 107
S.Ct. 2573, 96 L .Ed.2d 510 (1987) (strik ing  
• ta te  s ta tu te  th a t forbade teaching of evo­
lution in public school unless accom panied 
by instruction  on theory  of "crea tion  sci­
ence"); B oard o f  E ducation  v. Pico , supra  
(school board may not rem ove books from  
library shelves m erely because it d isap­
proves o f ideas they  express), E pperson  t'. 
A rkansas, supra  (s trik ing  state-law  prohi­
bition ag a in s t teaching D arw inian theory  of 
evolution in public school), West Virginia  
Board o f  E ducation  v. B arnette, 319 U.S. 
624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed 1628 (1943) 
(public school may not compel s tu d e n t to 
sa lu te  flag); Meyer t>. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed, 1042 (1923) 
(s ta te  law prohibiting the teaching of fo r­
eign languages in public or p rivate schools 
is unconstitutional).
F ree s tu d en t expression undoubtedly 
som etim es in te rfe re s  w ith th e  effec tiveness 
of the  school’s pedagogical functions. 
Some brands of s tu d e n t expression do so 
by directly  preven ting  the  Bchool from  p u r­
suing its pedagogical mission; T he young 
polemic who stands on a  soapbox during 
calculus class to deliver an  eloquen t politi­
cal d iatribe in te rfe res  w ith the legitim ate 
teaching of calculus. And the s tu d e n t who 
delivers a lewd endorsem ent of a s tuden t 
governm ent candidate m ight so extrem ely  
d is trac t an  im pressionable high school audi­
ence as to in te rfe re  w ith the orderly  o p e ra ­
tion of the  school. See Bethel School Dist.
No iOS v. Eraser, 478 U .S . , 106 S.Ct.
3159, 92 L .Ed.2d 549 (1986). O th er n u d e n t
speech, how ever, f ru s tra te s  the  school’s le­
g itim ate  pedagogical purposes m erely bv 
expressing  a  m essag e  th a t  conflicts with 
the  school’s, w ithou t d irectly  in terfering  
w ith the  school's expression o f its m essage 
A Btudent who responds to  a  political Bci 
ence te a c h e r’s question w ith the  re to rt, 
"Socialism  is good," su b v erts  the  school s 
inculcation o f the  m essage  th a t  capitalism  
is b e tte r  Even the  m averick who sits in 
c lass passively sporting  a  sym bol o f p ro test 
a g a in s t a  governm en t policy, cf. T inker  r. 
Des M oines Independen t School Dist., 393 
U.S 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 
(1969), or the  gossip  w ho s its  in the studen t 
com m ons sw apping  stories o f sexual esca 
pade could readily  m uddle a c lear official 
m essage  condoning the governm ent policy 
o r condem ning teenage sex. Likewise, the 
s tu d e n t new spaper th a t, like Spectrum , 
conveys a m oral position a t odds w ith the 
school's official s tance  m ight su b v ert the 
adm in is tra tio n 's  legitim ate inculcation of 
its own perception o f com m unity values
If m ere incom patibility w ith the  school’s 
pedagogical m essage  w ere a constitu tional 
ly su ffic ien t justification  for the su p p res­
sion o f s tu d e n t speech, school officials 
could censor each o f the  s tu d en ts  or stu  
den t o rgan isa tions in the  foregoing hypo­
th e t ic a l ,  converting  ou r public schools into 
"enclaves of to ta lita rian ism ," i d ,  a t 511, 89 
S Ct., at 739, th a t  "s tra n g le  the free  mind 
a t its sou rce ,"  West V irginia S ta te  Board  
o f  E duca tion  v. Barnette, supra, 319 U.S., 
a t  637, 63 S .C t, a t 1185. The F irs t A m end­
m ent perm its no such b lanket censorship 
au tho rity . W hile the  “constitu tional righ ts  
o f s tu d en ts  in public school are  not au to ­
m atically  coextensive w ith the  rig h ts  of 
ad u lts  in o th e r se ttin g s ,"  F ra se r , supra, 
478 U.S., a t  ------ , 106 S.Ct., a t 3164, s tu ­
den ts  in the  public schools do not "shed 
the ir constitu tional r ig h ts  to  freedom  of 
speech or expression  at the  schoolhouse 
g a te ,” Tinker, supra, 393 U.S., a t  506, 89 
S t ’t., a t 736. J u s t  as the public on the 
s tre e t co rner m ust, in th e  in te rest o f fo ster 
ing "en ligh tened  opinion," C antw ell r. 
C onnecticut, 310 U.S. 296 , 310, 60 S.Ct
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900. 906, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940), to le ra te  
speech th a t " tem p t(s] [the lis tener] to 
throw  [the speaker] o ff the  s tre e t ,” id., a t 
309, 60 S.Ct., a t 906, public ed u ca to rs  m ust 
accom m odate som e s tu d en t expression 
even if it o ffends them  or o ffe rs  view s or 
values th a t contrad ict those the  school 
w ishes to inculcate.
In Tinker, th is C o u rt s truck  the  balance 
We held th a t official censorship  o f s tu d en t 
exp ression—th ere  th e  suspension o f sev er­
al s tu d en ts  until they  rem oved th e ir  a rm ­
bands p ro testin g  the  V ietnam  W ar—is un ­
constitu tional unless th e  speech "m ateria lly  
d isru p ts  classw ork o r involves su b stan tia ! 
d iso rder or invasion o f the  rig h ts  of o th ­
e r s . . . ” Tinker, 393 U.S., a t  513, 89 
S.Ct., a t  740. School officials may not sup^ 
p ress "silen t, passive expression of opinion, 
unaccom panied by any  d isorder o r d is tu r 
bance on the  p a rt o f" the  sp eak er Id., a t 
608, 89 S.Ct., a t  737. The "m ere  desire  to 
avoid the  d iscom fort and unp leasan tness 
th a t alw ays accom pany an  unpopular view ­
point," id., a t 509, 89 S.Ct., a t 738, or an 
unsavory  subject, Fraser, supra , 478 U S ,
a t  ------ , 106 S.Ct., a t 3167-3168 (BREN
NAN, J., concurring  in judgm ent), does not 
ju s tify  official suppression  o f s tu d e n t 
speech in the  high school.
This C ourt applied the T inker  te s t  ju s t  a 
Term  ago in Fraser, supra, upholding an 
official decision to  discipline a s tu d e n t for 
delivering a lewd speech in su p p o rt o f a 
studen t-governm en t candidate. T he C ourt 
today casts  no do u b t on T in k e r ’s vitality. 
Instead  it erec ts  a taxonom y o f school cen­
sorship , concluding th a t  T inker  applies to 
one category  and no t another. On the  one 
hand is censorship  " to  silence a s tu d e n t's  
personal expression  th a t  happens to  occur 
on the  school p rem ises ” A nte, a t  569, 
On the  o th e r hand is censorship  o f ex p res­
sion th a t  a rises in the  context o f “school- 
sponsored expressive  activ ities th a t
studen ts , paren ts, and m em bers o f th e  pub­
lic m ight reasonably  perceive to  b ear the 
im prim atur of the  school." Ibid.
The C ourt does not, for it cannot, p u rp o rt 
to discern from  o u r precedents the  diatinc-
575
tion it crea tes. One could. I suppose, readi 
)y characterize  the  T in k ers’ symbolic 
speech as "personal expression th a t hap­
pens to  [have] o c c u rre d ]  on school p rem is­
e s ,” a lthough  T in ker  did not even hint th a t 
the  personal n a tu re  of the  speech w as of 
any (much leas dispositive) relevance. B ut 
th a t  sam e description could no t by any 
stre tch  of the  im agination fit F ra se r 's  
speech. He did no t ju s t "h ap p en ” to deliv­
e r his lewd Bpeech to  an ad hoc gath erin g  
on th e  p layground. As the  second p a ra ­
g rap h  o f F raser  evinces, if ever a  forum  
fo r s tu d en t expression w as "school-spon­
so red ,” F ra s e r ’s was:
" F ra se r  . . .  delivered a speech nom inat­
ing a  fellow s tu d e n t fo r s tu d e n t elective 
office. A pproxim ately 600 high school 
s tu d e n ts  . . .  a ttended  the  assem bly. 
S tu d en ts  w ere required  to  a tten d  the as 
sem hly o r to  re p o rt to  study  hall. The 
assem bly  w as p a rt of a school-sponsored  
educational p rogram  in self-govern­
m en t,” Fraser, 478 U.S., a t ------ , 106
S.Ct., a t 3162 (em phasis added)
Y et, from  the f irs t sentence of its analysis,
see id., a t ------ , 106 S.Ct., a t  , F r a s e r
faith fu lly  applied Tinker
N o r has th is  C ourt ever in tim ated a dis- 
tinction betw een personal and school-spon­
sored  speech in any o th e r context. P a rticu ­
larly telling  is this C ourt’s heavy reliance 
on T inker  in tw o cases o f F irs t A m end­
m en t in fringem ent on s ta te  college cam pus­
es, See Papish v. U niversity o f  A ftssouri 
B oard  o f  Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 671, n 6, 
93 S .C t 1197, 1199, n. 6, 35 L.Ed 2d 618 
(1973) (per curiam ); H ealy v. James, 408 
U.S. 169, 180, 189, and n. 18, 191, 92 S.Ct. 
2338, 2345. 2350, and n. 18, 2351, 33 L Ed 
2d 266 (1972) One involved the  expulsion 
o f a s tu d en t for lewd expression in a new s­
paper th a t she sold on cam pus p u rsu an t to 
un iversity  au thoriza tion , see Papish, s u ­
pra, 410 U.S.. a t  667-668, 93 S.Ct., a t 1197- 
1198, and the  o th e r invoived the  denial of 
y. ;versity  recognition and concom itant beli­
e f ' a  to  a political s tu d en t organization , see 
F saly , supra , 408 U.S., a t  174, 176, 181 — 
182. 92 S.Ct,, a t  2342, 2343, 2346-2347.
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T rack ing  T in k e r 's  analysis, the C ourt 
found  each ac t o f suppression  u n constitu ­
tional. In neither case did this C ourt Bug 
g e s t the  distinction, which the  C ourt today 
finds dispositive, betw een school-sponsored 
and  incidental s tu d en t expression.
II
Even if we w ere w riting  on a clean slate, 
I would reject the  C o u rt’s ra tionale  fo r 
abandoning  T inker  in th is  case. The C ourt 
o ffe rs  no m ore th an  an obscure tan g le  of 
th ree  excuses to a ffo rd  ed u ca to rs  " g re a te r  
con tro l” over school-sponsored speech than 
the  T inker  te s t would perm it, the  public 
ed u ca to r's  p rerogative  to control cu rric ­
ulum ; the  pedagogical in te re s t in shielding 
the  high school audience from  objectionable 
view points and sensitive topics; and the 
school's need to dissociate itse lf from  s tu ­
den t expression. A n te , a t  569-570. N one of 
th e  excuses, once d isen tangled , supp o rts  
the  distinction th a t  the  C ourt d raw s. T ink­
er  fully  ad d resses  the f irs t concern; the  
•econd is illegitim ate; and  the th ird  is 
readily  achievable th ro u g h  less oppressive 
m eans.
A
The C ourt is certa in ly  co rrec t th a t  the  
F irs t A m endm ent perm its ed u ca to rs  "to  a s ­
su re  th a t partic ipan ts learn  w hatever les­
sons the  activity is designed to  teach . . . ” 
A n te , a t  570. T h a t is, how ever, the  e s ­
sence of the  Tinker  te s t, not an excuse to 
abandon it. U nder Tinker, school officials 
m ay censor only such s tu d en t speech as 
would "m ateria lly  d isrup ft]" a leg itim ate  
cu rricu la r function. M anifestly , Btudent 
speech is m ore likely to  d is ru p t a cu rricu la r 
function w hen it a rises  in th e  co n tex t of a 
cu rricu la r ac tiv ity—one th a t “ is designed 
to  teach" som eth ing—than  w hen it  a rises 
in the  con tex t o f a noncurricu lar activity. 
T hus, under Tinker, the  school may consti­
tu tionally  punish  the  budding political o ra ­
to r  if he d isru p ts  calculus class b u t not if 
he holds his tongue  fo r the  cafe teria . See 
C onsolidated E dison Co v. Public Sendee  
Com m  ’n, 447 U.S. 630, 544-545, 100 S.Ct.
2326, 2337, 65 L.Ed.2d 319 (19801 (STf;vr\s 
J ., concurring  in judgm ent). T h a t is not 
because som e m ore s tr in g en t standard  ap 
plies in the cu rricu la r context. (AfLer all 
th is  C ourt applied the sam e standard  
w h e th e r the  T inkers w ore th e ir  a^mband^ 
to  the  "c lassroom " or the  “cafe te ria  " 3<i;t 
U.S., a t 522. 89 S.Cl., a t 740 ) It is because 
Btudent speech in the  noncurricu lar context 
is less likely to  d isrup t m aterially  any legit 
im ate pedagogical purpose.
I fully ag ree  w ith the  C ourt th a t the 
F irs t A m endm ent should a ffo rd  an edu 
ca to r the  p re ro g a tiv e  no t to  Bponsor the 
publication o f  a  new spaper article th a t is 
"ung ram m atica l, poorly w ritten , made 
q u a te ly  researched , biased o r  prejudiced,' 
or th a t  fa lls sh o rt o f the  "h igh  stan d ard s 
fo r , , . s tu d e n t speech th a t is dissem inated 
un d er [the school's] a u s p ic e s . . . . "  Ante. 
a t 570. B u t wc need no t abandon Tinker  
to  reach th a t  conclusion; we need only 
apply it. The enum era ted  crite ria  reflect 
the  skills th a t  the  cu rricu la r new spaper " i s  
designed to  teach ,"  The educato r may, 
under Tinker, constitu tionally  “ censor" 
poor g ram m ar, w riting , o r research  be­
cause  to  rew ard  such expression  would 
"m ateria lly  d isrup [t]"  the  new spaper's  cur 
ricu lar purpose.
The sam e canno t be said of official cen 
sorsh ip  designed  to  shield the  audience  or 
dissociate the  sponsor  from  the  expression. 
C ensorship  bo m otivated m igh t well serve
(although, as I dem onstra te  in fra , a t --------
 , cannot legitim ately  serve) som e other
school purpose. B ut it in no way fu rth e rs  
the  cu rricu la r purposes of a s tu d en t news 
paper, un less one believes th a t the purpost 
o f the  school new spaper is to  teach stu 
den ts  th a t the  p ress  o u g h t never rep o rt bad 
new s, ex p ress  unpopular view s, or print a 
th o u g h t th a t  m ight upBet its sponsors. Un­
su rp rising ly , H azelw ood E a s t claims no 
B u c h  pedagogical purpose.
The C ourt relies on bits o f testim ony to 
p o rtray  the  principal’s conduct as a  peda 
gogical lesson to  Jou rnalism  II s tuden ts 
who "had  no t su ffic ien tly  m astered  those
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portions o f the . . , curriculum  th a t p e r­
tained to the tre a tm e n t of controversia l 
issues and personal a ttack s, the  need to 
p ro tect the privacy of individuals and 
'th e  legal, moral, and ethical restric tions 
im posed upon jo u rn a lis ts .. Artie, a t
572. In th a t reg a rd , the C ourt a ttem p ts  
to ju stify  censorship  of the article on teen 
age pregnancy  on the  basis o f the princi­
pa l's  ju dgm en t th a t (1) “ the [p reg n an t] s tu ­
d en ts ' anonym ity w as not adequately  p ro ­
tec ted ,"  despite the  a rtic le ’s use  o f aliases; 
and  (2) the ju d g m en t " th a t the  artic le  w as 
not sufficien tly  sensitive to  the  privacy in­
te re s ts  of the  s tu d e n ts ’ boyfriends and p a r­
e n t s .  A nte, a t  571 Sim ilarly, the 
Court finds in th e  principal’s decision to 
censor the divorce a rtic le  a journalis tic  les­
son th a t  the  au th o r should have given the 
fa th e r  of one s tu d e n t an "opportun ity  to 
defend him self” a g a in s t her ch a rg e  th a t (in 
the C o u rt’s words) he "chose 'p lay ing  cards 
w ith the g u y s ' over home and fam ily . . ."  
Ante, a t 572
B ut the  pnncipal never consulted the s tu ­
dents before censoring their w ork. ”[T]hey 
learned o f the deletions when the  paper 
was released . . . "  795 F.2d, a t 1371. F u r­
ther, he explained the  deletions only in the 
broadest o f generalities. In one m eeting 
called a t the  beh est o f  Beven p ro testing  
Spectrum  s ta f f  m em bers (presum ably  a 
fraction of the full class), he characterized  
the artic les as " 'too sensitive ' for 'o u r im­
m ature  audience of re a d e rs ,’ " 607 F.Supp. 
1450, 1459 (ED M o.1985), and  in a la te r  
m eeting he deem ed them  simply “ inappro­
priate. personal, sensitive  and unsu itab le  
for the new spaper,” ibid. The C o u rt’s sup ­
position th a t the principal intended (or the 
p ro tes te rs  understood) those g enera lities 
as a lesson on the  nuances o f  journalistic  
responsibility is u tte rly  incredible. I f  he 
did, a fac t th a t n e ither the D istrict C ourt 
nor the C ourt of A ppeals found, the lesson 
was lost on all bu t the psychic Spectrum  
‘-taffer.
B
The C o u rt’s second excuse for deviating 
from precedent is the  school's in te re s t in
577
shielding an im pressionable high school au 
dience from  m ateria l w hose substance  is 
"un su itab le  for im m ature  audiences." 
A nte, a t  570 (footnote om itted). Specifics! 
ly, the m ajority  decrees th a t  we m ust a f ­
ford ed u ca to rs  au th o rity  to  shield high 
school s tu d e n ts  from  exposure to  “poten­
tially sensitive topics" (like " th e  particu lars 
o f  teen ag e  sexual activ ity") o r unac 
cep tab le  social view points (like the  advoca 
cy o f  "irresponsib le  se[x] or conduct o th e r­
w ise inconsisten t w ith ‘the sh ared  values of 
a civilised social o rder' ") th ro u g h  school- 
sponsored s tu d en t activities. Id., a t 570 
(citation om itted).
Tinker  teaches us th a t the s ta te  edu 
c a to r 's  undeniable, and undeniably vital, 
m andate  to  inculcate m oral and political 
values is not a general w a rran t to  act as 
" th o u g h t police” stifling  discussion of all 
bu t s ta te-approved  topics and advocacy of 
all bu t the official position. See also EP 
person  v. A rkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 89 S.Ct. 
266, 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968); Meyer i\ N e­
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L Ed 
1042 (1923). O therw ise educators could 
tran sfo rm  s tu d en ts  into “ closed-circuit re ­
cipients of only th a t which the S ta te  choos­
es to  com m unicate,” Tinker, 393 U.S., a t 
511, 89 S.Ct., a t  739, and cast a perverse  
and im perm issible “pall of orthodoxy over 
the  classroom ," K eytshian v. B oard o f  Re­
gents, 385 U.S. 589, 603, 87 S.Ct. 675, 683, 
17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967). Thus, the S la te  
cannot constitu tionally  prohibit its high 
school s tu d en ts  from  recoun ting  in the 
locker room  “the  particu la rs  of [their] teen ­
age sexual activ ity ," nor even from  advo­
cating  “irresponsib le  se[x]“ o r o th e r p re­
sum ed abom inations of " th e  shared  values 
o f a civilized social o rd e r."  Even in its 
capacity  as educato r the  S ta te  may not 
assum e an O rw ellian "guard iansh ip  of the 
public m ind," Thomas v. Collins. 323 U.S 
516, 545 , 65 S.Ct. 315, 329, 89 L.Ed 430 
(1945) (Jackaon, J ., concurring).
The m ere fac l of school sponsorship does 
not, as  the  C ourt su g g ests , license such 
th o u g h t control in the high school, w hether
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th ro u g h  school suppression  of disfavored 
view points o r th ro u g h  official a ssessm en t 
of topic sensitivity.* The fo rm er would 
co nstitu te  unabashed  and unconstitu tional 
view point discrim ination, see B oard  o f  E d ­
ucation  i>. Pico. 457 U.S., a t 878-879, 102 
S.Ct.. a t  2813-2814 (BLACK.MUN, J„  con 
cu rrin g  in p a r t and concurring  in ju d g ­
ment), a s  well as an  im perm issible in fringe­
m ent o f the s tu d e n ts ' " ‘rig h t to  receive 
in form ation  and ideas,’ "  id., a t 867, 102 
S.Ct., a t 2808 (p lurality  opinion) (citations 
om itted); see F irst N a tio n a l B a n k  v. Bel 
lo tti , 435 U.S. 765, 783. 98 S.Ct, 1407, 1419, 
55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978).* Ju s t a s  a school 
board may not p u rg e  its sta te -funded  li 
b ra ry  o f all books th a t  " 'offen[d] [its] so­
cial, political and m oral ta s te s ,’ "  457 U.S., 
a t  858-859, 102 S .C t, a t  2804 (plurality  
opinion) (citation om itted), school officials 
m ay not, ou t of like m otivation, discrim ina- 
torily excise objectionable ideas from  a s tu ­
den t publication. The S ta te ’s p re roga tive  
to  dissolve the s tu d e n t new spaper en tire ly  
(or to  lim it its sub jec t m atte r) no m ore 
en titles  it to d ic tate  which view points s tu ­
den ts  may exp ress on its pages, th an  the 
S ta te ’s p rerogative  to  close down the 
schoolhouse en titles it to  prohibit the non- 
d isruplive expression o f  an tiw ar Bentiment 
w ithin its gates.
Official censorship  of s tu d en t speech on 
the  g round  th a t it ad d resses  "potentially  
sensitive topics” is, for re la ted  reasons, 
equally  im perm issible. I w ould no t be­
g ru d g e  an educato r the  au th o rity  to  limit
2. The Court quotes language in Bethel School
Dist y. Fraser. 478 U.S. ----- , 106 S C t. 3159. 92
L.Ed 2d 549 (1986), for ihe proposition that 
’ 'lt)he determ ination  of what m anner of speech 
in the classroom  or in school assem bly is inap­
propriate  properly rests w ith the school b o a rd ' ”
Ante, ai 567 (quoting 478 U.S., at ------, 106
S.Ct., at 3165). As the discussion im m ediately 
p receding that quotation  m akes clear, however, 
the Court was referring  only to  the app rop ria te­
ness of the m anner  in which the message is 
conveyed, not of the m essage’s content See.
eg ., Fraser, 478 UB„ a t ------. 106 S.Ct , at 3165
(‘the 'fundam ental values necessary to  the 
m ain tenance of a dem ocratic political system ’ 
disfavor the use of term s of debate highly offen­
sive or highly th rea ten ing  to others"). In fact, 
the Fraser Court coupled its first m ention of 
"society's . . . interest in teaching students the
the  su b stan tiv e  scope of a  school-sponsored 
publication to  a  certain , objectively define 
ble topic, auch aa lite rary  criticism , Bchuul 
sp o rts , or an  overview  o f the  school year 
U nlike those d eterm inate  lim itations, ' po 
ten tia l topic sensitiv ity" is a vaporous non 
s ta n d a rd —like " 'public w elfare , p e a o  
sa fe ty , health , decency, good o rder, moral*, 
o r convenience,’ " S h u tlle su o r th  v. B>r 
m ingham , 394 U.S. 147, 150, 89 S.Ct. 93,7, 
938, 22 L .Ed,2d 162 (1969), o r "  general 
w elfare  of c itizens,’ " S ta u b  v. Baxley, 357 
U.S. 313, 322 , 78 S .C t 277 , 282, 2 L.Ed 2d 
302 (1958)—th a t  invites m anipulation to 
achieve ends th a t  cannot perm issibly be 
achieved th ro u g h  b la tan t view point dts 
crim ination and  chills s tu d e n t speech to 
w hich school officials m ight no t object In 
p a r t  because o f those d an g ers , th is Conn 
has consisten tly  condem ned any  schem e a I 
low ing a s ta te  official boundless discretion 
in licensing «i>eech from  a particu lar fo­
rum  See, e.g., Shu ttlesw orth  r. B irm tny  
ham , supra, 394 U.S., a t 150-151, and n 2, 
89 S .C t, a t 938-939, and n. 2, Co.r t 
L ouisiana , 379 U.S. 536, 557-558, 85 S.Ct 
453, 465-466, 13 L .Ed.2d 471 (1965); Staub  
v. Baxley, supra, 355 U.S., a t 322-324, 7c 
S .C t, a t  282-283.
T he case befo re  us aptly  illu stra tes how 
readily  school officials (and courts) can 
cam ouflage  view point discrim ination as the 
"m ere"  protection o f s tu d en ts  from  sensi 
tive topics. A m ong the g rounds th a t tht
boundaries of socially appropriate behaviour," 
w ith an  acknow ledgm ent o f "(tjhc undoubiid  
freedom  to advocate unpopular and contro 
v en ia l view* in school* and  rlau ro o m i."  id . ai
 , 106 S.Ct., at 3164 (em phasis added). Set
also id., a t ------, 106 SC t., at 3168 (BRENNAN
J,, concurring) (“[n)or does this case involve an 
attem pt by school officials to  ban  w ritten mmr 
rials they consider 'inappropriate ' for hiph 
school students" (citation om itted))
J . Petitioners them selves concede lhal ’(c Lm 
trol over access' ” to  Spectrum  is permissible 
only if '  'the distinction* draw n are view 
point neu tra l.’ " Brief for Petitioners 32 (quoi 
ing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & td u  
cmtional Fund, Me.. 473 U.S 788. 806. 105 S Cl 
3439. 3451, 17 L E d.2d 567 (1985))
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C ourt advances to  uphold th e  principal'*  
censorship  o f  one o f  the  article* wa* the  
potential sensitiv ity  o f " teen ag e  sexual ac­
tiv ity .'’ A n te ,  a t  570. Y et the D istric t 
Court specifically found that the  principal 
' did not. as a matter of principle, oppose 
discussion of said topi[c] in S p ec tru m ."  
607 F Supp., a t  1467. T h a t m uch is also  
clear from  the  sam e p rincipal's  approval o f 
the "sq u ea l law " artic le  on the sam e page, 
dealing  fo rth rig h tly  w ith " teen ag e  sex u a li­
ty ," " th e  use o f con tracep tives by teen ­
ag e rs ."  and " teen ag e  p reg n an cy ,'* App. 
4-5. If topic sensitiv ity  w ere  the  tru e  basis 
of the principal’s decision, the two article* 
should have been eq ua lly  objectionable. I t 
is much more likely th a t  th e  objectionable 
article w as objectionable be- -.use o f the 
view point it exp ressed : I t  m ight have been 
read (as the m ajority  apparen tly  does) to  
advocate "irresponsib le  sex ."  See ante, a t 
570
C
The sole concom itant o f school sponso r­
ship th a t m ight conceivably ju stify  the  dis­
tinction th a t  the C o u rt draw * betw een  
sponsored  and nonsponsored s tu d e n t ex­
pression is the  risk  " th a t  th e  views o f  the 
individual sp eak er [m igh t be] erroneously  
a ttr ib u te d  to  th e  school." A nte, a t  570. 
O f course, the  risk  o f  e rro n eo u s a ttrib u tio n  
inheres in any s tu d e n t expression, includ­
ing "persona l exp ression" th a t, like the 
T inkers ' a rm bands, "happens to  occur on 
the school p rem ises,"  a n f r ,  at 569. N ever­
the less, the  m ajority  is certa in ly  co rrec t 
th a t indicia o f school sponsorsh ip  increase 
the likelihood o f such  a ttrib u tio n , an d  th a t 
s ta te  ed u ca to rs  m ay th ere fo re  have a leg it­
im ate in te re s t in d issociating  them selves 
from s tu d e n t speech.
B ut “ ‘fe]ven th ough  th e  governm enta l 
purpose be leg itim ate  and su b stan tia l, th a t 
purpose cannot be p u rsu ed  by m eans th a t 
broadly stifle  fundam en ta l personal liber­
ties when the  end  can be m ore narrow ly  
achieved ' " K eyith ia n  v. Board o f  Re­
gents. 385 U.S., a t  602, 87 S C t., a t  C83 
(quoting Shelton  v. 7V c*rr, 364 U.S. 479,
579
468. 81 S .C t 247, 252, 5 L E d .2 d  231 (I960)). 
D issociative m eans sh o rt of censursh ip  are 
availab le to the  school. I t  could, fo r exam ­
ple, require th e  s tu d e n t activ ity  to  publish 
a disclaimer, such a t th e  "Statement of 
fo lic y "  th a t S p ec tru m  pub lished  each 
school y ea r announcing  th a t  "[a]ll . . ,  ed i­
to ria ls  ap p earin g  in th is n ew sp ap er re flec t 
th e  opinions o f  th e  S p ec tru m  s ta f f ,  which 
a re  no t necessarily  shared  by the  adm inis­
tra to rs  or facu lty  o f  H aie lw ood  E a s t."  
App. 26; o r it could sim ply issue its own 
response  clarify ing  the  official position on 
the  m a tte r  and explaining w hy the  s tu d e n t 
position is w rong. Yet. w ithou t so m uch as 
acknow ledging  the  less oppressive a l te rn a ­
tives, th e  C ourt approves o f b ru ta l cen so r­
ship.
Ill
Since the censo*ship served  no leg itim ate  
pedagogical purpose , it canno t by any 
s tre tc h  of the  im agination have been de­
signed  to p rev en t ” m ateria[l] d is ru p tio n  
of] c laasw ork ," Tinker, 393 U.S., a t 513, 89 
S C t ,  a t  740. N o r did the  censorsh ip  fall 
w ith in  the ca teg o ry  th a t T in ker  described 
as  necessary  to  p reven t s tu d e n t expression 
from  “ inva[ding] the  rig h ts  o f o th e rs ,"  
tbid. I f  th a t te rm  is to have any con ten t, it 
m ust be lim ited to rig h ts  th a t  a re  p ro tected  
by law. "A ny yardstick  less exac tin g  th an  
|th a t ]  could re su lt in school officials c u r ta il­
ing speech a t the  s lig h te s t fear o f d is tu r ­
bance ,"  795 F,2d, a t 1376, a p rospec t th a t 
would be com pletely a t  odds w ith th is 
C o u rt’s pronouncem ent th a t  the  "u n d iffe r 
en tia ted  fe a r  o r apprehension  o f  d is tu r ­
bance is not enough  [even in th e  public- 
school contex t] to overcom e the  rig h t to 
freedom  o f exp*ession.” Tinker, supra , 
393 U.S., a t  508, £9 S .C t, a t  737. And, as 
the  C ourt o f A ^ ie a ts  correctly  reasoned , 
w hatever jou rnalis tic  im propriety  these  ar 
t id e s  may have contained, they  could not 
conceivably be to rtious, m uch less crim inal 
See 795 F.2d, a t  1375-1376.
Finally, even ii the  m ajority  w ere co rrect 
th a t  the principal could constitu tionally  
have censored the  objectionable m aterial, I
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w ould em phatically  object to  the  b ru ta l 
m anner in which he did bo. W here "(t]he 
»eparation  of leg itim ate  from  illegitim ate 
speech calls for m ore sensitive tools" 
S peiser  r. R andall. 357 U.S. 513, 525, 78 
S Ct 1332, 1342, 2 L Ed.2d 1460 (1958); see 
K eyish ian  t'. B oard o f  Regents, supra, 385 
U.S., a t 602, 87 S.Ct., a t 683, the principal 
used a  paper sh redder. He objected to 
som e m ateria l in tw o artic les, bu t excised 
six en tire  articles. He did no t so much as 
inquire into obvious a lte rn a tiv es , such as 
precise deletions o r additions (one o f which 
had already  been made), rea rran g in g  the 
layout, or delaying publication. Such u n th ­
inking contem pt fo r individual r ig h ts  is in­
to lerab le  from  any s ta te  official I t is p ar 
ticu larly  insidious from  one to whom the 
public e n tru s ts  the  task  of inculcating in its 
y ou th  an  appreciation  fo r the  cherished 
dem ocratic  liberties th a t o u r C onstitution 
g u a ran tee s .
1185. The young m en and women of Ha- 
aelwood E a s t expected a civics lesson, but 
no t the  one the C ourt teaches them  today.
I d issent.
IV
The Court opens its analysis in this case 
by pu rpo rtin g  to reaffirm  Tinker's, time- 
te s ted  proposition th a t public school s tu ­
den ts  " 'do not shed th e ir constitu tional 
r ig h ts  to  freedom  o f speech o r expression 
a t  the schoolhouse g a te  ' "  A nte, a t 567 
(quoting  Tinker, supra . 393 U.S., a t 506, 89
S.Ct , a t 736) T hat is an ironic introduc 
tion to an opinion th a t denudes high school 
s tu d e n ts  of m uch o f the F irs t A m endm ent 
p ro tection  th a t T in ker  itse lf  prescribed 
In s tead  of " teach[ing] children to  respect 
the  d iversity  o f ideas th a t is fundam ental 
to  the  Am erican sy stem ,"  B oard  o f  E d u ­
cation v. Pico, 457 U.S., a t  880, 102 S .C t , 
a t  2814 (BLACKM UN, J., concurring  in 
p a r t  and concurring  in judgm ent), and 
" th a t  o u r C onstitu tion is a living reality , 
no t parchm ent p reserved  under g lass ,"  
S h a n ley  n. N ortheast Independen t School 
Dist. B exar Cty, Tex., 462 F.2d 960, 972 
(CA5 1972). the C ourt today "teaeh[es] 
youth to  discount im portan t principles of 
ou r governm ent as m ere p la titu d es."  West 
V irg in ia  S ta te  B oard o f  E duca tion  v. 
B arnette , 319 U.S., a t 637 , 63 S.Ct., a t
VITA
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